Australia’s Association with Horizon Europe and the EU’s Growing External Projection in Oceania

Michele Sacco

Horizon Europe is the EU’s key funding programme for research and innovation (R&I). The programme aims to boost EU competitiveness and to support the implementation of EU policies while tackling global challenges such as climate change. At first glance, Horizon Europe is an instrument to strengthen the European scientific and technological bases and to maximise the added value of the Union’s R&I investments. However, insofar as third countries may associate with the programme, Horizon Europe can also serve as a tool to exercise a sort of atypical external policy, grounded in science diplomacy.

Building upon Australia’s recent association with Horizon Europe (more specifically, with the programme’s Second Pillar), the analysis first examines the key features of Horizon Europe and how the programme projects European soft power abroad. Subsequently, it turns its attention to the specific case of Australia’s association, evaluating its significance in light of other crucial agreements signed between Brussels and Canberra over the last few months. Lastly, it discusses the conditions under which the EU’s growing bilateral partnerships with Oceania’s biggest countries (namely, Australia and New Zealand) could evolve into a broader regional approach.

President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese following the signing of agreements between Australia and the European Union, March 2026
Source: Australian Government / Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 4.0
Horizon Europe, Science Diplomacy, and European Soft Power

Building upon the Letta Report‘s call for a “fifth freedom” to enhance research, innovation, and education in the single market, the Commission is proposing to double the budget for Horizon Europe to roughly €175 billion in the next long-term EU budget 2028-2034. The new programme will be based on four pillars:

  • Pillar I ‘Excellent Science‘ aims to strengthen the EU’s scientific base, attract top talent and promote excellent research in Europe, upholding a ‘Choose Europe’ approach.
  • Pillar II ‘Competitiveness and Society‘ aims to support EU competitiveness through collaborative research and innovation in areas of high societal impact, like the clean transition and digital leadership.
  • Pillar III ‘Innovation‘ aims to support innovation in Europe, with a focus on high-risk disruptive projects, especially defence and dual-use startups.
  • Pillar IV ‘European Research Area‘ aims to support the development of a unified European Research Area (ERA). 

Crucially, Horizon Europe is not only available to EU Member States, but it is also open to third countries. More precisely, four categories of countries are eligible for association with the programme: firstly, members of the European Economic Area (EEA); secondly, acceding countries, candidate countries and potential candidates; thirdly, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries; and lastly, other third countries that fulfil a set of criteria related to their economic, political and R&I systems.

Hence, Horizon Europe interacts with some of the most important external policies, such as the enlargement and neighbourhood ones. Yet, the association potentially encompasses other countries, provided that they meet certain criteria that are laid down and scrutinised by the EU. This transforms Horizon Europe into a powerful tool for science diplomacy, a concept that indicates “the direct or indirect use of science, scientific evidence, and scientific cooperation to support diplomatic objectives, as well as the deployment of diplomacy to support scientific progress”.

Amidst growing geostrategic rivalries and global competition, science, technology, and R&I are vital to ensure competitiveness and geopolitical influence. Accordingly, the Commission found that “Science Diplomacy would help the EU to project soft power and pursue our economic interests and values more effectively, meeting demand and interest from partner countries and playing to the EU’s strengths as a research and innovation powerhouse”. Against this backdrop, the association of third countries with Horizon Europe transforms a funding programme into a tool of soft power. Specifically, Horizon Europe pursues this objective by creating institutional affiliations, epistemic communities, and transnational projects that all gravitate around the EU, adopt EU standards, and advance EU priorities.

Ursula von der Leyen arrives at Parliament House in Canberra during her official visit to Australia, March 2026
Source: Australian Government / Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 4.0
Australia’s Association with Horizon Europe

The EU and Australia enjoy “a strong, dynamic, and continuously evolving partnership“.  Their relationship has been formalised several times, for instance by the 2017 EU-Australia Framework Agreement, highlighting shared values and close historical, political, economic and cultural ties. On top of that, they share a long history of research collaboration, with the first treaty-level science and technology agreement signed more than thirty years ago, in 1994. Thus, Australia’s association with Pillar II of Horizon Europe is not meant to find a new research partner. Rather, it signals a shift in the paradigm, since Australia is now part of a fully fledged European project and is being admitted to a club of countries and institutions that gravitate around Brussels.  

From the Australian point of view, the association with Pillar II of Horizon Europe is made particularly desirable for two reasons. Firstly, the considerable pool of funding, which could allow for research projects at a bigger scale; secondly, the possibility to unlock project-based access to global research infrastructure. The assumption is that this will not only benefit the researchers, institutions and entities directly involved in Horizon Europe activities, but also the Australian economy and society as a whole. This is because large-scale international projects and stronger research networks will drive productivity and accelerate innovation and economic growth. 

However, Canberra’s interest is not purely economic. Indeed, Pillar II facilitates joint research to tackle global challenges and strengthen industrial competitiveness across strategic policy areas, including supply chain security, critical minerals and technologies, advanced computing, climate and clean energy, just to name a few. These not only constitute top priorities for the EU, but also closely align with Australia’s National Science and Research Priorities.  

In sum, Australia’s association signals the attractiveness of an EU flagship project for third countries, deepening the partnership between Brussels and Canberra. Indeed, the association doubles down on the recent conclusions of a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) and of the negotiations for a Free-Trade Agreement (FTA). In the span of a few months, the EU and Australia signed a series of agreements that could provide a wide framework for strategic materials and technologies, from the research stage (Horizon Europe), through their trade and circulation (FTA), up to specific aspects of their use and governance (SDP).

The Delegation of the European Union to Australia in Canberra
Source: Nick-D / Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY SA 3.0
Horizon Europe and the EU’s Projection in Oceania

This strengthening of the bilateral relations with Australia can be read through the lens of the 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy. Specifically, Section 4.4, which focuses on digital governance and partnerships, recognises that “[i]nternational cooperation on research and innovation is crucial for the green and digital transitions and for promoting growth, prosperity, and social well-being”. However, the use of the association instrument in the relevant region was still limited at the time, with only “informal discussions” in place with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Singapore. 

Five years later, four out of these five key players, namely Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand, enjoy the status of associated countries, at least with Pillar II. Notably, with specific regard to Oceania, the implementation of the association proved to be quite successful in New Zealand, which relies on a practical scheme of national contact points, leading to several projects being approved and funded within the Horizon Europe framework. Moreover, scientific cooperation is also streamlined and supported by Euraxess Australia-New Zealand, which links local researchers with the EU and promotes Horizon Europe’s opportunities.

However, closer ties with Australia and New Zealand (the latter has also recently concluded an FTA with the EU) do not automatically translate into wider regional influence. Oceania is a dispersed and fragmented region, characterised by numerous Pacific Islands Countries (‘PICs‘), the combined Exclusive Economic Zone of which is close to the size of Sub-Saharan Africa. Albeit each of these states has its own specific features, all PICs share a common priority: fighting climate change, which poses a direct threat to their peoples and territories through harsher climate conditions and sea-level rise. It is not by chance that PICs are at the vanguard of climate action on the international stage. For instance, Vanuatu was the main actor to prompt the landmark 2025 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on climate change, while Tuvalu will co-host the 2027 International Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels.

This means that Horizon Europe and science diplomacy, by focusing on climate science, could effectively support the EU’s projection in Oceania. Indeed, alongside strengthening relationships with Australia and New Zealand, “reinforcing a regional approach and dimension for research and innovation with the Pacific Islands in areas that include earth observation, climate action, [and] biodiversity” is already a top policy priority for the EU. To this end, Australia’s association with Horizon Europe, coupled with New Zealand’s, could help evolve bilateral relations into a regional approach, allowing the EU to capitalise on their local research networks, specialised expertise, and first-hand experience. This requires prioritising research topics that are felt as capital for the local population, such as ocean science, biodiversity protection, and disaster resilience. 

Yet, a regional approach requires a comprehensive strategy. Thus, if the EU wishes to become a more relevant partner in Oceania, R&I should fit into the existing diplomatic, economic, and political framework. This is made up of several elements, such as: 

  • On the diplomatic side, the three EU delegations in the region: the one to Australia, the one to New Zealand, and, most importantly, the one to the Pacific (which has its seat in Fiji);
  • On the economic side, the investments under the Global Gateway strategy, as well as the trade relationships under the EU-Pacific States Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 
  • On the political side, the dialogue with the Pacific Island Forum and the relationship with the Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS), currently regulated by the Samoa Agreement.

In sum, thanks to Horizon Europe, the EU has a powerful tool of science diplomacy at its disposal. Recent agreements on trade, security, and scientific cooperation demonstrate that the EU’s projection is steadily growing in Oceania. However, to become a more influential regional actor, the EU needs to reinforce its broader framework of cooperation with all PICs, transforming the bilateral ties with Australia and New Zealand into a regional approach.

Conclusions

Australia’s association with Pillar II Horizon Europe is not purely academic news, but rather a diplomatic success which carries significant weight. Firstly, it reinforces European science diplomacy and soft power across the Indo-Pacific, with four key local actors (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) who have associated with Horizon Europe since the last Indo-Pacific strategy was adopted in 2021.   

Secondly, it adds another layer of cooperation to the bilateral agreements that have recently been concluded between Brussels and Canberra. After the FTA and SDP, Horizon Europe might offer the possibility to create a comprehensive framework to govern strategic materials and technologies which are essential for the digital and green transition, as well as for defence and security purposes, encompassing crucial aspects in the research, trade, and implementation stages. 

Lastly, Australia’s association with Horizon Europe, alongside the other recent bilateral agreements with Australia and New Zealand, constitutes an unprecedented opportunity for the EU to become a stable regional player. This, however, requires political, economic, and diplomatic efforts towards Oceania as a whole, and not only with its biggest countries on a bilateral basis. To this end, plenty of instruments are already in place, and could be revitalised if Australia’s association is properly understood not as a point of arrival, but rather as a point of departure. 

Additional Readings

Additional Questions
  • How should the success of association agreements with Horizon Europe be measured? Through scientific breakthroughs, economic benefits, industrial applications, diplomatic influence, promotion of EU values, or improvements in the lives of local populations?
  • Amidst the crisis of the rules-based international order, could association agreements with Horizon Europe foster greater cooperation among like-minded middle powers?
  • What makes the EU a desirable partner for Pacific countries? EU values, its commitment to fight climate change, access to its internal market and trade opportunities, its normative power, or its emerging role as a new security provider?

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Australia’s Associa…

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