[Report] A Silent Arms Race? North Africa and the Middle East: Recent Military Acquisitions

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Insitute the Middle East and North Africa rank among the biggest regions for arms imports globally. Indeed, the Middle East represented 27 percent of worldwide arms imports and North Africa comprised 2.2 percent between 2020 and 2024. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait were among the top ten importers. This pattern has been influenced by significant geopolitical events, such as: the Abraham Accords; the conflict in Ukraine; turmoil in Sudan; the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Hussain and Tartir 2025).

Established in 2020, the Abraham Accords represented a significant diplomatic change by normalizing relations between Israel and various Arab nations, namely the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. The main objecives were to bolster bilateral relations and to enhance defense collaboration, through joint air defense efforts and a rise in arms sales. By 2022, almost 25% of Israel’s defense exports came from Arab nations. Nevertheless, the Gaza conflict that started in 2023 weakened these ties by diminishing public backing in Arab nations, although no nation has officially pulled out (Soliman 2022).

According The Middle East Institute (2025b), drone warfare has become pivotal to regional conflicts, particularly following the Arab Spring, with extensive deployment in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. In five years, regional investment in drones has reached approximately 1.5 billion dollars.

At the same time, based on the Middle East and North Africa Report from the US Congress (2023), Russia’s position as a supplier has diminished because of the Ukraine conflict and sanctions, hindering shipments and restricting the functionality of its equipment. In the following this article will provide an overview over the military strategies in North Africa and the Middle East, adding high complexity to a region that is prone for military strains.

Offensive Actors: Rearming Under the Radar

The Gulf states and their North African counterparts follow unique but related defense modernization strategies influenced by varying threat perceptions, financial resources, and long-term goals. Although all aim to improve military effectiveness, their strategies differ, including significant dependence on imports, diversification of sources, and initiatives to develop domestic industrial capabilities.

Morocco has undergone one of the most notable military expansions in the region. Arms imports increased over ten times from 2005-2009 to 2010-2014 before falling in recent years (Hussain and Tartir 2025). The primary supplier continues to be the United States, with France and Israel next. Its purchases center on armored vehicles, missiles, and aircraft, notably armed drones. At the heart of Morocco’s modernization lies its F 16 initiative, which integrates enhancements to current aircraft alongside the procurement of new, advanced fighters (Trevithick 2026). A maintenance center in Benslimane assists this fleet and could also cater to other African operators (Helou 2022). The signing of the Abraham Accords led to enhanced relationships with Israel on missile defense, surveillance, and domestic manufacturing of loitering munitions (Helou 2021). According to The National Interest (2025) and The Jerusalem Post (2025), Morocco’s strategic objectives include a potential F 35 purchase and a defense budget nearing 19 billion dollars. Experts believe that this strategy is also fueled by competition with Algeria.

Algeria, on the other hand, presents a differing example. Despite a significant drop in imports, it keeps investing in sophisticated capabilities, particularly products from Russia, China, and other allies (Hussain and Tartir 2025). Concerning its drone capacities, its fleet of drones is extensively varied and Algeria is focusing on minimal local development and on limiting Chinese imports of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (Mitzer and Oliemans 2021). Based on The National Interest (2025a), the North African country aims at developing a more sophisticated military structure starting with the Russian stealth fighter Su 57. Further acquisitions of aircraft are being contemplated (Atalayar 2026). Algeria’s military plan places the country as a prominent regional power, especially against its neighbour Morocco (Army Recognition Group 2024).

Israel holds a distinctively advantageous status. Despite being the sixth largest arms importer in the region, conventional statistics underestimate the extent of its ties with the United States (Hussain and Tartir 2025). According to Council on Foreign Relations (2025), Washington accounts for the majority of Israel’s imports and offers substantial financial aid, with total support surpassing 300 billion dollars when adjusted for inflation. A permanent agreement ensures 3.8 billion dollars each year until 2028, encompassing significant funding for missile defense. Israel has gained from specific measures permitting certain assistance to bolster its internal defense sector, although this is being gradually discontinued. After the Hamas attacks in October 2023 and the Gaza conflict, US assistance significantly increased, featuring more than 16 billion dollars in extra funding and substantial shipments of military supplies, bolstered by pre-positioned US reserves. At the heart of Israel’s long-term strategy is the F 35I fleet, anticipated to total 75 aircraft, with an increase in recent orders indicating both wartime requirements and ongoing US dedication to maintaining Israel’s military edge (Fabian 2024).

Saudi Arabia continues to be a leading arms importer in the region, even with a 41 percent drop from 2015-2019 to 2020-2024, still representing 23 percent of total MENA imports. The United States remains its main provider (Hussain and Tartir 2025). This decrease indicates both purchasing cycles and a strategic change under Vision 2030, which seeks to localize more than half of defense expenditures (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2016). As of 2024, localization had achieved almost 25 percent, reflecting advancements while also underscoring the magnitude of the challenge (General Authority for Military Industries 2025). Saudi Arabia’s approach emphasizes technology transfer, collaborations, and local production, backed by a substantial defense budget that has increased considerably in recent years (Matthews et al. 2025). A significant arms agreement in 2025 valued at 142 billion dollars highlights that imports will continue to be crucial despite the growth in local capacity. The development of drones has emerged as a crucial focus, particularly following the 2019 assaults on essential infrastructure, leading Saudi companies to collaborate on UAV systems with international partners (Soliman 2022). The modernization of the air force remains a key element, with various advanced fighter alternatives being evaluated, all linked to industrial collaboration needs (Brahy 2025b).

The United Arab Emirates takes a distinct approach by merging lower import volumes with proactive geopolitical involvement via proxy networks (Hussain and Tartir 2025). The halt of a significant US arms agreement related to F 35 fighters symbolized a pivotal moment, fueled by disputes regarding technology and issues of sovereignty. In turn, the UAE shifted its focus to France, obtaining a substantial contract for Rafale jets and helicopters while broadening its supplier network (Mezher 2021, Ali 2022). Concurrently, it has enhanced defense collaboration with China, involving aircraft acquisitions and joint drills, generating strain on its long-established security ties with the United States (Ali 2022, Kahwaji 2021). Regardless, US defense relationships continue to be robust, featuring active arms sales and support agreements (US Congress 2026b) the Abraham Accords have created new opportunities for partnership with Israel, especially in drone and counter-drone technologies, fostering the growth of a local UAV ecosystem (Soliman 2022).

Qatar showcases the fastest and most extensive procurement growth in the area. Although it is small, it emerged as the largest arms importer in the Middle East during 2020-2024, influenced by the strategic effects of the 2017-2021 blockade (Hussain and Tartir 2025). This experience hastened initiatives to develop robust and independent defense systems. Qatar procures equipment from various Western partners, featuring significant purchases such as sophisticated aircraft and naval ships (The White House 2025, Army Recognition Group 2025). Anticipated future expenditures are projected to keep increasing, bolstered by infrastructure development like a new naval base and a rise in personnel (Kenez 2024).

Qatar has further strengthened important defense collaborations. Collaboration with Turkey involves a combined air squadron that incorporates resources from both nations (Kenez 2024), while ties with the United States have deepened via significant agreements addressing missile defense, drones, and wider security collaboration. These agreements are part of a broader economic collaboration surpassing 240 billion dollars, which goal is to enhance Qatar’s strategic significance and to sustain a highly proficient and contemporary military capability (The White House 2025).

Defensive Actors: Between Rebuilding and Modernization

While some state military powers are focused on modernisation efforts, other state military powers have shared a common goal of strengthening deterrence and rebuilding military capability as a means to combat the evolving regional security environment, rather than projecting military power beyond their borders. Therefore, supply acquisition strategies will be instrumental in achieving operational readiness, reforming institutions, and diversifying suppliers and in the majority of cases states’ military budgets are limited. More states are now focusing on investing in modern technology and developing local industry capability and, thereby, increasing their resilience and decreasing their strategic reliance.

Egypt’s path highlights diversification and strategic realignment. Despite the decline in imports, attention has transitioned from aviation to maritime strength, indicating altered security concerns in the Mediterranean and nearby areas (Hussain and Tartir 2025). Egypt integrates international acquisitions with local projects, especially in drones, although its air force is limited by enduring US limitations on advanced armaments (Soliman 2022, US Congress 2026). Initiatives to address these constraints involve increasing its Rafale fleet (Satam 2025), obtaining new US missile authorizations, and strengthening relations with China (US Congress 2026a, Dizboni El-Baz 2021, Arbeli 2025). Army Recognition Group (2026a) has stated that discussions with France regarding submarines emphasize Egypt’s wider objective of gaining not just equipment but also technology transfer and domestic production abilities, reinforcing its aim to diminish dependence on external suppliers gradually.

Jordan’s modernization is narrower in scope yet strategically targeted. A national transformation strategy highlights adjusting to emerging threats via cyber capabilities, drones, artificial intelligence, and better coordination among military branches, while also enhancing domestic industry (King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein 2026, Arab News 2026). Procurement choices show a purposeful diversification approach. SR5 and WM 120 rocket systems supplied by China have enhanced long-range precision strike abilities (Army Recognition Group 2025c), while ongoing collaboration with the United States offers advanced radar and surveillance technologies. This strategy demonstrates Jordan’s dual approach, utilizing various partners for distinct abilities while preventing dependency on any one supplier (Bernacchi 2026).

Iraq’s modernization initiative is the most ambitious considering its starting conditions, seeking to restore military capability after years of warfare (Shafaq News 2026). A suggested agreement with France for 14 Rafale F4 fighter jets would tackle significant shortcomings in its existing air force by incorporating cutting-edge avionics, sensor integration, and contemporary weaponry (Brahy 2026). Complementary investments consist of South Korea’s KM SAM air defense system and the US-backed enhancement of satellite communications infrastructure. Combined, these initiatives create an extensive program aimed at revitalizing operational capacity via varied international collaborations and tackling persistent structural deficiencies (Iddon 2026, Aziz 2026).

The Special Conditions of Yemen and Libya

Libya and Yemen exemplify the most severe instances of arms proliferation due to conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. In these two cases, foreign intervention, breaches of sanctions, and the militarization of non-state entities have established persistent cycles of instability that global regulations have been unable to manage.

In Libya, competing foreign interests have led to ongoing arms shipments that disrupt any enduring resolution. The West’s early engagement centered on counterterrorism and managing migration, with France backing Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, while Italy and the U.S. perceived Libya as a barrier to jihadist growth and irregular migration. These initiatives ultimately backfired, as ongoing arms supplies heightened proliferation, bolstered black markets, and extended instability. Regional players escalated the conflict even more (Serim 2023). The LNA’s main supporters were the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, which provided aircraft, equipment, and direct military help, breaching the UN arms embargo due to their opposition to Islamist groups and driven by security and economic goals. Western military sales to these nations indirectly played a role when weapons were redirected to Libya (Dziadosz et al. 2026).

Turkey supported the Tripoli-based government by supplying drones and air defense systems, which stopped Haftar’s 2020 offensive and created a delicate military stalemate. Russia provided indirect assistance via advanced aircraft that were allegedly used by private contractors. In spite of the embargo, both parties persist in obtaining arms via smuggling operations, middlemen, and secret supply routes. The increase of drones has been notably substantial, with conflict showcasing systems from both Turkey and China (Iddon 2026a). The LNA’s announced intentions to purchase fighter jets and training planes from Pakistan might further shift the power dynamics (De Souza 2025).

Yemen offers a similar yet even more striking illustration. According to the Counter Extermism Project (2023), the Houthis, even while subject to a UN arms embargo, have created an advanced arsenal featuring ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, air defense systems, and unmanned maritime platforms that can hit targets as far as 2.600 kilometers away. From 2015 onwards, they have carried out over 1.800 assaults, while significant amounts of arms intended for them have been seized, with some excess apparently being resold. Iran has played a key role in this development, offering both entire systems and specialized knowledge.

Nevertheless, the most notable change has been in the direction of local manufacturing. By 2024 to 2025, the majority of intercepted deliveries comprised parts and raw materials obtained worldwide through intricate networks, with China becoming a key supplier. Satellite images and captured equipment suggest an increasing semi-industrial production capability. Simultaneously, Iran persists in delivering sophisticated systems via discreet avenues. Yemen exemplifies the constraints of sanctions and the capacity of a resolute non-state actor to develop a robust and adaptable military force that alters regional security dynamics (Salisbury et al. 2026).

Conclusion

The Middle East is undergoing a major shift in military power driven by the rapid spread of unmanned aerial vehicles among both state and non state actors. Although the countries examined display different procurement patterns and strategic priorities, three broader dynamics emerge:

1) Competition between states within a region is driving countries towards military modernization, i.e. Morocco and Algeria are competing with each other for military superiority and the Gulf monarchs are attempting to gain greater influence within the region by building their militaries.

2) Many states have developed a dissatisfaction with importing arms only and are now actively seeking to develop their own indigenous defense industries, i.e. Saudi Arabia is implementing Vision 2030, Morocco has created a series of initiatives to expand its military capabilities through partnerships (maintenance and production of military hardware), Egypt has focused its efforts on the creation of local manufacturing capabilities, and the UAE is investing significantly in the development of indigenous UAV capabilities, demonstrating that states want to pursue domestic production of critical weapon systems as a way to increase their economic growth and create jobs for their citizens and create stability in their respective regions.

3) Alliances are becoming increasingly important in the procurement of defense systems and equipment. While the United States continues to be the most significant security partner for the majority of states in the region, countries are diversifying their relationships with other nations (i.e. France, China, Turkey, Russia, and Israel) and engaging those countries according to their specific strategic interests.

In “Drones are re-engeneering the geopolitics of the Middle East” (2022) Soliman highlights that, as part of this overall change, drones have become a key part of today’s regional conflict. By using cheap drones, Turkey has shown that they can redefine typical warfare methods, while Iran has also used drone systems to support its local allies and non-state actors. The initial use of drones in Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other areas has made military intervention easier, increased its use as a proxy method of warfare, and changed the meaning of air superiority. In response, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other countries have increased spending on developing their own drone capabilities and developing counter-drone weapons.

Overall, the contemporary arms competition in the Middle East is “silent” in the sense that there has been no decrease in military rivalry, but rather because it is becoming increasingly evident that there are fewer direct conflicts between states and more reliance on innovation, industrialisation, strategic partnerships, and proxy wars as the means of ability to undertake military operations. With the rapid proliferation of new technologies for warfare (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, missile delivery systems, and cyber weapons), as well as with increased growth of defence industries in the Middle East, the sources of future regional military power will likely be less characterised by the total size of a state’s military physical arsenal, but will instead depend much more upon ability to develop, manufacture, and operationalise growingly complex weapons systems. Additionally, the ongoing trade in illegal arms and use of proxy wars will contribute to continuation of these trends and shape the Middle Eastern security environment for many years to come.

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