This past November, China’s President, Xi Jinping, visited Brazil and held promising, high-profile talks with his Brazilian counterpart, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. While Brazil hosted the G-20 Summit, Xi’s state visit sparked commentary and mobilized attention on what ended up being a consequential meeting between Brazil and its largest trading partner.
Reflecting upon the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, the two countries’ leaders signed 37 trade and diplomatic agreements, which ranged from agriculture, renewable energy and infrastructure development. Marking a renewed commitment between South America’s largest economy and China, these agreements prompted Xi Jinping to comment on the relationship’s excellent status, which was reportedly characterized by him as being at “an all-time high.”
Building upon these agreements on a wide set of economic sectors, Xi’s visit was also concluded with a statement that reaffirmed Brazil and China’s common view on Ukraine, Palestine, and international geopolitical issues. The geopolitical sintony between these high-caliber Global South giants, however, is not impervious to challenges and is often met with a nuanced balancing act by Brasilia.
Brazil’s balancing act: between Beijing and Washington
While China’s inroads in Latin America have been widely observed and discussed in the context of its hegemonic struggle with the United States, Brazil’s position over the last years has been marked by a cautious balancing act. After a tumultuous and histrionic Bolsonaro government, which squabbled frequently with China – especially during pandemic-related vaccine issues – Lula’s return to Brazil’s presidency signalled a promise of good relations with China and of a reprisal of high-profile international agency, one of Lula’s first tenure’s hallmarks.
While China cruised through Bolsonaro’s tenure and kept its place as Brazil’s largest trading partner and privileged destiny of Brazil’s huge agribusiness sector, Lula’s tenure has not been marked by a full-on, aggressive buy-in into the BRICS and BRI projects as some might have guessed beforehand.
From playing a role in pivoting away from Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro to refusing outright to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (or New Silk Road), Brazil has signalled to be perhaps more interested in playing a rather reserved and cautious balancing game.
While counting on China and Russia’s consent, Venezuela’s joining of BRICS was blocked by Brazil, which has tried to position itself as a guarantor of democracy in the country, assuming an anti-Maduro and often confrontational tone. Simultaneously, Brazil’s strategic advisor and historical foreign policy figure, Celso Amorim, has signaled that Brazil would debate “synergies” with the BRI project, rather than outright joining it wholesale, as an “insurance policy.”.
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Trump’s upcoming tenure
As these themes mark Brazil’s topical disagreements with Beijing, the upcoming second Trump tenure is sure to influence Brasilia’s balancing act. While Brazil might be hedging its strategy by siding with the United States in matters, such as Venezuela, and by not outright joining BRI, a Trump administration is by nature unpredictable and can harbor unpleasant surprises for the South American country’s strategy.
At the same time, Lula faces domestic struggles regarding his relationship with Congress and considering the high-profile investigations targeting Bolsonaro and his circle following the disclosing of a botched coup attempt in 2022. The investigations have recently gained momentum and resulted in the arrest of Bolsonaro’s 2022 vice-President nominee, Brazilian four-star General Braga Netto, the first arrest of such a figure in the country’s history. The U.S.’s historical role in Brazilian politics is sure to be a recurring theme as the investigators hover around Bolsonaro and his closer associates.
As Brazil’s domestic political scenario develops into muddier waters, its foreign policy seeks to conduct this hedging strategy of a balancing act between Beijing and Washington. At the same time, China’s profile in Latin America only grows and selected partners are already harvesting important gains, such as Peru’s latest port infrastructure win.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while these themes might indicate some “trouble in Paradise” for the two Global South giants, the fact is that Brazil and China’s relationship continues as a stalwart of BRICS strategy and a growing multipolar world order alternative. Brasilia’s cautious hedging act can be better understood when we take stock of Lula’s domestic struggles and an upcoming second Trump tenure. As 2025 rolls around, this lesser “Triangular Diplomacy” is sure to bring attention and thought to Latin America and beyond.
Questions for Readers
1 – How should Brazil approach its relationship with China, considering the upcoming Trump administration?
2 – How does the upcoming Trump administration influence Brazil’s domestic force correlation, considering the high-profile investigations targeting Bolsonaro and his botched coup attempt?
3 – What role can Brazil and Latin America play in the larger context of hegemonic dispute between Beijing and Washington?
Further Reading
Xu Wei, Mo Jingxi.. Xi’s visit to Brazil helps elevate relationship. Chinadaily. 18 November 2024.
