Introduction
Over the past decade and a half, global politics has experienced significant and disruptive transformations. On a global level, although with different shades, political landscapes have been reshaped by the rise of populism and nationalism, coupled with the erosion of democratic institutions, the rise of illiberal ones, or the entrenchment of authoritarian regimes. This trend—often described as a wave of democratic backsliding—represents not just isolated developments but a coordinated shift that is altering the fabric of international relations and domestic governance alike. Scholars have documented a new form of democratic backsliding: Bermeo in “On democratic backsliding” (Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, January 2016, pp. 5–19) where democracies do not collapse abruptly through military coups or revolutions, but rather erode incrementally, as elected leaders manipulate legal frameworks to extend their authority and restrict dissent. Levitsky and Ziblatt in “How Democracies Die”(2018), illustrate this phenomenon through detailed case studies, highlighting how democracies can deteriorate from within as leaders exploit legal mechanisms to curtail political freedoms, eliminate checks and balances, and consolidate power.
This trend is particularly evident in numerous countries where populist leaders have leveraged anti-elitist rhetoric, xenophobic tendencies, and nationalistic appeals to gain broad public support and implement policies that weaken democratic institutions mocked as ineffective or constrictive towards people’s will. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary offers a paradigmatic example of this form of “illiberal democracy.” Orbán has strategically consolidated power by curtailing judicial independence, restricting media freedoms, and weakening civil society, and now his party and cronies have entrenched themselves in power positions hard to challenge. His emphasis on “illiberalism” has become a blueprint for other leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, who view this model as an alternative to Western liberal democracy.
Similarly, in Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has systematically reduced the independence of the judiciary, weakened opposition voices, and exerted control over the media, consolidating his hold on power and transforming Turkey’s political system into a more authoritarian structure, with a semblance of electoral democracy but aggressive agenda on foreign affairs coupled with a reaffirmation of Turkey’s Islamic roots. In Latin America, Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro rose to prominence through a blend of populist and nationalist rhetoric, which he wielded to polarize public opinion and cast the media and judiciary as opponents of the people’s will. His approach to governance, marked by an undermining of democratic norms and a rejection of international standards on human rights, resonated with similar movements around the globe.
Traditional democratization theory assumes that younger democracies are more susceptible to destabilization due to their comparatively weaker institutions and less established political norms. The older, consolidated democracies should theoretically possess a behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional resilience that protects them from such regression. However, recent developments in democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom challenge this assumption, demonstrating that even well-established democracies are vulnerable to authoritarian pressures, nationalism, and the erosion of democratic norms. In the United States, for instance, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue that the rise of populist rhetoric, particularly during the Trump administration, has undermined core democratic norms of mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance, casting the judiciary, media, and opposition parties as adversaries rather than democratic institutions. Similarly, the Brexit process in the United Kingdom showcased the susceptibility of even longstanding democratic institutions to populist mobilization and societal polarization. Scholars like Flinders (2018) argue that the “resilience paradox” in the UK’s institutions—where perceived stability fosters complacency—has left even this mature democracy exposed to destabilizing forces.
In 2024, South Asia appears to be rediscovering the power of democracy and popular participation. Authoritarian, nationalist, and populist tendencies are on the rise globally, and countries in this region are sending a strong signal of resistance and renewal. Through elections, civil uprisings, and even armed resistance, many South Asian populations show an unexpected attachment to democracy. This year, citizens and activists have challenged the growing authoritarian tendencies and indicated that even well-established leaders are subject to accountability showing interesting examples of democracy’s capacity for self-correction, adaptation, and responsiveness
India
In 2024, against all forecasts, after the general elections in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party lost the absolute majority in the parliament. Modi, whose decade-long tenure was marked by Hindu nationalist policies, consolidation of power, crony capitalism, and the systematic marginalization of religious minorities, had been widely expected to dominate the polls. His administration had leveraged control over media narratives, tightened its grip on state institutions, and faced repeated accusations of targeting journalists and political opposition. Despite these efforts, election results presented a significant setback for Modi’s BJP, which fell short of securing an even larger majority in parliament, BJP projected a target of over 400 seats, but it was able to secure only 240 out of 543—a dramatic decline from its previous standing. This outcome reflected an unanticipated discontent with Modi’s polarizing governance style. His Hindu nationalist and Hindu religious extremism failed to win the support of the people who were affected by economic challenges such as inflation, unemployment, and a struggling manufacturing sector. Regional parties and opposition coalitions, representing India’s diverse social fabric, capitalized on this discontent. The setback has forced Modi to shift his approach, as the BJP now relies on coalition partners to maintain power. This shift is likely to constrain Modi’s executive authority, compelling him to engage in a more collaborative, consensus-based style of governance—a stark contrast to the strongman image he has projected over the years. The election outcome not only tempers the BJP’s power but gives hope to India’s secular and democratic identity. In this climate, Modi’s leadership may need to evolve from divisive tactics to building bridges, balancing his ambitions with the demands of a diverse electorate.
Ultimately, the 2024 election reaffirms the resilience of India’s democracy, where the electoral process serves as a powerful check on authoritarian drift. The challenge now lies in Modi’s willingness to adapt, as the country’s democratic institutions and its people call for a more balanced and inclusive political approach. This historic vote could symbolize a turning point in India’s backsliding tendencies, reinforcing the principles of democracy.

Mass Gathering of Anti Citizenship Act protests at Chandmari, Guwahati. Source: Wikimedia Commons (this file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license. No modifications to the original picture were made)
Thailand
Thailand’s political landscape was rocked by the dissolution of the Move Forward Party (MFP), a popular progressive force that has consistently challenged Thailand’s conservative establishment. On August 7, 2024, the Constitutional Court disbanded MFP, citing its pledge to reform the country’s strict lese-majeste law, which criminalizes insults to the monarchy. The court’s ruling, rooted in a desire to “protect” the monarchy, reflects the power dynamics that have long kept Thailand’s political landscape under the influence of unelected bodies aligned with royalist and military interests. This dissolution follows the fate of the MFP’s predecessor, the Future Forward Party, which was banned in 2020 on different charges, though similarly tied to its progressive and anti-establishment agenda.
The dissolution of MFP, which won the most votes in the 2023 elections, effectively invalidated the political voices of over 14 million Thais who supported the party’s campaign for a more transparent, democratic government. The party’s proposed reforms, which included breaking up monopolies, ending military conscription, and re-evaluating the lese-majeste law, resonated with Thailand’s youth and urban populations, including in traditionally conservative Bangkok. Despite this support, Thailand’s military-appointed Senate blocked MFP from forming a government, reinforcing the establishment’s resistance to any political entity threatening the status quo. Following the dissolution, MFP lawmakers announced the formation of the People’s Party, under which they plan to continue their reformist agenda to achieve a “decisive victory” in the next general election in 2027.
This shift is emblematic of Thailand’s “supra-constitutional” order, a term coined by Thai scholar Somchai Preechasilpakul to describe a system in which conservative and unelected institutions maintain ultimate control over Thailand’s political sphere, beyond the scope of electoral mandates. This structure has allowed royalist and military-aligned actors to dissolve multiple reformist parties since 2007, including those associated with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, illustrating the lengths to which Thailand’s conservative establishment will go to prevent democratic forces from gaining ground. Despite these obstacles, the Move Forward Party’s dissolution has not discouraged its leaders or supporters. Their strategic decision to regroup under the People’s Party aims to harness public frustration with the ruling elite, who many argue lack a clear vision for Thailand’s future beyond maintaining the status quo. The fate of the People’s Party will likely be shaped by its ability to galvanize this discontent, particularly in urban centers, and by the performance of the incumbent government, which has struggled to address pressing economic issues, further fueling calls for reform.
The dissolution has not only intensified domestic dissatisfaction but has also drawn international attention, with political analysts warning that these undemocratic measures could lead to increased political instability. MFP’s former leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, cautioned that this episode might spark renewed mass protests. Although Pita himself advocates for change through parliamentary channels, the pervasive sense of injustice among Thai citizens, particularly the youth, suggests that the conservative establishment’s approach could ultimately backfire, reinforcing rather than suppressing the democratic aspirations that MFP and now the People’s Party represent.

Protestors around Victory Monument (Bangkok). Source: Wikimedia Commons (This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license. No modifications to the original image).
Bangladesh
The current political upheaval in Bangladesh has resulted in Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation from office and flight from the country, ending her 15-year rule. Once hailed as a time of economic expansion and stability, Hasina’s administration came to be associated with authoritarian governance, marked by a deterioration of democratic norms, grave violations of human rights, and a stepped-up assault on dissent. She oversaw a string of dubious elections in Bangladesh that were tainted by allegations of manipulation, intimidation of opposition parties, and widespread media control, all of which served to silence anyone who tried to oppose her rule. Bangladesh was turning into an autocratic stronghold as civil rights were restricted and institutions that had previously supported democratic norms were methodically destroyed.
A period of political change is now underway in Bangladesh because of Hasina’s regime’s fall, with Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus leading an interim caretaker government that aims to reestablish democratic principles. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and other political organizations, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, have been able to reenter the political sphere of Bangladesh due to the interim government’s restoration of competition. However, there are significant obstacles to this democratization endeavor, such as economic instability brought on by years of unfair economic policies and an excessive reliance on the textile industry, as well as sectarian tensions that have erupted in the absence of a strong-handed government. Bangladesh’s economy, which has suffered from slow GDP growth, a depreciating currency, and a substantial national debt linked to megaprojects that have not produced the anticipated returns, is being actively watched by economists. Addressing these issues while simultaneously fostering a stable political environment will be a key test for the interim administration.
The provisional government’s ability to rebuild Bangladesh’s democratic institutions will likely define the country’s political future. While Hasina’s regime stifled opposition and hollowed out democratic structures, there is a renewed public appetite for reform and accountability. Observers suggest that establishing a transparent electoral process will be crucial, as will the government’s approach to handling the military’s historic political influence. Long-standing institutions like the Rapid Action Battalion, implicated in numerous human rights abuses, may need significant restructuring or disbanding to facilitate democratic consolidation. The caretaker government’s success in promoting an inclusive and representative political environment will also depend on addressing inter-communal tensions and ensuring the protection of minority groups often marginalized under Hasina’s rule.
The path to a stable democracy remains fraught with challenges, yet the opportunity for a fresh start has generated optimism within Bangladesh and among its international allies. If managed effectively, this transition could place Bangladesh on a path to democratic resilience and economic recovery, reshaping its role in South Asia and beyond.

Protesters in Bangladesh. Source: Wikimedia Commons (This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license. No modifications to the original image).
Myanmar
Myanmar’s civil war, now entering its fourth year, began as a direct response to the military junta’s abrupt halt to the nation’s transition towards democracy in 2021. Democratic supporters, faced with oppression and violence, fled to remote regions or rebel-held areas, forging alliances with marginalized ethnic groups and existing armed factions. Together, they have mounted a broad-based resistance to create a more inclusive and democratic Myanmar.
As opposition forces gain ground, the conflict has only intensified. The military junta recently attempted peace overtures, marking its first offer for dialogue since seizing power. Yet, these gestures have been broadly rejected by rebel groups and pro-democracy factions. The exiled National Unity Government, representing Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement, swiftly dismissed the proposal, questioning the junta’s legitimacy in overseeing elections or offering any genuine resolution to the country’s political crisis. Major ethnic armed groups have also rebuffed the overture, demanding the military’s withdrawal from politics, accountability for extensive human rights abuses, and the establishment of a federal democratic constitution—demands the junta is highly unlikely to accept.
The ongoing military strategies and the junta’s failure to negotiate sustainable peace reveal the deep-seated divides within Myanmar. The country is now more fragmented than ever, with the junta retaining control over less than half of Myanmar’s territory. The widespread disillusionment with the regime has fueled both internal resistance and international denunciation, with the United Nations labeling Myanmar as descending into an “abyss of human suffering.” Tens of thousands have been killed, millions displaced, and the nation’s infrastructure and social fabric are steadily eroding. Cross-border crime is escalating, and the deteriorating humanitarian and economic situation shows little sign of abating.
This conflict has become an all-out struggle for democracy against the junta’s dictatorship. As the regime clings to power, the opposition remains resolute, signaling that the fight for Myanmar’s future is far from over and is likely to usher in further turmoil as the crisis deepens.
Conclusion
In 2024, South Asia appears to be rediscovering the power of democracy and popular participation. At a time when centralized authority and authoritarian tendencies are on the rise globally, countries in this region are sending a strong signal of resistance and renewal. In a world of growing democratic backsliding tendencies, South Asia provides a glimpse of hope and reflection, demonstrating how the struggle for democracy can still resonate powerfully.
Bibliography
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Suggested Readings
Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. New York: Crown Publishing Group. Available here: https://archive.org/details/HowDemocraciesDieStevenLevitsky
Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19. Johns Hopkins University Press. Available here: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/607612
Diamond, L. (2019). Ill winds: Saving democracy from Russian rage, Chinese ambition, and American complacency. New York: Penguin Press. Available here: https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/illwinds_ch1excerpt.pdf