The events of October 7 2023 in which Hamas launched a devastating surprise attack against Israel, have reignited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s intelligence and military preparedness. However, despite the scale of this shock, history suggests that the current hostilities, like past confrontations, are unlikely to alter the current state of political and security affairs. Instead, this conflict fits into a recurring cycle in which Israel, initially caught unprepared, responds with overwhelming force to reestablish the superiority of its army and intelligence. This dynamic has played out repeatedly in Israel’s history, creating short-term victories but perpetuating long-term instability and enabling the rise of even more radical factions.
Historical Precedents: Shock and Payback
The Yom Kippur War (1973) is one of the most notable examples of this cycle. Israel’s intelligence, adhering to the flawed Conceptzia doctrine, failed to predict the coordinated surprise attack by Egypt and Syria. The initial shock resulted in heavy Israeli losses, threatening the survival of the state. However, Israel quickly reorganized its forces, counterattacking in both the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Intelligence operations provided real-time battlefield data, enabling precise strikes and the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. By the war’s end, Israel had reclaimed its dominance, but the psychological damage of the surprise attack prompted widespread reforms in its intelligence community, which temporarily restored confidence. However, the war strengthened the first Assad regime in Syria, which had been extremely antagonistic towards Israel.
Similarly, the Second Intifada (2000–2005) began as a wave of violent protests and suicide bombings that overwhelmed Israel’s security apparatus. Hamas emerged as a major player during this period, exploiting the discontent fueled by failed peace negotiations. Israel responded with Operation Defensive Shield, employing targeted assassinations and incursions into Palestinian territories to dismantle militant networks. The military successes and elimination of key leaders temporarily restored Israel’s sense of security but also cemented Hamas’ status as a dominant force in Gaza, setting the stage for future clashes.
The 2006 Lebanon War followed a similar trajectory. Hezbollah’s cross-border raids and rocket attacks exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s northern defenses. Israel launched a large-scale military campaign, heavily bombing Hezbollah positions and infrastructure. While Hezbollah survived the war, its operational capacity was degraded, and Israel’s deterrence was reestablished. Yet, Hezbollah emerged politically stronger, continuing to build its arsenal and influence with Iranian support, highlighting the limitations of Israel’s short-term military payback.
Disaster Victim Identification after 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. (Attributiom: Spokesperson unit of ZAKA / CC BY-SA 4.0. No modifications to the original image were made).
The Current Conflict: October 7 and Beyond
The October 7 attacks reflect yet another instance of Israel’s unpreparedness, this time involving failures in both intelligence (Shin Bet) and military readiness. Hamas’ infiltration and massacre revealed gaps in Israel’s surveillance systems and defense protocols. As in previous cycles, Israel has responded with overwhelming force, targeting Hamas’ infrastructure and leadership while conducting a ground offensive in Gaza. These actions aim to destroy Hamas as a military and political entity while restoring the perception of Israeli dominance.
However, as history has shown, such payback operations often come with unintended consequences. The destruction of Hamas may create a power vacuum in Gaza, potentially allowing even more radical factions to rise. Islamic Jihad, or groups aligned with ISIS, could exploit the chaos, perpetuating the cycle of violence. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s involvement along Israel’s northern border suggests that Israel may face simultaneous threats, further testing its ability to maintain deterrence.
The Intelligence Factor: Patterns of Failure and Recovery
Israeli intelligence has often played a pivotal role in these cycles. While failures like the Yom Kippur War and October 7 highlight vulnerabilities, subsequent operations demonstrate Israel’s capacity to adapt and strike back effectively. The Mossad’s recent targeting of Hezbollah’s communications systems—specifically the destruction of their paging network—shows how Israel is already working to restore its intelligence dominance. Such actions reinforce the psychological and strategic deterrence that Israel relies upon, but they also risk escalating conflicts further.
The reform of Israeli intelligence after the 1973 war led to improved integration between Mossad, Aman, and Shin Bet. Similarly, the aftermath of October 7 may prompt further restructuring to address systemic weaknesses. Yet, as in the past, these reforms are likely to focus on short-term recovery rather than addressing the root causes of conflict.
The Rise of Radicalism: A Perpetual Threat
One of the most troubling aspects of this cycle is its tendency to empower more radical factions. The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982 led to the rise of Hezbollah, a more ideologically extreme and militarily sophisticated adversary. Similarly, the weakening of Fatah during the Second Intifada allowed Hamas to gain power in Gaza. The destruction of Hamas today risks opening the door to even more radical groups, further complicating efforts for long-term peace.
The humanitarian toll of Israel’s military campaigns often fuels resentment, which extremists exploit to recruit and justify their actions. Each round of conflict deepens grievances, perpetuating the cycle of violence rather than resolving it.
The recurring cycle of surprise, violence, and payback has defined Israel’s conflicts with its enemies, from the Yom Kippur War to the Second Intifada, the Lebanon War, and the ongoing battles with Hamas. Each clash exposes vulnerabilities in Israel’s defense, prompting reforms and decisive military actions to restore deterrence. However, these responses often leave deeper political and humanitarian wounds, fueling the rise of more radical adversaries and ensuring the continuation of hostilities.
As Israel faces the aftermath of October 7, it once again seeks to reestablish its military and intelligence dominance. Yet history suggests that this effort, while effective in the short term, will not resolve the underlying dynamics of the conflict. Instead, it risks reinforcing the very conditions that give rise to future threats, leaving the status quo unchanged. “Peace through strength” has proven to be impossible: only a political solution and compromise can pave the way to peace and development.
Bibliography
- CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). (2023). Why Hamas Attacked When It Did. Available here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-hamas-attacked-when-it-did
- MEI (Middle East Institute). (2023). Israel’s Failures and Response to the Hamas Attack: A Preliminary Assessment. Available here: https://www.mei.edu/publications/israels-failures-and-response-hamas-attack-preliminary-assessment
- The New Arab. (2023). Hamas Attack on Israel: Context, Analysis, and Repercussions. Available here: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/hamas-attack-israel-context-analysis-and-repercussions
Suggested Readings
- Wyss, M. (2023), “The October 7 Attack: An Assessment of the Intelligence Failings,” West Point CTC (Combating Terrorism Center); Available here: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-october-7-attack-an-assessment-of-the-intelligence-failings
- Levite, A. (2024), “How Was Israel Caught Off-Guard?,” War on the rocks; Available here: https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/how-was-israel-caught-off-guard
- EU Intelligence. (2023). Hamas Surprise Attack: Failure of Israeli Intelligence Agency Mossad. Available here: https://euintelligence.com/opinion/hamas-surprise-attack-failure-of-israeli-intelligence-agency-mossad
