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- Bitcoin: Crypto-Anarchist Dreams or Invisible Governance? - 8 September, 2026
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Introduction
Bitcoin has aimed to eradicate centralised control through an open-source software model enacting monetary policy. Cryptocurrency blockchain technologies, such as Bitcoin, have been valued in their transformative potential to revolutionise the traditional currency system by creating a fairer economy; or to realise the crypto-anarchist dream of addressing the corrupted hierarchy of centralised finance. This advocates a techno-decentralist ideology to create a decentralised ‘non-hierarchical’ and ‘egalitarian’ digital currency system. Currently, the implementation of the Bitcoin protocol and control of blockchains are widely perceived to have a total reliance on code that is formulated from an egalitarian open-source model. These implicit assumptions of Bitcoin technology conceal where power is held, including the hierarchical development process and invisible governance Bitcoin relies on. This essay will demonstrate the presence of hierarchies in Bitcoin through examining its software architects and senatorial governance.
Software Architects
Bitcoin’s software is perceived as an “egalitarian network of developers free of hierarchical organisation and centralisation of control” (Ducheneaut, 2005, p. 324). As the monetary policy of Bitcoin is embedded in the structure of blockchain (Parkin, 2020, p. 465), it follows ‘code is law’ (Lessig, 1999); if ‘code is law’, then central to discussions of power, control, and generalisations are the lawmakers and the process in which code becomes law. An elitism of Bitcoin’s code developers is evident in the systematic exclusion of women (DuPont, 2019, p. 13–14), source code maintenance in mainly English (Parkin, 2020, p. 99), and predominance of privileged males (Hütten and Thiemann, 2018, p. 34), in Bitcoin design and cryptocurrency discourse (Parkin, 2020, p. 99). Furthermore, Bitcoin developers are largely based in the Global North (Takhteyev and Hills, 2010, p. 1), with the repository (central database) contributors being primarily wealthy males (Parkin, 2020, p. 97). This examination of architect identity and origin critically illuminates the politics surrounding Bitcoin’s emancipatory dream and its potential beneficiaries.
The Bitcoin project is a twofold structure: on one hand, there is a decentralised infrastructural layer of peer-to-peer networks representing an open-source model, and on the other, there are the architects: a small group of developers entrusted with the architectural development and control over the direction of the project. Only Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonym used for the creator(s) of bitcoin and first lead developer(s), could initially place code in the Bitcoin repository. In 2011, the creator went offline, leaving no verifiable personal records and continues to remain anonymous to this day. This power was later extended to a small group of ‘core developers’ confined to Nakamoto’s original concept (Filippi and Loveluck, 2016, p. 18). The position of lead developer, which entails paramount control over code changes and other developers’ administrative capabilities, has been passed down from Gavin Andresen to Wladimir van der Laan (Parkin, 2020, p. 96). The evident “technocratic power structure” is further exemplified by the politics of the Block Size Debate (increasing transaction processing speed vs. preserving network decentralisation); ex-core developer Mike Hearn describes the resolution failure as a result of the closed centralised governance in which “only 5 people … can make changes to the Bitcoin Core source code” (2015). The small group of developers’ undemocratic control over the Bitcoin project reveals elements of centralisation.
Bust of Nakamoto 2026. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Senatorial Governance
Bitcoin network’s technical functions, which constitute its monetary policy, are mutable and dynamic. For an update in its monetary policy, a version fork must be initiated through an assemblage of decisions conceived by Parkin as akin to a senate (2020, p. 109), in which actors of unequal power status (see Figure 5.2) attempt to enact change. The decision-making process passes through a hierarchical channel (see Figure 5.3) where programmers propose, miners vote in, and companies/node operators lobby for change (Parkin, 2020, p. 109). Core and lead developers are positioned at the top of the hierarchy by virtue of technical knowledge, undemocratically granted the right to decide the specific features that could be implemented on the platform (Filippi and Loveluck, 2016, p. 24). Additionally, version forking of the software (updates on monetary policy available for download) opens issues of architectural conflict that Bitcoin has historically resolved via centralised control (Parkin, 2020, p. 105). Bitcoin enables users to escape the political hierarchy of state and market institutions, but ultimately it remains “subject to the invisible politics of a handful of individuals” (Filippi and Loveluck, 2016, p. 22), producing unequal power relations in the governance of its technology and future project direction.
While the “authoritative channels” of decision-making could be further democratised, complete eradication of Bitcoin’s elements of centralised control is viewed as not possible (Mik, 2018, p. 17; Parkin, 2020, p. 112; Atzori, 2015, p. 20). The techno-decentralist aim to create a governance by exclusive technological infrastructure would be predisposed to issues as it cannot account for the comprehensive complexity of social interactions (Filipi and Loveluck, 2016, p. 26). Elements of centralisation would ultimately be required for major decision-making as well as to regulate or protect the technology from unexpected uses and address peer-to-peer network issues: Conflict resolution, protection of community borders, participation incentives, and contribution status (Filipi and Loveluck, 2016, p. 13). The cyber-spatial imagination of anarcho-capitalism holds inherent contradictions, as the human production, architecture, and maintenance of software create power hierarchies and would ultimately require a degree of centralized control to enact decisions and for organisational purposes.
Distributed Maintainer Model
The role of the lead developer most overtly demonstrated Bitcoin’s senatorial governance throughout its history. Bitcoin’s longest-serving lead developer, Wladimir van der Laan officially stepped down in 2023; “One thing is clear: This is a serious project now, and we need to start taking decentralisation seriously,” van der Laan, wrote in his resignation announcement, emphasising that Bitcoin’s digital currency project was not intended to have any leaders in his resignation (Hertig, 2021). The dissolution of his status as a single point of failure eliminated the centralised bottleneck of decision-making through a singular individual within Bitcoin to a multi-maintainer model.
Today, the role of lead developer is split between a peer group of independent maintainers who use multi-signature cryptographic keys to sign software updates (Mulcahy, 2024). This new structure is called the distributed maintainer model, which differs from singular senatorial governance as there is no longer a single developer managing the entire codebase. However, the cryptographic key holders are limited to a small circle (between five and six individuals), who go through a rigorous elite vetting process which aggregates into an insular group of veterans (2024). Anyone can contribute code within Bitcoin, but the group of these maintainers hold the explicit power to review code, implement software releases and merge safe code (ibid.). The operational structure demonstrates that despite the relinquishment of the lead developer position for Bitcoin and the shift to a distributed maintainer model, Bitcoin continues to operate under senatorial governance. In other words, a bureaucratic group continues to drive code updates by “legislating” through code implementation and merging changes that alter monetary rules.
Conclusion
Bitcoin maintains hierarchies of control when it comes to architectural changes, as exemplified in software architectural governance and the Block Size Debate. Rather than a radical decentralist realisation, such as crypto-anarchism, Bitcoin has perpetuated an uneven technocratic power structure, with core developers controlling the architecture of the software and, therefore, monetary policy. Furthermore, to maintain the legitimacy and accountability of Bitcoin, a form of peer-to-peer online network governance is required; there is a limit to algorithmic decentralisation as software requires an element of coordinated human control to create/maintain it. The implicit assumptions of Bitcoin having achieved the crypto-anarchist dream of eradicating centralised control ultimately beg the unanswered question of whether capitalism, inherently hierarchical and authoritarian, can be dismantled and effectively decentralised in a future cyberspace.
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