Water We Going to Do? An Analysis of Water Security and Diplomacy

Water is one of the most basic and essential building blocks of life on Earth. Not only is water an essential medium for terrestrial life to exist, but it was also the catalyst that allowed humans to transition from a hunter-gatherer society to an agricultural one. Taming freshwater sources for agriculture eventually gave rise to human civilizations across the world. It quickly became essential in other practical activities, from animal husbandry to economic growth. In addition to its practical applications, water has been ingrained into different cultural identities, represented in religious baptisms, healing practices, and belief in deities who control this life-giving substance. Simply put, without water, we would not be who we are as a species today. In addition to supporting human life and activity, water is the most important building block for thousands of global environments, with billions of plants and animals dependent on the nourishment and habitat water brings to their climates. Thus, water is used and defined in different ways: as an economic good, a political good, an environmental essential, and a cultural good.

Freshwater comes from two main sources: surface water, found in rivers, lakes, and streams, and groundwater, stored in underground aquifers. These sources can be shared between countries and are called transboundary water sources. When a country has a river or lake, it is called a riparian state. Countries that share a source of surface water are called riparian neighbor states. One example of such neighbors are Ethiopia and Egypt, which share the Nile River.

Water is a multifaceted resource essential for human society and economy, as well as environmental well-being. Climate change is altering normal water supply, changing regular distribution and patterns with extreme droughts and floods becoming common occurrences. On the demand side, water demand is projected to exceed sustainable supply by nearly 40% by 2030, with nearly a third of the global population facing a 50% deficit between demand and supply (Molnar et al., 2017, pg 8). Currently, nearly two billion people are facing absolute water scarcity, while another two-thirds of the world faces water-stressed conditions. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates global water usage will increase by 55% in 2050, driven by a 400% increase in the manufacturing industry, a 140% increase for electricity needs, and a 130% increase in domestic needs (Journal of Hydrology 575, 2019, pg 2). Water scarcity is currently estimated to cost nearly 6% of global GDP and depress GDP growth by 6-14% in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East by 2050. Simply put, as such, more environments and societies will regularly face greater exceptional droughts, notably disrupting the general and economic livelihood of billions of people and countless communities.

Water scarcity, however, is not a new phenomenon. Previous strains on shared water sources have led to both competition and cooperation, such as the Mekong River Delta. While the looming question of how severely climate change will impact available water sources remains to be acted upon, we can draw lessons from successful treaties and organizations established to manage shared water sources. We can also look at current policy developments and national security priorities that view water as a finite resource and understand how this approach is both dangerous and ultimately unhelpful.

Water Security and Securitization

The United Nations defines water security as “the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods … and for preserving ecosystems in a time of peace and political stability” (UN Water, 2013, pg 1). While countries take this human-centered definition of water security into account when addressing water challenges, they can also view water sources, especially shared ones, as finite.  When water is categorized as a finite resource exacerbated by climate change and increased demand, especially in arid environments, it therefore cannot be shared and must be taken and protected.

When water is treated as a resource, governments treat it as both a security and sovereignty issue, looking to claim and retain water sources for themselves, much like energy sources. This process, in which a commodity is defined and treated as a strategic or security item essential to state survival, is called securitization. Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, for example, treat water security as a national security matter. Water is securitized due to scarcity, power asymmetry, and a lack of trust between riparian neighbor states. For example, if upstream Riparian State A builds a large hydro plant, it can influence the amount of water their downstream neighbor, State B, receives. This may lead State B to securitize water, because they are now dependent on State A, who can dictate the flow of water, affecting either floods or droughts in State B. Such a power dynamic was seen in the late 1990s between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with the former two threatening to withhold or release large quantities of water during heightened tensions.

When water is viewed as a diminishing resource, it leads countries into a zero-sum game, where there must be absolute winners and losers. When placed in such a scenario, states will aggressively compete for the resource. Claiming and storing vast amounts of water not only deprives your rival of the resource but also destroys the downstream environment and societies previously dependent on regular flows. Water securitization, therefore, leads to a dangerous environmental game and increased tensions, while merely resulting in a net neutral outcome.

One example is how Israel and Palestine share water in the West Bank. Israel greatly limits the ability Palestine has to develop water infrastructure and therefore, regularly access water sources. The guarding of water by Israel shows their securitization of the resource. In turn, the scarcity of water Palestinians face leads them to securitize it as well. Very simply, in this case Israel is the winner and Palestine the loser because of the zero-sum game their securitization led them to.

According to the Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy Database (TFDD), which traces conflicts related to water issues, no modern conflicts have started solely because of water scarcity. Such scarcity, however, is seen as a catalyst, eventually leading to economic insecurity, political instability, and possible conflict. While water securitization develops because of scarcity, lack of trust, and power asymmetry, it persists with a lack of transparent information and an inability for riparian states to cooperate.

Water Diplomacy and Cooperation

Thankfully, full-fledged water wars have not (yet) happened. Instances of water scarcity and insecurity have instead pushed many countries towards water diplomacy. Before diplomacy can happen, however, water must be desecuritized, meaning it is no longer treated as a competitive and finite resource. Innovation and sustainable practices help countries avoid viewing water as a finite resource by expanding and stretching their water supplies. Fixing leaking water infrastructure, which accounts for nearly 30-50% of lost water, is an approachable step that makes the most of existing sources. Desalination plants, on the other hand, are an example of innovation creating new sources of freshwater. Some prominent examples of successful water diplomacy that led to successful cooperation frameworks include the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the 1994 Jordan-Israel water treaty.

Once a framework for water cooperation has been reached, typically a river basin organization, or RBO, is established as a third party tasked with mediating and coordinating the riparian states’ demands. There are several factors for an RBO to operate successfully.

The first, is the gathering and sharing of trusted and transparent data with all stakeholders. Trust in the RBO, and therefore the neutral management of shared water, is built when all parties have the same accurate information and can pinpoint its origins. The second, is involving all relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process. This process includes formal actors, such as national and local governments, and informal actors, including farmers, fishermen, and cultural groups dependent on the water source. The MRC, for example, when considering the Lao-proposed Pak Beng hydropower project, looked at the energy and economic benefits for Laos, as well as the consequences on local fisheries and sediment flow. The MRC engaged and informed local communities dependent on the river about the project, gathering data and grassroots information. Third, there are procedures preventing states from taking unilateral decisions that may influence the normal flow of a river or levels of an aquifer. Essentially, member riparian states must agree on major projects affecting their water supply before they are built. Lastly, there must be RBO mechanisms that facilitate negotiations and support solutions regarding shared water sources. This ensures the RBO maintains its position as a neutral and legitimate platform for water problems to be openly discussed and solved. These traits not only enable an RBO to successfully organize multilateral water cooperation but also prevent future conflicts over shared water sources.

Water diplomacy, however, does not always lead to successful water cooperation. For example, while numerous water agreements were signed in the late 1990s between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, they never held. Water remained securitized and was bargained like energy sources between the countries. While water security was not the main driver of tensions between the countries, it was a major contributing factor. Eventually, the power asymmetry between the upstream country, Kyrgyzstan, and the downstream country, Uzbekistan, nearly led to open conflict in 1997-98. However, it’s important to note that water scarcity did not drive this escalation. Kyrgyzstan, for example, threatened to either severely restrict water or flood Uzbekistan’s lucrative cotton fields. In retaliation, Uzbekistan threatened to restrict fossil fuel exports to Kyrgyzstan during the winter (Karaev, 2005). While water cooperation may not have prevented the final build-up of tensions, it could have mediated a contributing factor that nearly led to war between the two countries.

While there is no agreed-upon definition of water diplomacy, in general it is a process where two riparian states discuss how to allot shared water sources. However, all negotiating parties must desecuritize water before and during the diplomatic process. Innovative and sustainable practices, ranging from fixing water infrastructure to desalinization plants, draw away from a finite resource mindset by extending existing water sources. If diplomatic efforts are successful, riparian states then focus on water cooperation by establishing an RBO, which then mediates water issues between relevant parties. A successful RBO coordinates, collects, and shares transparent data; involves all relevant stakeholders; prevents unilateral decision-making by members; and remains an impartial and lawful body for negotiations. The MRC is a good RBO that has matured to include all these elements.

Conclusion

Most terrestrial life and all human civilizations have started because of access to freshwater. Water, which was used for agriculture, livestock, human consumption, and industry. Water, which led to economic progress, cultural development, and a growing population. Yet in the face of growing global demand for water, coupled with climate change, many communities and countries face water scarcity. Such scarcity can push states towards one of two strategies. They either treat water like a limited resource or cooperate over shared water. Treating water as a finite resource, however, leads states to compete and safeguard shared water sources from others, much like strategic energy reserves. Not only does such action lead to a zero-sum game, where there are only absolute winners and losers, but it can increase tensions between states and places undue strain on the environment.

The second approach to water scarcity is water diplomacy and cooperation, which avoids unnecessary pressure on the environment as well as provides a setting for conflict de-escalation and resolution.  Additionally, water cooperation does not simply focus on the quantity of water flowing between riparian states. It also focuses on the quality of water, rate of flow, access to hydroelectric dams, and their impact on the environment and local communities. Water diplomacy and cooperation, therefore, present a unique intersection between power, politics, economics, environmentalism, and science.

While states have the sovereign right to decide on how to pursue their national interests and security, increased cooperation and de-escalation over such an important and universal resource is essential for a net positive outcome. I’ll be honest, I am looking for editorial direction on how to end the analysis.

Recommended readings:

  1. Christiane Fröhlich, Desecuritisation of Water as a Key for Water Diplomacy, European Institute of the Mediterranean April, 2020
  2. Anoulak Kittikhoun, Denise Michèle Staubli, Water Diplomacy and Conflict Management in the Mekong: from Rivalries to Cooperation, Journal of Hydrology 567, October, 2018
  3. Zaininddin Karaev, Water Diplomacy in Central Asia, Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 9, March 2005
  4. Lawrence Susskind & Shafiqul Islam, Water Diplomacy: Creating Value and Building Trust in Transboundary Water Negotiations, Harvard Law School Daily Blog, October, 2012
  5. Kata Molnar, Rosa Cuppari, Susanne Schmeier, Siegfried Demuth, Preventing Conflicts, Fostering Cooperation – The many Roles of Water Diplomacy, UNESCO International Center for Water Cooperation, December, 2017

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Water We Going to Do? An …

by Theodore Goujon time to read: 9 min
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