The history between China, Japan, and Taiwan can be traced along with animosity, due to various international conflicts dating back to the 1800s. Unresolved disputes over diplomatic recognition still follow the three nations and their bilateral ties. After much diplomatic quarreling, Japan and China reached a compromise on how to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In the 1972 Japan-China joint communiqué, Japan “understands and respects” the One China principle; however, it never legalized China’s territorial claims over Taiwan.
Source: 日本語: 内閣官房内閣広報室 (Cabinet Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Secretariat) Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 4.0
I. Japan’s Shift in Stance: Provocation or Self-Defense?
Fifty years after the joint communiqué, tensions over Taiwan have risen between China and Japan. Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, is pursuing closer ties with the United States and has pledged to double Japan’s defense spending for the fiscal year 2026, including the plan to install missiles close to Taiwan. On 7 November 2025, Takaichi answered a question about a possible crisis regarding Taiwan differently from previous prime ministers, and it sparked diplomatic tensions. Her response was that in the case of an attack on Taiwan by China, Japan could see this as a “survival-threatening situation,” allowing Japan to use its Self-Defence Force (SDF). This was the first time that a sitting prime minister in Japan used this terminology and explicitly mentioned that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could be qualified as a crisis.
Because of this shift in terminology, China, which recognizes Taiwan as its own territory, called Takaichi’s statements an interference in internal affairs, demanding a retraction which Takaichi has refused to do so far. In the following analysis, the recent escalation and current situation will be discussed with a primary focus on the strategic posture of the three countries: Japan, China, and Taiwan. This will be done by tracing the debates and discussions in each country.
Taiwan’s Strategic Importance for Japan
Taiwan is important to Japan for a multitude of reasons, not only geographically and militarily. Taiwan lies 110km from Okinawa, and is part of an important route for Japan’s oil imports. Furthermore, Taiwan produces semiconductor chips essential for Japan’s car and tech industry. The recognition of Taiwan as a country with close ties to, but not a formal ally of, Japan is also a strategic circumvention of the pacifist Japanese constitution.
Should Takaichi Retract Her Statements?
From a countrywide survey held in December, 67% of respondents do not think Takaichi should retract her statement, whereas 11% say she should. Among government supporters, support for non-revocation is as high as 81%, while among government critics, 40% oppose revocation (compared to 34% in favor). There is also broad support within the political parties for the view that revocation is unnecessary.
Respondents give different reasons for why she should or shouldn’t retract her statement. Many Japanese people responded, saying that Takaichi’s statement was factually correct, therefore deeming retraction unnecessary and China’s reaction an exaggeration. Some Japanese respondents also mention that China is provoking and trying to intimidate Japan, pointing out the historical context and saying that “the days when Japan worried about China’s loss of face are over” and that “a leader should not give in to international pressure.” Others mention that the timing and formulation, despite the factual accuracy of the statement, could have been better, and that Japan should be able to better explain its point, while Takaichi should look for a position that China can accept.
On the other side, those calling for retraction are mostly elderly Japanese who believe that Taiwan is a part of China. Others mention that the statement by Takaichi was unwise and damaged relations with China, therefore damaging the Japanese economy long-term. They voice that the friendship between Japan and China is of more importance than the security of Taiwan.
What is hardly mentioned in the survey responses as a reason for Takaichi to retract her statement is Japan’s compliance with Article 9 of the Constitution. Japan’s pacifist constitution, adopted in 1947, prohibits the country from waging war as a sovereign right or using the threat of force as a means of conflict resolution. This so-called peace clause limited Japan’s defense policy to purely self-defense for decades. But since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reinterpretation in 2014, Japan is now also permitted to engage in collective self-defense, providing strict conditions are met, such as a “survival threatening situation” the exact wording Takaichi used in her statement.
The general debate in Japan shows that the vast majority agrees with Takaichi’s statement. Even though Takaichi has since nuanced and softened her statement, it is unlikely that she will fully revoke or rectify her statement. It is now up to Japan and its newly elected government to follow through on its trajectory while navigating its diplomacy with China and avoiding further escalation.
II. China’s Rapid Escalation Pattern
In Beijing, Takaichi’s election as Prime Minister in October 2025 was received with deep suspicion. Under her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, bilateral relations had slowly moved toward renewed diplomatic engagement, including the first high-level economic dialogue in six years, held in Beijing in early 2025. Takaichi’s hawkish stance towards China was widely discussed during her first meeting with Xi Jinping at the APEC meeting in South Korea in November 2025.
From the Chinese perspective, Japan’s ongoing reassessment of its defense and security policy not only revives long-standing historical grievances linked to the former imperial empire, but also directly affects China’s strategic interests: As America’s key ally in Asia, Japan underpins US military presence in East Asia and constrains China’s access to the Pacific as the northern part of the first island chain—a strategic string of archipelagos stretching from Japan to the Phillipines. This chain of Western-aligned territories effectively contains China’s naval access to the Pacific. Moreover, tensions in the East China Sea persist today, and the territorial dispute over the Senaku Islands remains a daily flashpoint in bilateral relations.
Wolf Warrior Leftovers
From this perspective, Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan can be seen as a welcoming opportunity for China to revive historical narratives of Japanese “militarism and fascism.” Inflammatory nationalist rhetoric by Chinese officials is nothing new: in 2010, when Japan arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler after it collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats near the disputed Senkaku Islands, Beijing halted all shipments of rare earth to Japan—the first time Beijing leveraged its dominance in critical minerals to assert its interests. But the ferocity of the response against Japan exceeded even the standards of the infamous “wolf warrior” diplomacy. On November 8, Xue Jian, the PRC’s consul general in Osaka, demanded that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off.” What followed was a sustained campaign by state media outlets to personally criticise Takaichi and Japan in general:
- The People’s Daily, the CCP’s official mouthpiece paper, launched a series of comments, arguing that Takaichi’s comments contain “perilous signs of a resurgence of militarism” and will bring Japan to “inevitably suffer the results of its own evil actions.”
- Official statements by the Chinese side echoed this outrage, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi stating that Takaichi “crossed a red line” with her comments on Taiwan.
- On November 21, the PRC’s ambassador to the UN, Fu Cong, sent an open letter to the UN-Secretary General António Guterres, which stated that “Taiwan is China’s sacred territory. How to resolve the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people and brooks no foreign interference.” Most notably, Fu laid the blame for future conflicts on Japan: “If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression. China will resolutely exercise its right of self-defence under the UN Charter and international law and firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
- This was accompanied by a new propaganda slogan following the traditional way of numerology: the “Three Never-Allows” (三个绝不充许): “China will never allow Japanese right-wing forces to turn back the tide of history” (中方绝不允许日本右翼势力开历史倒车); “Never allow foreign forces to encroach on China’s Taiwan area” (绝不允许外部势力染指中国台湾地区); and “Never allow a revival of Japanese militarism” (绝不允许日本军国主义死灰复燃).
In Chinese politics, media rhetoric and practical policy often go hand-in-hand. Soon after the remarks, the Chinese government ordered an advisory against travel to Japan, announced an import ban on Japanese seafood products, and cancelled concerts by Japanese musicians in China. Beijing’s swift and centralized use of tailored economic pressure can be seen as a sign of what a recent book by US analysts dubbed a “weaponization of trade“: When Beijing sees its core values threatened—and the Taiwan question has remained at the center of China’s national security interests for decades—symbolic gestures of concession are quickly overshadowed by coercive measures.
A Change in Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy?
The Chinese reaction following Takaichi’s remarks must be embedded within the broader realignment of China’s policy towards Taiwan. Alongside the increased frequency and intensity of PLA military maneuvers around the Taiwan Strait, officials in Beijing have also adopted a changing approach in talks with foreign representatives. While in past years, Chinese leaders often dismissed requests by foreign visitors to go into depth on the topic of Taiwan because they saw it as an inherent domestic issue, this has changed in meetings during the past months. Wang Yi frequently raised the issue in meetings with European counterparts, most notably during the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, where he launched a three-minute tirade against Japan and Takaichi in particular. Although the Taiwan question was not discussed in the October 2025 talks between Xi and Trump in Busan, observers expect the topic to play a crucial role in Trump’s upcoming trip to Beijing.
Regarding Japan, there are few signs that the relationship will revert back to the pre-Takaichi diplomatic thaw. From a broader perspective, Japan-China relations are deteriorating and increasingly defined by geopolitical rivalry in security issues and political mistrust in economic issues. With a rising fragility, the risk of further escalation may also increase.
Source: Tyg728 / Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
III. Taiwan: Caught in the Crossfire
Although the Taiwan question is the centerpiece of the conflict, the government in Taipei adopted a rather subdued communication towards China. Except for a forceful statement by the ROC’s Foreign Ministry reiterating that “the ROC (Taiwan) is a sovereign, independent nation,” the administration assumed that it would be better to stay outside an intensifying diplomatic clash, as direct involvement would be self-defeating. This was exacerbated by the US’s reserved reaction. According to Chinese state media, Trump and Xi held a phone call on November 24 and discussed the issue of Taiwan, and on the following day, the Washington Post reported that Trump urged Takaichi to refrain from further actions that might reignite the dispute.
The dispute was closely followed by Taiwanese media. Taiwanese people traditionally tend to hold a favorable opinion towards the former colonizers, and Japanese culture, food, and music are very popular, particularly among young, urban Taiwanese. The political response to Takaichi’s comments, however, largely followed established party lines. Several legislators of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voiced support for Japan and encouraged the public to buy Japanese goods as a gesture of economic stability. The opposition party Kuomintang (KMT), which holds the majority in the Legislative Yuan, expressed concerns regarding the remarks. Former President Ma Ying-jeou called Takaichi’s comments “reckless,” and others joined in by emphasising the need to acknowledge that Taiwan is “no longer Japan’s colony.”
America Skepticism
Whether this in fact signals a widespread “war of perception” that erupted in Taiwan, as argued by The Diplomat‘s Brian Hioe, remains contested. Politicians of both major Taiwanese parties—the DDP and KMT—have attempted to utilize the spat to bolster their own position by targeting the other through simple appeals to unity through division. This reflects the deepening partisan divide over Taiwan’s overall security architecture. The Taiwanese government has to balance diplomatic self-assertion and strategies for de-escalation, and its relationship with China has been a central topic of Taiwanese domestic affairs for decades. Recent polls, however, suggest that Taiwanese people grow increasingly tired of a constant talk of war, and prioritize domestic and cross-strait stability above all else.
This friction also aligns with various polls that indicate growing misgivings among the Taiwanese society regarding US reliability. The widely discussed “America Skepticisms Theory” (疑美論) notably emerged before Trump became President of the United States for the second time. Yet, Takaichi’s remarks and the Chinese response have brought a new dynamic into the debate: While slight changes in US foreign policy in Asia are often widely discussed in Taiwanese media, it is rare for a Japanese politician like Takaichi to emerge as such a polarizing person in Taiwanese domestic affairs.
Source: Government of Japan / Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 4.0
Conclusion
While the triangle relationship between China, Japan, and Taiwan continues to be defined by geopolitical rivalry, with Chinese territorial claims in the East China Sea and the Taiwan question as its centerpiece, it arguably remains difficult to predict that it will improve anytime soon. As seen at the 2026 Munich Security Conference, Beijing is expected to continue its assertive stance towards the Takaichi government, with Chinese state media echoing the narrative of a new “Japanese threat.” In Japan and Taiwan, the majority still hold a favorable opinion of each other. The bilateral relations between China and Japan remain under higher pressure. China’s call to stop tourism, as well as ban Japanese imports, shows that this issue spans beyond security and is more complex than what is shown on the surface. The influence and reliability of the United States are of great importance when examining Japan, China, and Taiwan’s multilateral relations. Trump’s planned visit to Beijing in May is therefore likely to be monitored closely by other Asian countries.
Literature Recommendations
Zack Cooper: Asia After America. How U.S. Strategy Failed–and Ceded the Advantage to China (Foreign Affairs, February 17, 2026)
John Dotson: The PRC’s Diplomatic Offensive Against Japan Over Taiwan (Global Taiwan Institute, Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 10, Issue 21, December 1, 2026)
Kento Fukuta, Alexandra Sakaki: The End of the Diplomatic Thaw between Japan and China (SWP Comment, Nov 52, December 2025)
Bonnie S. Glaser: If China Attacks Taiwan. The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and Major War” Scenarios (The German Marshall Fund, December 2025).
Masaya Inoue, The Japan-China Joint Communiqué and the Question of Taiwan (The Diplomat, December 30, 2025).
Thomas J. Shattuck, The Return to Strategic Ambiguity: Assessing Trump’s Taiwan Stance (Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 7, 2025)
William Sposato: Can Sanae Takaichi Make Japan Great Again? (Foreign Policy, February 9, 2026)
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