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The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany’s foreign intelligence service and is an integrated tool of the German republican democracy. It has recently gained widespread media attention following a series of counterintelligence operations and public debate has emerged about its effectiveness as an intelligence service. This article examines the BND’s tasks, structure, and fundamental differences compared to conventional foreign intelligence services.
The BND’s nature and limitations are closely tied to Germany’s history and the origins of the German republican system that emerged after the Second World War. To comprehend the nature of the BND, Germany’s security policies, and the contents of its constitution and justice system, it is vital to first understand how deeply ingrained the reflection of the Third Reich era is in the minds of German decision-makers and the general public. This makes understanding the story of how the BND came to be all the more challenging to an interested outsider.
It seems that in the early years of its existence, the BND was not entirely forthcoming about its existance and true tasks. It was initiated by Reinhard Gehlen, head of Wehrmacht intelligence on the Eastern Front, who, fearing retaliation by the Soviet Red Army, hid intelligence on the Soviet Union gathered by his agents over the years and offered it to the U.S. in exchange for his and his men’s safety and fair treatment. The allies were quick to recognize the value of German intelligence as the Soviet Union’s aggressive posture as the primary competitor amongst the allies in Europe became increasingly clear throughout the late 1940´s. The U.S. initiated “Organization Gehlen“, which in its early years was primarily focused on gathering intelligence on the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe.
As time passed, Organization Gehlen expanded and reorganized itselfo into the primary foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956, with Gehlen serving as its first president. The Weimar Republic and its failings served as a cautionary tale for the young democracy and its constitution, known as the Grundgesetz. As part of this approach, the BND is subject to significant limitations set forth in Germany’s intelligence law and is required to maintain high transparency and accountability to the German parliament. Parliament have a dedicated group of members from various parties responsible for overseeing its affairs by means of the Parliamentary Oversight Panel with the government obligated to report on BND activities when inquiries take place. Furthermore, an internal body of the Federal Chancellery is responsible for maintaining high accountability of the BND and its 6,000 members while another agency is responsible for financial audits.
It would at first appear that the BND cannot extensively gather information in a way that would comply with the various domestic data protection laws. The 2016 legal reform only established further oversight measures, such as an independent panel. However, given the lack of legal precedent and the complexity of intelligence domains such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), the reform and the bills proposed by the German government following the 2020 Federal Court decision leave room for loopholes regarding foreign strategic surveillance.
On the other hand, it is not an executive organ and does not have the right to employ violence, such as apprehending suspects or engaging in armed operations abroad. Germany would rely on its army or allied foreign intelligence services to conduct hostage releases or engagements requiring brute force. Its self-proclaimed task is to gather information on global affairs and present data in intelligence packages to policy-makers so that they may adjust their foreign and security policies accordingly.
The German government keeps its information-gathering directives on other nations a secret. However, a reasonable estimation suggests gathering intelligence on international terrorist networks as a primary objective. If alarming information comes to light, the BND notifies the relevant authorities, who then apprehend the terrorist suspects promptly.
In recent years, reports of foreign intelligence services infiltrating and spying on both the German intelligence structures and its political ranks have increased. Such incidents highlight the potential risks of BND infiltration by non-affiliated intelligence services. For example, in 2022, Carl L., a division head within the BND, was detained for allegedly working closely with the Russian domestic intelligence agency, the FSB, and transmitting vital data about the war effort in Ukraine through an intermediary that was also detained. It goes without saying that this would have been a serious breach of the BND’s internal security and would have jeopardized the agency’s assets. While it is encouraging that he was discovered before he could cause further damage, it raises questions about the extent to which belligerent actors have infiltrated German state organs and gained access to highly classified files.
The Russian Federation, having developed a robust presence in Germany over the years, poses one of the biggest security challenges. Examples of concerns include instances of violence, such as the murders in Berlin’s Tiergarten Park in 2016. Russian hackers are allegedly responsible for a significant number of cyberattacks on German infrastructure and political figures. For example, the headquarters of the SPD, the party of the current chancellor, recently experienced a cyberattack and just last week as of the publishing of the article, CNN has reported that US and German intelligence services have uncovered and doiled an assasination plot by Russian intelligence aimed at Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger.
While German counterintelligence focuses on Russian assets in Germany, Chinese espionage has also increased in recent years. Police arrested a European Parliament aide for far-right candidate Maximilian Krah (AfD) on suspicion of spying for the PRC, sparking nationwide outrage. In addition, three Germans were arrested, with one in particular alleged to have collaborated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security in an attempt to transfer high-level dual-use technology and scientific knowledge to the PRC to be used for military purposes.
In the context of legal limits, these considerations raise questions about the BND’s ability to conduct its operations effectively within the framework of Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende. Scholz uses this term to describe a readjustment of foreign and security policy to address the resurgence of power politics and aggressive posturing by international competitors. It also shows a competent conduction of the constitutionally-mandated job.
When compared with neighbouring allies, Germany faces different security threats with policies focusing on separate areas. German policymakers should focus on three main areas of espionage: protecting the country from Russian infiltration, which seems to have had some success; protecting its research and industrial products of a dual-use nature; and combating terrorism. As a result, Germany is more of a counterintelligence power that is a vital partner to allied intelligence sharing efforts than one that excels in offensive espionage. On the other hand, given the highly classified nature of the details, it is not easy to pass judgment.
Further questions:
- How should the BND maintain the delicate balance between national security concerns and individual privacy?
- Is the BND a splendid example of interoperability between allied intelligence services?
- In what way can German intelligence enhance democratic transparency and accountability without compromising efficiency?
Further readings:
- Gordon, J. S. (2017). Intelligence sharing in NATO. Atlantisch Perspectief, 41(6), 15–19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48581386
- Wetzling, T. (2017). Germany’s intelligence reform: More surveillance, modest restraints and inefficient controls. In Stiftung Neue Verantwortung. https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/snv_thorsten_wetzling_germanys_foreign_intelligence_reform.pdf
- Ellison, M. (2019, April 12). The German Behind America’s Postwar Strategy. Palladium Magazine. https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/04/12/the-german-strategic-mastermind-behind-the-post-world-war-ii-liberal-order/
