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NATO leaders gathered in Ankara on July 7th and 8th, for a summit which carried high expectations. As part of the main outcomes, the members of the alliance reaffirmed their will for collective defence, pledged 70 billion Euros in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine in 2026 and put defence production, innovation and procurement at the centre of alliance development. More than that, the summit gave Türkiye a stage it had long sought for.
For Ankara, the summit was about more than hosting. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used it to press allies on restrictions against his defence industry and on the place of non-EU NATO members in European security initiatives. That demand touches a larger question now facing Europe. The continent wants to spend more, produce more and rely less on the United States. Yet one of the actors most relevant to that ambition sits inside NATO, outside the EU, and only partly inside Europe’s emerging defence industry system.
Türkiye controls access to the Black Sea, maintains working channels with both Kyiv and Moscow, has built a growing drone and defence base and has influence across several theatres that matter for European security. At the same time, its relations with Europe remain strained by democratic backsliding, disputes with Greece and Cyprus, Syria, the S-400 dispute and a foreign policy that often aims to manoeuvre between rival powers.
The summit in Ankara did not settle Türkiye’s place in Europe’s security architecture, but it showed why the trying to settle it has become harder to postpone. As NATO becomes more dependent on European capabilities (or Europe more dependent on its own), Türkiye’s position is gaining importance.
NATO on the Edge of Europe
Türkiye’s position in European security is unusual because it is both central and peripheral. It has been a NATO member since 1952, hosts one of the alliance’s largest armed forces and sits between the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Its geography gives it influence over several security theatres at once, while its politics make that influence difficult for many European governments to absorb.
The institutional picture is just as complicated. NATO and the EU describe each other as essential partners, with 23 countries belonging to both organisations. Their cooperation covers, among others, capability development, hybrid threats and support for Ukraine. Yet this overlap leaves a gap for non-EU NATO members.
The reason is clear. European defence is becoming more EU-shaped as NATO is asking Europe to carry more of the burden. Procurement, industrial policy, funding and market access increasingly run through EU mechanisms. Türkiye remains outside those structures, even as its military weight, defence industry and regional position make it relevant to the capabilities Europe needs.
This produces a relationship built on necessity and suspicion. A recent study describes Türkiye as strategically significant but politically contentious, arguing that the EU needs a pragmatic, interest-driven approach to Ankara while keeping defence cooperation separate from the frozen accession process. Europe can have little appetite for reopening the membership debate and still need an answer to Türkiye’s place in its security architecture.
The Ankara summit brought this tension into view. Türkiye sought for a role in the machinery of European security. The more Europe turns defence into an industrial project, the more salient that question becomes.
Türkiye’s strategic weight
Türkiye’s importance starts with geography. The country controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which makes Ankara central to any European strategy towards Russia and Ukraine. The Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, gives Türkiye authority over naval passage through these straits and sets stricter rules for warships during war. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Türkiye has used the Montreux Convention to close the straits to warships of belligerent powers. That constrained Russia’s ability to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, while also limiting NATO’s naval presence in the same theatre.
This balancing act defines Turkish policy. Ankara has supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied drones and defence equipment, and helped Kyiv strengthen its maritime capabilities. It has also kept economic and diplomatic channels open with Moscow. Recent academic work describes this as strategic ambiguity, a policy of selective alignment that preserves leverage with both Russia and the West. For Europe, this makes Türkiye useful and difficult at once.
Türkiye’s military-industrial role adds another layer. Turkish firms such as Baykar, TUSAŞ, Roketsan and Aselsan have become important in drones, aerospace, missiles and electronic systems. Defence exports reached 6.3 billion Dollar in 2024, while the Bayraktar TB2 became one of Ankara’s best-known strategic assets. Türkiye now offers Europe production capacity, systems tested on the battlefield and technologies for which demand is rising.
Yet Turkish autonomy has limits. Its defence industry has matured into a significant competitor, while still falling short of giving Ankara the strategic autonomy it seeks. Dependence remains in engines, air defence, fighter aircraft, submarines and other high-end subsystems. This makes Europe important for Türkiye as well. Ankara wants recognition as a defence actor, but it also wants access to markets, technology and co-production frameworks.
Sources of Mistrust
Türkiye’s importance and goals however come with political friction. For many European governments, closer security cooperation sits beside concerns over democratic backsliding, rule of law and Ankara’s disputes with neighbouring countries. These concerns shape how far EU institutions and member states are willing to move, even when strategic interests point toward cooperation.
A dispute of the S-400 air defence system captures the trust problem. Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian system became a symbol of sovereignty at home, but it damaged relations with the U.S., led to sanctions and removed Türkiye from the F-35 fighter jet program.
Syria adds strain as well. A study of the US-Türkiye standoff shows how two NATO allies came close to military confrontation over diverging threat perceptions and Washington’s cooperation with Kurdish groups that Ankara viewed as a threat. Formal alliance membership can contain such disputes, yet strategic mistrust may remain.
Russia policy raises similar unease. Türkiye has supported Ukraine and mediated between Kyiv and Moscow, while preserving trade, energy links and diplomatic access to Russia. While this makes Ankara valuable in moments of crisis, it also makes many European governments wary of building too much security dependence around it.
From Spending to Production
The Ankara summit turned NATO’s new spending mood into a production agenda. Allies reaffirmed Article 5, pointed to Russia and terrorism as long-term threats and announced more than 50 billion Dollars in new procurements. They also committed to expanding manufacturing capacity, accelerating innovation and removing defence-trade barriers among allies.
Ukraine remained central. NATO pledged new military equipment, assistance and training, with the aim of sustaining at least equivalent levels in 2027. That pledge matters for Türkiye because the war has made the Black Sea, ammunition supply, drones, air defence and maritime security part of the same European security debate.
The summit also showed how broad NATO’s capability agenda has become. The new industry strategy aims to deepen cooperation with defence firms, simplify access to NATO structures, open space for smaller suppliers and improve long-term demand signals. The Innovation Scale-Up Package adds another layer, focusing on rapid adoption, private capital and scalable technologies.
Several announcements specified this shift. Allies launched new space initiatives, including plans linked to satellite connectivity and missile tracking. Denmark, Finland, Germany and Norway announced the purchase of up to five Triton surveillance aircraft. NATO also moved ahead with a protected digital network for classified operations.
This creates opportunity and pressure for Türkiye. The summits stance on industry, innovation and barrier removal fits Ankara’s own goals. Yet the outcome left the question of fuller access to the European security machinery open.
The EU Defence Gap
NATO sets targets, standards and warfighting requirements. The EU increasingly controls money, market rules and industrial incentives. Europe’s rearmament is becoming a procurement system as much as a military effort.
SAFE is the clearest example. The instrument offers up to 150 billion Euros in loans for defence investment, with a focus on common procurement and Europe’s defence industrial base. It also opens routes for Ukraine, EEA-EFTA states, candidate countries and partners with security and defence agreements, while keeping strict rules on eligible suppliers and component origins.
For Ankara, this is decisive. Türkiye wants to be treated as a defence-industrial partner, not only as a NATO flank state. SAFE could give Türkiye access to technology, markets and joint production, while also linking participation to political trust and respect for EU member states’ sovereignty.
Türkiye has long sat at the edge of European defence-industrial collaboration, even as its own industry became more capable. Ankara now sees a chance to move closer. Europe sees a partner with useful capacity and real political costs. That is the gap the Ankara summit made clear.
The Türkiye question is sharpened by a wider shift inside the alliance. Washington under President Trump wants European allies to carry more of the conventional defence burden, while Europe is trying to turn higher spending into real capability. A Europe that takes more responsibility for its own defence however needs forces, factories, supply chains and access to contested regions. Türkiye brings all four.
Yet a more European NATO also increases the EU’s role. If Europe’s defence effort depends on EU funding, procurement and industrial rules, Ankara’s NATO membership alone gives it only partial access. That is why Türkiye’s demand at the summit was so direct. It wants the logic of alliance burden-sharing to apply to defence-industrial cooperation as well.
What the Summit produced
The summit points to three conclusions. First, Türkiye is a necessary ally for a Europe that wants greater responsibility for its own security. Its role in Black Sea access, Ukraine support, regional diplomacy and defence production gives Ankara practical leverage.
Second, Türkiye remains a difficult partner. The S-400 dispute, Syria, Russia ties and domestic political trajectory all make deeper integration sensitive for European governments. Strategic value sits beside political distrust.
Third, Türkiye has become a test case for Europe’s defence architecture. NATO wants more production, faster innovation and fewer barriers among allies. The EU channels much of the funding and market access through its own instruments. Ankara sits between those systems.
Those results turned the Ankara summit useful. It did not offer a grand bargain, but it clarified the crossroads. Europe can treat Türkiye either as a difficult external partner, or it can design a security architecture that makes room for strategically important NATO allies beyond the EU.
Conclusion
The Ankara summit left Türkiye’s place in European security more visible than settled. It showed an alliance moving from declarations of burden-sharing to the harder work of production, procurement, innovation and long-term support for Ukraine. In that world, Türkiye is more than a flank state. It is a military actor, a Black Sea gatekeeper, a defence producer and a regional broker with access to theatres that Europe increasingly has to understand.
That does not make integration easy. Türkiye’s political trajectory, its disputes with EU members and its balancing between Russia and the West all limit trust. Yet these frictions do not remove the strategic question. If Europe builds its security future through EU-centred funding and NATO-centred defence planning, it will have to decide how far strategically important non-EU allies can participate.
For now, Ankara sits between these two systems. It is inside NATO’s collective defence framework, but only partly inside Europe’s defence-industrial architecture. The summit made that tension even more visible. Europe’s security debate is moving from the question of how much to spend to the question of who belongs inside the machinery that spending creates. Türkiye will be among the most consequential tests of whether Europe can deliver on that answer.
Further Questions:
- Where would you locate Türkiye´s future position in a world of changing spheres of influence?
- What are the lessons to be drawn from a defered admission process?
- What other criticial points of common interest could foster EU, NATO and Türkiye?
For further reading:
Dursun-Özkanca, O. (2019). Turkey–West Relations: The Politics of Intra-Alliance Opposition. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998960
Eraslan, Isa (2013). Turkey–NATO Relations after the Cold War: Ascending Importance of Turkey within the Changing Mission of NATO after 9/11. Saarbrücken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. ISBN 978-3-659-36019-0
Larrabee, F. S., & Lesser, I. O. (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. RAND Corporation.Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty | RAND
Oğuzlu, T. (2025). Turkey. In J. Sperling & M. Webber (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of NATO (pp. 736–750). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198851196.013.46
Sperling, J., & Webber, M. (Eds.). (2025). The Oxford Handbook of NATO. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198851196.001.0001
