How are Europeans reacting to Mark Carney’s call for middle powers to build new alliances?
What happened?
Carney’s Davos speech called for the world’s middle powers to organise, shoring up against a crumbling rules-based international order. Carney identified a ‘rupture’ caused by the U.S. abandonment and the excesses of other major powers, such as territorial and trade wars, and he called on middle powers to unite in order to provide alternatives and mitigate these issues. While not strictly a ‘doctrine,’ the speech marked a watershed moment in both that a Western state voiced it and in the reactions it invoked.
Middle powers? Rupture?
Widely defined in the speech, middle states are mostly those that have benefitted from a peaceful international order, formerly underwritten by the U.S. That can encompass any state that isn’t a greater power that can more easily navigate the more anarchic world or those that actively have will and unilateral means to shape it. For the sake of this piece, it’s European countries with their various alliances and unions.
The rupture refers to the end of the post-Cold War era, during which primarily Western, but also some non-Western states, benefited from an order that reliably supported relations between countries. These alliances facilitated conditions that ensured stable trade and economic growth, with the EU serving as a prime example.
The more bellicose policies of the second Trump administration particularly, have, per Carney and Finnish President Stubb, shattered any illusion in Europe and the West that this will likely endure or return.
TLDR: Canada and, in our context here, Europe, can’t therefore, be dependent on the U.S. for protection over security and trade.
Carney’s approach?
Domestically, Trump’s musings on annexation have stoked both cultural and economic efforts to emphasise Canadian sovereignty and reduce economic dependency on trade with the U.S. Where previously Canadian political and business leaders had seen U.S. ties as an advantage, these are now increasingly viewed as a risk, with increased advocacy in favour of ‘hedging’ against it. Recent tariff reductions on Chinese e-vehicle imports, nuclear energy deals with India, an updated trade deal with Australia, and lobbying Europe to create a new defence bank are examples of such.
Carney’s initiatives are also invoking a supportive domestic response at home. Defections from opposition MPs, favourable opinion polling, more cordial relations with provincial administrations, and a recent poll favouring closer ties with Europe reflect this ‘mood.’
How has Europe reacted to the call-to-action?
It varies.
In accepting the rupture and opposing the U.S.’ policies, Spain stands out. Recently critiquing the Iran war and refusing to agree to NATO 5% GDP spending target, PM Sanchez has pulled a harder line in response to the Trump administration than most Europeans. Where Sanchez uniquely differs in his analysis of the issue and required fix is. Rather than accepting an explicit rupture, he argues that Europeans should revive the international system via more engagement with the global south. In advocating for a larger and more equitable distribution of influence, Spain’s leader makes the case that middle powers should in effect, replace the American underpinning of institutions as opposed to forming new ones.
Finland’s Stubb takes on a more cautious and qualified stance while agreeing with Sanchez’s core suggested fix. While agreeing that the Global South holds the key to deciding what order emerges, Stubb emphasises that some Europeans might be better positioned to front this, noting others’ colonial pasts. Further Stubb pulls a more cautious line, emphasising that transatlantic institutional relations, as credited for ‘Greenland deescalations,’ remain vital despite the Trump administration’s adverse stances toward Europe.
For Britain, hedging by bridging between the Trump administration and seeking a form of rapprochement with the EU was, the norm. It recently finds itself cautiously heeding Carney’s rallying call, however Starmer is unlikely to deliver a ‘Love Actually’ moment. The upcoming state visit by the U.K monarch to Washington and the longstanding security ties, among other things, initially led to Britain seeking to hedge between Europe and the U.S. Directed critique by Trump on the Iran war and longer MAGA hostility may have persuaded Starmer to change his tune. Going beyond mere musings, Britain is proactively seeking a closer relationship with the EU on trade and defence. Further, it forms core components of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Ukrainian peacekeeping coalition. However its cuts to formerly significant foreign aid funds and laggard defence spending increases could in the short term impede its newfound approach.
Germany has undergone a sea change in position regarding more autonomy for Europe on defence and trade. The Ukrainian war brought about a change in the consensus view to increase defence spending. The Trump administration’s stance toward Europe has spurred Chancellor Merz to speculate whether the U.S. is a reliable defence and trading partner, notable for a traditionally Atlanticist state. This shift is also reflected across the domestic political spectrum, with the AFD (having courted MAGA support) calling for U.S. forces to leave Germany, indicating a possible longer term shift across the political spectrum. Germany is indicating the desire to shore up European economic and security capabilities, such as closer relations with Britain regardless of Brexit. However, its input is qualified in some instances, as its lack of willingness to send troops for a potential Ukrainian peacekeeping force is concerned.
France’s president may feel somewhat vindicated, having been a longstanding advocate for more European autonomy, following in French tradition. Maintaining an independent nuclear and defence posture since De Gaulle, French administrations traditionally are skceptical of American presence in European affairs. In having called for more autonomy on defence in 2019, Macron has long recognised Carney’s recent stated diagnosis; you can’t rely on the Americans forever. Where that vision remains, actions haven’t necessarily aligned. Lagging on defence spending commitments, reluctance toward British access to SAFE, and foot dragging on the EU-Mercosur FTA demonstrate a slight mismatch in wanting to realise more potential autonomy in the short term.
Others, such as Italy and Poland, while guided by ‘Eurosceptic’ and historic alignment with Trump’s politics, have come to support elements for middle power (non-U.S. dependent) cooperation. These factors complicate European-centric cooperation and efforts to distance from U.S. predominance, as seen in Meloni initially veering away to explicitly critique Trump and Nawrocki’s veto of allocated Polish SAFE funds, which angered its pro-EU government. Yet neither are aligned with Trump on Iran, support Ukraine, or participate in the Coalition of the Willing. Tusk has also recently questioned Europeans’ ability to rely on the Americans’ continued cooperation on defence, hinting at a potentially accepted direction of travel away from U.S. dependence despite domestic political conditions or obstacles.
Where the EU’s commission is concerned, it proactively embraces the call to action. Policy pursuits such as new FTAs with Australia, India, and Mercosur recently indicate a willingness to court global middle power alliances in economic terms. Other schemes such as SAFE (including non-EU members such as Canada and maybe Britain) and its organising role in Ukrainian war aid show its institutions aim to spur more autonomy regarding defence. However, internal constrictions halt the capacity to enact many policies that are currently plans, such as France’s reluctance to approve the Mercosur deal and Hungary’s recent veto of Ukraine aid in the EU council demonstrate.
So what’s next for the Europeans? Will they ‘match’ the middle power moment?
Who
Perhaps first it should be who. If corralling an international coalition of middle powers is required to respond to the rupture, as Carney argues, an appropriate ‘leader’ or set of them should arise to forge it. For the EU on trade it’s the Commission and Council presidents. On security issues it’s likely a set of minilateral issue coalitions with a degree of overlap led by different leaders, as the JEF (British-led), Coalition of the Willing (French and British), and a ‘New Arctic Alliance’ (Nordic and Canadian) demonstrate.
While France’s president may have positioned himself implicitly years ago, in predicting a U.S. abandonment, it may prove difficult for him or his successor to realise it alone. Others, primarily more traditionally Atlanticist states,, disagree French rhetoric even though it had anticipated this call to action. For instance, the ‘buy European’ campaign has been met with scepticism in other European capitals. French leadership, likewise, is treated with degree of scepticism by other Europeans due to France’s own laggard defence spending commitments and overall fiscal condition when arguing others should shore up theirs. Overriding this is ultimately that France remains in capacity the continent’s primary defence power, any coalition will therefore require French involvement and likely leadership.
What’s next?
Events since January’s ‘Greenland’ crisis have arguably had a galvanising effect on Europe’s leaders. While all may not rhetorically have met or will meet Carney’s call, in policy terms significant steps are being taken to unify European actors and to forge cooperation with others outside of the continent. This also means seizing new opportunities as they arise to couple negotiations with broader discussions, such as the UK-EU TCA mid-term review regarding security dialogues and Ukraine.
The ultimate requirement, as Stubb identifies to match the challenging new order, is to engage with the Global South. Widely defined, finding the right method and person to engage with these may be more difficult. Complicated in large part because of the diverse set of states, alliances, and interests that make up the ‘Global South’, and because these states can all operate with some degree of agency. While for the EU its commission may traverse the globe to negotiate trade deals, as the controversy over the Mercus0r deal presents, delivering on these ideas becomes a secondary and almost larger task.
So far, most of these initiatives have reacted to global events such as the war in Ukraine, the situation in Iran, and shifts in American foreign policy objectives as outlined in the NSS. However, signs are that in some respects, as in the aforementioned JEF and New Arctic Alliance, some initiatives from Europeans may be forthcoming, seeking to contribute to shaping a new international order incorporating their terms.
Questions for the readers:
- Will Western states be able to forge closer relations with ‘global south’ middle powers?
- Is the shift toward more ‘strategic autonomy’ for Europe on track?
- How could a potential U.S. withdrawal from the European security architecture in the long-term affect EU and British relations? How could this affect intra-EU relations overall?
- How do middle powers seek to shape international relations and to what extent are the ‘successful’ in this regard?
- Will the 21st century be defined by greater power competition (U.S. and China) or multipolarity (several competing and overlapping ‘blocs’)?
Further readings related to this topic:
“Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead”, Economist, November 2019.
“Special Address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada”, World Economic Forum, January 2026.
