(Report) The Ukraine Conundrum: Reform, Resilience, And European Integration

Ukraine’s potential EU membership brings a range of significant challenges and opportunities. If admitted, Ukraine would be the EU’s largest country by landmass and would rival Poland in population. However, the ongoing war struck a blow to Ukraine’s GDP, necessitating an examination of the Copenhagen criteria, or the benchmarks for assessing a nation’s progress in terms of governance reforms that adhere to European norms. Ukraine, despite its proclaimed aspirations of liberal democratic governance, still has to implement many reforms to align with the EU.

While the Republic of Ukraine was granted potential membership status in the EU on the 23^rd of June, 2022, stakeholders discussed the country’s accession well before that. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has tried to navigate between its eastern and western neighbors. Formal relations between the EU and Ukraine started with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994, an economic cooperation agreement that “[didn’t] provide for integration of Ukraine with the EU but establish[ed] a framework for cooperation and the coordination of certain policies” (Spiliopoulos, 2014). President Yanukovych’s removal from power after blocking a trade agreement marked a watershed moment in European power dynamics: Russia feared that Ukraine’s shift out of its sphere of influence would undermine its security. Following the 2004 Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko’s rise to power, the EU-Ukraine relation strengthened with the Eastern Partnership in 2008. “The Eastern Partnership is an answer to the call of the neighbouring countries in the east of EU; that call would be to approach EU… But it is also a vital concern for EU to contribute to ensuring stability, democratizing, making governance more effective, and supporting the economic development at its eastern borders” (Costea, 2011).

Following the Euromaidan, the EU and Ukraine further solidified their political relations with an Association Agreement (AA) (European Union, 2014) on 21 March 2014. The AA “mark[ed] the definitive shift in the geopolitical and economic orientation of the country and the disengagement of the long Russian influence […] It [provided] the clearest demonstration of the commitment of both parties for a common future and common path” (Spiliopoulos, 2014). The Association Agreement, together with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), marked significant advancements in trade between Ukraine and the European Union. Later on, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a constitutional amendment committing Ukraine to becoming a member of NATO and the European Union (Radio Free Europe, 2019). On 19 February 2019, Poroshenko described securing Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU as his strategic mission; he stated that Ukraine should “submit a request for EU membership and receive a NATO membership action plan no later than 2023”, while acknowledging significant obstacles (Associated Press 2019). The purpose of this article is to summarize EU-Ukraine relations and to examine possible consequences along with political and legal obstacles to Ukrainian membership in the European Union. Finally, this report will explore an alternative path to greater cooperation without full membership.

To join the European Union, applicants must complete nine steps emphasizing political agreement among member states with compliance to technical criteria (European Union, 2023). Ukraine has completed five. States begin the accession process by submitting an application to the council, followed by the commission submitting an opinion on the application. Once EU member states unanimously grant candidate status and conditions are met, negotiations open and formally start after the commission proposes a draft framework with unanimous support from member states.

Ukraine submitted its membership application shortly after the beginning of the Russian offensive on February 24th, 2022. Upon reviewing the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission issued its opinion on the application, concluding that Ukraine should have been offered the prospect of EU integration and delineating seven main areas for improvement in order for Ukraine to join the Union, mainly related to the rule of law (European Union, 2022). Ukraine was then granted candidate status on June 23rd, 2022, with the European Council inquiring on Ukraine’s progress (European Union, 2022). Ukraine secured political agreement from the member states in the European Council to grant it candidate status and begin negotiations. Following this, in February 2023, the Commission issued a report that assessed Ukraine’s capability to meet the obligations of EU membership, including the acquis, or the full body of EU law as outlined in the Treaty, secondary legislation, and EU policies (European Union, 2023). On November 8th, 2023 the Commission published its first annual enlargement report on Ukraine, where the country was assessed positively according to its progress on the seven areas (European Union, 2023).

On December 14^th, 2023 the European Council accepted to start accession negotiations with Ukraine (General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, 2023). In March 2024, the Commission proposed a draft negotiating framework for Ukraine, which outlined guidelines and principles for accession negotiations in three parts: governing principles, negotiation substance, and procedures (Press and Information Team of the Delegation to Moldova, 2024). On June 21^st, 2024 the Council of the EU approved the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations with Ukraine, fixing the first meeting of the intergovernmental conference on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union on June 25^th, 2024 (European Union, 2024). This framework stressed that Ukraine must apply the acquis as it exists at accession and ensure its timely and effective implementation. The chapters of the acquis that Ukraine must implement are organized into six clusters, as introduced by the revised enlargement methodology in 2020: Fundamentals, Internal Market, Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth, Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion, and External Relations (European Union, 2020). This change aimed to ensure government focus on the rule of law, democratic institutions, and economic reforms. It addressed issues of one-party control and sought to improve judicial independence.

Given Ukraine’s war and history of poor governance, it is crucial to implement reforms and maintain administrative capacity to enforce EU norms. With the sixth step, formal negotiations can finally begin, with the Commission and the Ukrainian government overseeing the accession negotiations. This is the most difficult step, as the candidate country needs to incorporate the EU acquis into its governance (European Union, 2023). Currently, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey are in this stage. However, the technical challenge might stop before starting for Ukraine, as Hungary assumes the Council’s rotating presidency from July 1^st to December 31^st, 2024 (Liboreiro, 2024). Viktor Orbán’s government will control the agenda, prioritizing topics and chairing ministerial meetings. On June 18^th, Hungary’s Minister for European Affairs János Bóka confirmed that Hungary will not support opening any of the 35 chapters essential for Ukraine’s membership talks (Liboreiro 2024). Instead, Bóka emphasized focusing on the Western Balkans and ensuring the enlargement process remains “merit-based, objective, and credible”.

Economic realities

Ukraine’s potential EU membership brings a range of significant challenges and opportunities. If admitted, Ukraine would be the EU’s largest country by landmass and would rival Poland in population. However, the ongoing war struck a blow to Ukraine’s GDP, necessitating an examination of the Copenhagen criteria, or the benchmarks for assessing a nation’s progress in terms of governance reforms that adhere to European norms. Ukraine, despite its proclaimed aspirations of liberal democratic governance, still has to implement many reforms to align with the EU. One major consideration is the EU’s agricultural budget, which heavily subsidizes farmers and agribusinesses. Ukraine’s entry would position it as the largest producer of agricultural products with some of the weakest economic farmers. This shift could redirect substantial funds away from long-standing EU members, creating economic and political tensions. Integrating and subsidizing such a large competitor may not be economically prudent and could fuel domestic instability across the Union. However, according to a study conducted by Bruegel, Ukraine’s EU membership would cost current EU countries €136 billion from 2021 to 2027, or €19 billion per year—0.13% of EU GDP (Darvas et al., 2024). This cost would minimally affect the net beneficiary status of current members.

Ukraine’s membership could also positively influence the EU’s GDP through enhanced trade, migration, and foreign direct investment, leading to increased employment, production, and tax revenues. The enlargement of the EU single market through the admission of new members like Ukraine can facilitate trade, boosting domestic production and employment in existing member states. Immigration from new member states can alleviate labor shortages and address demographic challenges faced by existing members. Ukraine’s energy sector presents substantial potential, with capabilities in natural gas, renewable energy, and nuclear power. It could become a major exporter of low-carbon electricity, hydrogen, natural gas, and energy-intensive products like ‘green’ steel to the EU (Devlin & Mykhnenko, 2024). The reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine’s outdated and war-damaged energy infrastructure offer vast opportunities for investment, aimed at enhancing energy efficiency and maintaining or improving energy services. The demand for financial services to support energy supply and efficiency investments in Ukraine will be considerable.

Political obstacles

Ukraine’s path to EU membership will necessitate the establishment of clear standards for rule of law and fundamental values, along with effective mechanisms to ensure ongoing compliance post-accession. This approach is crucial to ensuring that future enlargements positively impact EU governance. Amid the ongoing war, Ukraine faces the immense challenge of implementing deep institutional changes in seven main areas, namely  (1) enacting legislation for selecting Constitutional Court judges; (2) completing integrity vetting for the High Council of Justice; (3) strengthening anti-corruption efforts and appointing key anti-corruption officials; (4) adopting anti-money laundering laws; (5) implementing the Anti-Oligarch law; (6) adopting a media law aligning with EU directives; (7) and finalizing the legal framework for national minorities based on Venice Commission recommendations. Enlargement has historically been a potent and successful tool for fostering such transformations, benefiting both the applicant country and the EU.

A key aspect of Ukraine’s accession process will involve EU decision-making. The majority of EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV), where a Council decision requires approval by 55% of the member states, representing at least 65 % of the EU population. Ukraine would hold about 9% of the votes, comparable to Poland’s seat shares. This would slightly decrease the shares of other member states like Germany, whose share would drop from 18.6 % to around 16.9 %. Consequently, Poland and Ukraine combined would possess relative voting weight to Germany’s. Conversely, some resolutions require unanimity inside the Council instead, such as the subject of enlargement (Zweers et al. 2024). The Council determines whether a candidate country advances in its accession process based on various criteria and, often, politics.

Historically, member states have repeatedly used their veto powers to block a country’s entry into the EU for political reasons. For instance, France vetoed the UK’s membership twice in 1963 and 1967, and more recently Greece and then Bulgaria blocked Macedonia’s accession for reasons unrelated to the compliance with the technical criteria (Hajdari, 2020). This creates a clear power asymmetry in the accession process, enabling member states to dictate the pace based on their domestic political interests, and not on the reforms candidate countries are working towards. Focusing on domestic issues, member states divert attention from the essential reform efforts and transformative goals of the EU enlargement process.

Security risks

The EU must develop robust assistance programs to support the Ukrainian government in addressing post-war security challenges, both external and internal. This includes managing the large volume of weapons in circulation and encouraging the return of Ukrainian refugees, who will be essential for reconstruction efforts. Additionally, securing small arms and light weapons (SALW) in a post-conflict situation will be a major priority to prevent their proliferation on unsanctioned domestic and international markets which might exacerbate the danger posed by terrorist cells wanting to operate in Europe (Wisotzki 2021, 249). Additionally, the EU must remain vigilant against hybrid threats coming from Russia, such as disinformation campaigns targeted at strengthening euroskepticism in established EU members and covert information or personnel channels that Russia may have established inside Ukraine proper (Heck, 2024).

Upon joining the EU, Ukraine will have one of its largest armies, experienced in countering external aggression, terrorism, cyberattacks, and modern warfare tactics (Darvas et al., 2024). Furthermore, Ukraine’s substantial defense industry has the potential to significantly contribute to the EU’s defense sector. Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty mandates that in the event of an armed attack on a member state, other member states must provide all possible assistance and aid, underscoring the collective security commitment that would extend to Ukraine (European External Action Service 2022). However, integrating Ukraine also poses risks. Small arms proliferation, potential for increased organized crime, and the management of a significant military force all require careful handling. The EU must ensure that the benefits of Ukraine’s membership, such as enhanced security and defense capabilities, outweigh these risks by implementing comprehensive strategies and support measures. The ongoing conflict with Russia means that the EU must prepare for heightened tensions and potential escalations, making diplomatic and military readiness key priorities.

A Way Forward?

Given the significant challenges and risks associated with Ukraine’s full membership in the EU, an alternative solution is the establishment of an Enhanced Partnership Framework (EPF). This framework could offer Ukraine closer cooperation with the EU without immediate full membership, ensuring that political, economic and security objectives are met while mitigating potential risks. The EPF would begin with a structured integration roadmap that progressively aligns Ukraine with EU standards in governance and economic policy and includes clear milestones and benchmarks, allowing for assessment of progress and necessary adjustments along the way. Enhanced trade and economic cooperation are the cornerstone of this framework. The expansion of the current Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) should include further tariff reductions, simplification of customs procedures, and channeling EU investment into Ukraine’s energy, agriculture and technology sectors to promote economic growth and stability. In addition, targeted financial assistance and structural funds would support key economic reforms and infrastructure development, with strict monitoring to ensure effective use.

Security strengthening measures like defense cooperation are another critical component of the EPF. Regular joint military exercises, training programs, and robust intelligence sharing could enhance Ukraine’s defense capabilities and counter hybrid threats. Cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defense industries would further enhance technology transfer and production capabilities. To counter hybrid threats and enhance cyber security, the EPF should implement joint EU-Ukraine cyber defense initiatives to protect critical infrastructure and promote resilience to cyber attacks.

Assisting Ukraine in implementing critical institutional and governance reforms is essential for long-term stability and alignment with EU standards. This support should emphasize anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and decentralization programs to empower local governments and improve public service delivery (Darvas et al., 2024). Encouraging and supporting the participation of civil society organizations ensures transparency and accountability in the reform process. Addressing migration and humanitarian issues is also critical. Concurrently, the EPF ought to provide support programs for Ukrainian refugees, including education, health care, and employment assistance, with incentives for eventual return to Ukraine. The creation of a dedicated fund for post-war reconstruction should integrate returning refugees and displaced persons into the reconstruction process. Gradual legal and regulatory harmonization would be achieved through sectoral agreements that align Ukrainian regulations with EU standards in areas such as environmental protection, consumer rights, and competition policy. Technical assistance would be provided to help Ukraine adopt and implement these regulations effectively.

Ultimately, the Enhanced Partnership Framework presents a viable option for fostering enhanced bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU. It strikes a balance between the imperative for closer collaboration between the two parties and the political and economic realities associated with attaining full EU membership. The focus on incremental integration, targeted assistance, and robust security cooperation enables Ukraine to align its domestic policies with those of the EU while mitigating potential risks and fostering mutual benefits. Moreover, this approach contributes to regional stability and economic growth, thereby strengthening the preparedness of both Ukraine and the EU to navigate future challenges and opportunities.

In conclusion, while Ukraine’s path to EU membership involves navigating significant political and economic hurdles, the potential benefits are substantial. Achieving this integration will require strategic planning and substantial reforms, ensuring that Ukraine aligns with EU standards and contributes positively to the Union’s future.

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