The Netherlands’ new minority coalition government is ambitious in its ‘European agenda’ yet faces potential obstacles to realising these at home. Pro-EU Prime Minister Rob Jetten’s minority coalition government took office on February 23rd, following, by Dutch standards, a ‘short’ negotiation period.
In contrast to the preceding administration led by Dick Schoof consisting of Geert Wilders’ Eurosceptic party (PVV), which at home and abroad was perceived to have diminished Dutch influence in Brussels. In doing so, this new government set itself a benchmark for influence on European issues (EU and NATO alike), much like Denmark has been viewed during Mette Frederiksen’s government in respect of Trump’s claims on Greenland and on Ukrainian armaments. In other words, they aspire to establish a ’smaller power’ that can exert significant influence in international affairs.
What’s so unique about this government?
On the face of it, not much; three broadly pro-EU parties (D66, VVD, and CDA), each with varying degrees of governing experience, came together following last year’s snap election to form a minority government. While not the first of its kind, current NATO chief and ex-PM Mark Rutte’s first government in 2010 was of similar ilk, it lacks, a committed confidence-and-supply partner in parliament.
Therefore, this marks a new type of political experiment in the Netherlands, where the government will need to build issue coalitions with opposition parties to enact its legislative agenda. It must navigate between seeking support from the largest opposition party, the Social Democrats and Greens Party (GL-PvdA) and/or other parties, ranging across the political spectrum. Considering that the Dutch parliament totals 17 parties this presents an extra dimension to this challenge. Opposition parties’ reactions to the government’s formation and agenda have largely been tolerant, as it marks the end of demissionary administration, although some parties have expressed concerns about specific policy proposals that may affect their constituents’ interests.
The Jetten government’s policy ambitions in Brussels
The new government’s more proactive European policy proposals include the creation of an EU ‘five eyes,’ commitments to rapidly increased defence spending, possible reform of Article 7 TEU to suspend violating members’ voting rights, and a common European Defence Fund open to non-EU allied states such as Norway, Britain, and Canada, to support a potential future tiered-membership model for the EU.
How domestic politics varied the Dutch ‘influence’ in Brussels
While short, the ‘Schoof era’ has largely been attributed to diminished influence of the Dutch in Brussels’ policymaking forums, in contrast to the 14 years under his predecessor Rutte.
Under Rutte, the Netherlands significantly punched above its weight in terms of both EU policy influence and perception. As exemplified in Rutte’s defacto leadership of the ‘Frugal Four’, consent to the EU’s recovery fund plan with certain conditions attached. His long tenure and experience in coalition building at home enabled him to extend his influence to shaping policies in Brussels.
Schoof’s government plagued by infighting undermined its ability to present a coherent approach and to deliver on its ‘Eurosceptic’ aims. Seeking exceptions from EU rules on migration, agriculture, and emissions, its parties opted for confrontation over cooperation in Brussels; it was unable to realise these due to mainly internal disputes at home. Many point to Wilders’ approach, seeking to criticise the cabinet when decisions didn’t appeal to his party, and combination of maximalist stances in negotiations. These disputes would often be aired publicly, leading to fractured relations between the governing parties. An example being the ‘Rwanda’ incident which led to its near early collapse mere months into its term. Additionally, the divide between the parties meant other EU ministers would encounter various counterparts from different parties at summits, making them express that dealing with Dutch counterparts was unpredictable and unreliable. This was worsened the moment Wilders withdrew in June 2025 over a refusal to adjust proposed refugee asylum rules and the subsequent reshuffling to fill the gaps. The net result was a fractured cabinet that couldn’t agree on common policy approaches, and, in Brussels, the inability to forge relations with other states’ ministers over issues such as climate and migration.
Further, Schoof’s lack of a personal political mandate was credited with undermining his ability to lead on policy when required. Schoof caused internal tumult in March 2025 when he expressed support for the EU Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, despite lacking approval by both the cabinet and parliament. Schoof wasn’t able to exert leadership on the issue despite his preference by, for example, invoking a ‘nuclear option’ to threaten resignation to force approval from cabinet and parliament. Resulting in a policy muddle upon return to Brussels, where Schoof had to ‘back down’ from his previously enthusiastically expressed support. This added to the view that the Dutch were unreliable due to indifference in their stances.
The new government’s likely approaches to pressing issues
The new government is unlikely to deviate from its positions on borrowing and spending, as these align with domestic political consensus, although the parties have left some flexibility regarding funding for Ukraine. Dutch frugality remains where the Eurobonds concept is concerned, the parties expressing ‘subtle scepticism’ toward it in their coalition accord adhering to domestic long-standing political consensus. However, the ‘subtle skeptic’ tone wasn’t an explicit rejection, which could indicate a willingness to accommodate where circumstances demand it. For instance, its pledge to continue support for Ukraine’s war effort and Jetten’s critique of Hungary’s recent veto indicate a willingness to keep it within the European mainstream rather than be an outlier.
Where raising revenue for increased defence spending is concerned, domestic politics may complicate its objective to meet the NATO target. Research conducted by the Dutch Office for Budget Responsibility concluded that coalition’s ‘defence levy’ would burden lower- to middle-incomes more than higher earners. While marginal this revelation spells difficulty for a government navigating support in a parliament widely elected, promising to address cost-of-living in last year’s election. This could limit Jetten’s domestic room for more maneuverability should it come to a ‘showdown’ with parliament, as he lacks a majority to ‘force’ compliance as Rutte did with Ukraine aid in 2022. With no immediate ‘route’ to enact this policy with parliamentary approval, a solution could take some time to realise, which jeopardises the Netherlands’ ability to meet its target.
On other aspects, the Netherlands could likely meet its aspiration to be a more ‘proactive’ European, aligning with EU parliament and other states in favour of majority voting to overcome blocks in the EU Council. Jetten’s recent critique of Orban’s veto follows the coalition’s openness to reform Article 7 TEU voting rules in the EU’s Council. Where this issue is concerned, it may be able to find domestic approval more easily from GL-PvdA, for instance, which has itself in the EU Parliament been critical of Hungary‘s previous vetoes, yet it would have to pass objections within the EU Council itself.
Its approach to other issues remains unclear, such as in the case of EU emissions reduction targets. Commitment to the EU’s emissions reduction targets remains central to its aspirations; it’s here where domestic political support could undermine meeting that aim. Home to one of the world’s largest agricultural sectors by output, previous governments attempted to reduce livestock and manure to meet emissions reduction targets. This invoked a furious reaction from farmers’ interest groups, culminating in widespread protest actions across the country. Domestically the government will either have to align with GL-PvdA, likely in favour of ‘stricter’ targets, noting that emissions reduction is central to its party platform, or with ‘conservative’ parties that may prefer more derogations from EU rules. Jetten it’s suggested it’s likely conscious of previous criticism lobbed at this party for being too aloof on this issue and appointed a minister from a rural background who’s engaged in ‘open dialogue’ with farmers, indicative of an attempt so far not to state its approach yet. Overall, how the Netherlands will approach this issue in practice remains unclear.
Overall…
Ultimately predicting politics can be a mug’s game in which you’ll end up being proven wrong in part or entirely. Where its European policies are concerned, the Jetten government is undeniably ambitious but remains subject to opposition parties’ willingness to support these. While it may have options available now at the start of its term, these could narrow over the course of the parliament, affecting its ability to enact its European (let alone domestic) agenda.
Disclaimer: this article was completed before the GL-PvdA renaming convention and approval by the Netherlands’ Electoral Council. It’s now called ‘Progressief Nederland (Pro)’.
Questions for the readers
- How will political shifts in other European states influence the Netherlands’ and other ‘frugal-minded’ states’ ability to exert influence over EU policy? Noting that Denmark ‘quit’ the Frugal Four citing European rearmament demands.
- To what extent can domestic political factors shape states’ approaches to international forums, agreements, and/or policies?
- How do ‘smaller’ EU states leverage their position within the EU Council to exert influence over policy?
- Has political fragmentation impacted European policy (EU and NATO) consensus in the Netherlands and other European states?
- Will the Jetten government last its full term till 2030?
Additional reading
German Politics, Vol 31 (2022), Amy Verdun: The Greatest of the Small? The Netherlands, the New Hanseatic League and the Frugal Four
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644008.2021.2003782
Atlantic Council Experts (2025), Your Primer on the Dutch General Elections
Politco (2026) Eva Hartog
https://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-new-government-rob-jetten-now-hunger-games-begin-netherlands/
