A Change of Tides: EU Security and Defence Partnerships. Australia as a case study

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Michele Sacco

Content Writer at The New Global Order

Michele is a law graduate from Bocconi University, Milan, and is currently pursuing an LL.M. in European Law and Policies at Luiss University, Rome. His interests lie at the intersection of European integration, geopolitics, and international relations. After participating in the Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, he interned at the Italian Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand, and is undertaking a Master in Diplomacy at ISPI, Milan.

Latest posts by Michele Sacco (see all)

• A Change of Tides: EU Security and Defence Partnerships. Australia as a case study - 15 June, 2026
• The Devil is in the Detail: How the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument’s Legal Features Could Lead to a Political Fiasco - 11 March, 2026

In March 2026, the European Union (EU) and Australia signed a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP). The preface to the agreement and the EU’s declarations stress the shared commitment of two “reliable, predictable and values-based partners” to “democracy, human rights, gender equality, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”.

However, the SDP’s significance goes well beyond the shared need of two like-minded partners “to uphold and strengthen the international rules-based order”. On the contrary, the conclusion of the partnership marks a significant milestone in the pursuit of both parties’ political agenda.

To demonstrate this, the first part will shed light on the SDP’s benefits for the EU, outlining what Canberra brings to the table and how the partnership fits into the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy (the Strategy). The article will then try to adopt the Australian point of view, assessing the extent to which the EU has become a desirable security partner and the role it could play in the country’s security architecture. Lastly, the article will move back to the European perspective, analysing how the recent trend of SDPs contributes to the broader picture of European security.

The European Perspective

The EU is increasingly deepening its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs) and broader economic partnerships have been signed with key regional players, such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, and New Zealand. Moreover, negotiations have recently been concluded with India, Indonesia, and Australia.

In 2024, EU trade with the Indo-Pacific region amounted to €848 billion, making up 18.5% of all EU imports and 15.4% of all exports. The protectionist turn of the second Trump administration, which took office in 2025, made the region even more attractive, as its immense market could compensate for the sinking transatlantic trade opportunities. In geoeconomic terms, this macro-region now represents approximately two-thirds of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), and it is estimated that it will soon host two-thirds of the world’s middle class.

The economic relevance of the Indo-Pacific is not purely “quantitative” but also “qualitative”, as the region plays a pivotal role in global value chains. Consequently, the Strategy recognised the need to strengthen and diversify trade relations in the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, paragraph 4.1 of the Strategy called for implementing existing trade agreements, finalising ongoing trade negotiations, and developing cooperation in strategic sectors, including addressing strategic dependencies in supply chains.

As far as Australia is concerned, the country plays a key role in the production of critical minerals. As of 2024, not only is Canberra the world’s largest producer of lithium, contributing around 49% of global production, but it is also ranked among the top five producers for cobalt (2%), manganese ore (9%), rare earths (8%), rutile (35%), tantalum (6%), and zircon (24%). These materials are essential for “EV motors and turbines, battery electric storage solutions, aerospace systems, medical devices, semiconductors lithography, and advanced electronics”.

Thus, critical minerals are not only necessary to produce high-tech defence systems, but also to support the green transition. Notably, the latter has become a strategic imperative amidst the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the repeated stress on vital chokepoints, such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Against this backdrop, the EU and Australia signed the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Critical and Strategic Minerals (the “MoU”). The MoU had the objective of developing “Australia’s domestic critical minerals sector” and enabling “the EU to diversify its suppliers for materials necessary to achieve the green and digital transition and its open strategic autonomy”.

The EU-Australia SDP demonstrates that, in an age of economic weaponisation, trade and security constitute two sides of the same coin. Two remarks will be sufficient to prove this point. First, the signing of the SDP went hand in hand with the conclusion of FTA negotiations, with the two events being separated by less than a week (18 March and 24 March, respectively). Secondly, the SDP specifically addresses economic security. More specifically, paragraph 58 provides that, in light of the 2024 MoU, the EU and Australia will continue to build secure and sustainable critical and strategic minerals value chains that support key industrial sectors, including defense.

The Australian Perspective

The reasons behind the Australian desire to deepen its security ties with the EU can be traced in the 2024 National Defence Strategy. Points 3.12 and 3.13 confirm that as Canberra’s interests remain global, events outside the Indo-Pacific can directly affect Australia’s interests, including through supply chain disruption and disinformation. The conflict in Ukraine is presented as evidence of how events in Europe can have implications for the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, the defence of Australia’s interests lies in protecting its economic ties to the world and maintaining the global rules-based order.

Yet, the conclusion of the SDP has faced some criticism. For instance, The Australian’s foreign editor Greg Sheridan adopted a sceptical approach, claiming that the partnership “won’t amount to anything”. While it is important not to overestimate the current military capabilities of both parties, similar observations tend to misinterpret the SDP’s nature. The goal is not to set up a hard defence alliance through mutual defence clauses, nor to support a full-scale rearmament plan. Rather, borrowing the words of Prime Minister Albanese, the SDP will “provide a framework” for current and future cooperation, including in areas such as defence industry, cyber and counter-terrorism.

The SDP’s domains of cooperation will be reviewed regularly in the framework of the annual EU-Australia Security and Defence Dialogue, which will take stock of progress made and provide impetus. On the European side, said Dialogue has been elevated to the level of the External Action Service Managing Director for Peace, Security and Defence. On the Australian side, the Dialogue will now take place at the First Assistant Secretary level of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and of the Department of Defence.

In this context, the most tangible benefit for Australia is of an economic nature. Australian companies will now be eligible to participate in defence procurement with EU Member States, supported by financial assistance from the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. However, some analysts have underlined a more critical strategic shift underpinning the SDP. While agreements of this kind risk falling short in delivery, the partnership does provide a comprehensive platform for defence and security cooperation that can translate converging interests into action, whether through joint initiatives, capability development or coordinated policy responses.

Therefore, the burden of translating the agreement into practice does not lie on the SDP itself, but on subsequent political will. For Australia, this requires placing greater weight on the European theatre, while the EU needs to increase its political and operational presence in the Indo-Pacific. Notably, the SDP cannot be considered an alternative to AUKUS, the trilateral partnership with the United Kingdom and the United States that will provide Canberra with conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines. On the contrary, the SDP complements Australia’s defence architecture with broader security cooperation and diplomatic alignment, underscoring Brussels’ shift from a purely economic partner to an increasingly relevant security provider, as well as Washington’s reduced commitment to the rules-based international order.

The Recent Trend of EU Security and Defence Partnerships

As previously mentioned, the one with Australia is not the only SDP signed by the EU. Over the last two years, Brussels has concluded 12 SDPs, namely with Moldova, Norway, Japan, South Korea, North Macedonia, Albania, the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Iceland, Australia and Ghana.

The conclusion of SDPs, alongside the aforementioned SAFE programme, constitutes an integral part of the 2022 Strategic Compass (the Compass). Adopted shortly after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Compass aims at making the EU a stronger and more capable security provider. In the context of war returning to Europe and of major geopolitical shifts, the Compass supports the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to safeguard its values and interests. Thus, the Compass rests upon four main pillars: partnerships, security, investments, and action.

Now, SDPs can be understood as horizontal tools that serve different purposes across these four pillars. First and foremost, by promoting the EU as a security provider, the SDPs have developed tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries such as Canada and Japan. These partnerships can also be used to increase alignment with neighbouring and candidate countries, such as Moldova and Albania. Finally, as the agreement with Ghana demonstrates, SDPs can foster cooperation in regions crucial to European security, such as West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.

By strengthening the European readiness to respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, SDPs naturally pursue security as well. Artificial intelligence governance, cybersecurity, and foreign information manipulation constitute recurrent domains of cooperation with the twelve partners. Furthermore, the Australian example demonstrates how SDPs can benefit the investment pillar as well. Indeed, by securing supply chain resilience and by promoting industrial synergies, SDPs can play a decisive role in expanding and developing the European defence technological and industrial base.

Moving to the more operational pillar, namely the action one, maritime security leaves the EU with broad room for direct engagement. As the Indo-Pacific is named after two oceans, maritime security is consubstantial with the region’s interests. Notably, both the SDPs with India and Australia stress not only the security of what travels above water, but also of what lies beneath. Accordingly, the protection of freedom of navigation is paired with that of critical submarine infrastructure, such as submarine cables.

However, it is also important to appreciate the specificities of each SDP. For instance, the one with India emphasises counter-piracy, enhancing the Indian Navy’s cooperation with two European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) operations, namely Atalanta and Aspides. While the former has been operational since 2009 to deter piracy and armed robbery at sea, the latter was launched in 2024 as a response to the Houthis’ threat in the Red Sea. Although with different missions and geopolitical significance, the two operations represent the cornerstones of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP) and the EU’s Naval Diplomacy for the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, their inclusion in the SDP with India underscores the external projection of European CFSP and the desirability of the EU as a security partner.

Conclusions

The EU-Australia SDP does not constitute an isolated diplomatic achievement. On the contrary, it represents a crucial step towards strategic recalibration for both parties. For the EU, the agreement reflects the new awareness that economy and security are deeply intertwined, especially in a region at the heart of global value chains. For Australia, the partnership reveals a willingness to diversify security ties, pairing traditional alliances with flexible partnerships, and to acknowledge that European stability and global economic governance are integral parts of the national interest.

More broadly, the steep increase in SDPs illustrates a transition of the EU from a purely economic and regulatory power to a more assertive actor. While security has long been on Brussels’ agenda, its promotion to a top priority reflects a radical change in the EU’s international posture. This constitutes the natural response to recent external events, but a revolution of this magnitude cannot be achieved alone nor overnight. As the EU explores unfamiliar waters, SDPs offer flexible arrangements and broad cooperation.

In conclusion, the effectiveness of SDPs ultimately depends on political will and future implementation. If followed up by sustained commitment, SDPs could become a defining feature of EU external action, complementing trade agreements or accession negotiations. From this perspective, the EU-Australia SDP cannot be regarded as an endpoint but rather as a paradigm of the EU’s attempts to navigate the current geopolitical landscape, in which war has returned to Europe and transatlantic solidarity appears increasingly uncertain.

Additional Readings:

• S. Donovan, “EU and Australia sign defence and security pact“, ABC Australia, 24 March 2026;
• G. Abbondanza, G. Grgić, “Europe’s Indo-Pacific Pivot. Navigating New Horizons“, Palgrave Macmillan, 2025;
• B. Girardi, P. van Hooft, G. Cisco, “What the Indo-Pacific means to Europe. Trade Value, Chokepoints, and Security Risks“, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2023.