Svalbard Islands: From Moby-Dick to Resource Exploitation. The Legal Struggle for Sovereignty and Strategic Position

Introduction: A Frozen Frontier Between Law and Geopolitics

Six hundred miles north of mainland Europe, halfway between Norway and the North Pole, lies the Svalbard archipelago, one of the most remote yet strategically significant territories on Earth. Often described as a frozen frontier, Svalbard is governed by one of the most unusual legal regimes in international law. The islands were historically considered terra nullius before being placed under Norwegian sovereignty through the Svalbard Treaty in 1920.

Under this instrument nationals of other signatory states were granted the right to carry out activities there on equal footing as Norwegians. One illustrative example is the Russian coal mines still operating on the Norwegian islands, and several hundred Russians and Ukrainians living and working in Barentsburg, a settlement historically linked to Soviet presence.

The Svalbard Islands lie in a critical maritime corridor between the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean, making it strategically significant for both Europe and other global powers. Historically shaped by whaling, hunting, and trapping, Svalbard later became a center for coal mining, science, and tourism. Today, it remains a hybrid space of cooperation and geopolitical tension, increasingly influenced by Russia, Norway, and broader Arctic competition involving global actors such as China.

From Terra Nullius to International Treaty

For centuries, Svalbard was subject to overlapping claims. Denmark, Norway, Britain, The Netherlands, and Russia all advanced competing arguments based on discovery, geographic proximity, or maritime usage rights. However, none of these claims resulted in effective sovereignty, and the archipelago remained terra nullius.

By the early twentieth century, industrial exploitation, especially coal mining, made formal governance necessary. Negotiations led to the Svalbard Treaty (1920), which established Norwegian sovereignty while guaranteeing equal economic rights to all signatories. Accordingly, Article 1 recognizes “the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway,” whereas Article 3 ensures equal access to economic activities such as mining and shipping. Equally significant is Article 9, which prohibits naval bases and fortifications, making Svalbard a demilitarized zone.

The Soviet Union initially opposed the treaty but recognized Norwegian sovereignty in 1924 and formally acceded in 1935 following the normalization of diplomatic relations. Although the Soviet Union accepted the treaty framework, some Russians have argued that the agreement disadvantaged Russian interests and that Svalbard should have been placed, at least in part, under Russian control. Following the Second World War, however, the USSR sought to revise the existing arrangement by proposing a bilateral agreement with Norway and the transfer of Bjørnøya to Soviet control. Norway rejected these proposals in 1947, reaffirming the existing treaty framework. Nevertheless, Soviet accession established the legal basis for Russia’s continued presence and economic activities on the archipelago.

Norway’s Arctic Interests and Governance

For Norway, Svalbard is both a legal responsibility and a geopolitical asset. The archipelago plays a role in fisheries management, environmental protection, and Arctic governance. It also reinforces Norway’s sovereignty in the High North. Although the treaty guarantees equal access, Norway retains regulatory authority, especially regarding environmental protection and safety standards. The treaty has led to tensions with Russia, which sometimes interprets Norwegian regulations as indirect restrictions on its economic activity.

Norway interprets Article 9 as allowing defensive and administrative military activity while prohibiting offensive infrastructure. Russia, however, has periodically argued that military-related activity in the Arctic undermines the treaty’s demilitarization principles. They claim that “dual-purpose facilities are operating on the archipelago, allowing, along with civilian tasks, to perform military ones, including combat operations on the territory of third countries.”

The dispute reflects deeper interpretative differences: Russia views increasing regulation as strategic exclusion, while Norway views it as legitimate governance. Analysts also note that Svalbard’s strategic position makes it relevant in broader NATO-Russia tensions. Although demilitarized, its location near critical maritime routes gives it latent strategic importance in any future conflict scenario.

Russia’s Strategic Presence in Svalbard

Russia’s presence is concentrated in Barentsburg and the abandoned settlement of Pyramiden, both operated by the state-owned trust Arktikugol. Although mining operations have been economically unprofitable for decades, they continue for strategic and symbolic reasons. During the 1990s, Russian activity declined significantly, but the state chose not to withdraw entirely. Instead, it maintained a reduced but permanent presence, emphasizing historical continuity and geopolitical visibility.

Today, Russian officials frame Svalbard as part of Soviet and Russian Arctic heritage. Pyramiden, in particular, is described as a “monument to Soviet Arctic achievement.” This symbolic framing reinforces Russia’s justification for continued presence. Since the 2000s, Russia has developed a coordinated Arctic strategy. A government commission established in 2007, chaired by senior officials close to the Kremlin, oversees policy regarding Svalbard.

The commission promotes economic diversification, including tourism, fisheries, research, and infrastructure development. The goal is to maintain presence while improving financial sustainability. Arktikugol later created a tourism branch, Arctic Travel Company Grumant, reflecting a shift from purely extractive activity toward mixed economic models. Between 2025 and 2027, Russian subsidies for Svalbard operations are expected to reach approximately 4 billion rubles (over 40 million USD), underscoring the strategic rather than economic logic of the presence.

American and NATO interests 

The unique situation of the Svalbard islands is to be viewed in the exceptional geopolitical climate that is currently affecting the North Atlantic and the Arctic. Beyond Norway and Russia, other geopolitical actors such as China and the USA share a considerable interest in these islands and might seek to influence the situation to their favour. 

The current competition for influence between major powers also views the Arctic as a key region. Particularly, the Svalbard’s position between Russia and NATO makes the islands highly relevant from a strategic viewpoint.

The recent controversy concerning Greenland has made it clear how larger powers might want to take possession of territories belonging to other nations in order to gain strategic advantages. Furthermore, climate change and the melting of glaciers are also relevant factors that are likely to increase the relevance of the Arctic region and the Svalbard Islands. While the increased temperature might make some natural resources more available, new sea routes might be easier to navigate and enable actors such as Russia to reach distant locations more quickly. 

America has a special interest in securing the Arctic region, and NATO represents a valuable institutional framework to pursue such interest: the prevention of Russian and Chinese incursions in the North Atlantic. While the 1920 treaty prevents NATO from the installation of defence forces on the islands, the alliance can support Norway in the patrolling of the Exclusive Economic Zone around the islands by supplying more innovative defence systems and intelligence. The presence of Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula is only 500 miles from the Svalbards, armed with nuclear submarines, which is the main direct threat for NATO in the Arctic. 

While the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine retain considerable attention and resources, the threat from the Arctic remains real, and the USA has a special interest in securing the region. If the 1920 Treaty were to be broken, the likelihood of a direct confrontation would be dangerously tangible. The easiest course for NATO would be the increase of resources and military personnel in mainland Norway, alongside patrolling operations.

Chinese visions

China is one of the signatories of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty (even though China signed in 1925) and has increased its presence in the Arctic region during the last years as a consequence of Beijing’s ambition to become a “near-Arctic State.” China’s interests in the Svalbard and in the Arctic include scientific, research, satellite infrastructure, and trade reasons. 

Once again, it is important to underline that the melting of glaciers and the navigability of the North Sea Route would allow China to enlarge the Silk Roads, and to reach distant markets without dealing with the risks linked to the Malacca strait, became the issue defined by former Chinese President Hu Jintao as Malacca Dilemma.

China is a familiar actor in Arctic geopolitics. The Asian nation has played different roles in Greenland, in the Faroe Islands, and in Iceland. Beyond trade routes, China has a special interest in digital infrastructures and the Svalbard islands are a key element in the Digital Silk Road which is to be seen as an integral part of the 2018 Arctic Strategy. The Chinese have described their activities in the islands as research-oriented, declaring they are acting in a spirit of cooperation with like-minded partners to improve communication infrastructures and routes in the Arctic.  

While China does not have a satellite station in the islands, as it relies on the Norwegian-owned Svalbard Satellite Station to track and receive data from dozens of its polar-orbiting satellites, it does have an important presence in the islands: the Yellow River Station in Ny-Ålesund (established in 2004). This station focuses on space and atmospheric physics, tracking glacier movement, marine and terrestrial ecology, and environmental science. 

This station was then followed by the establishment of similar stations: the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in Kárhóll, Iceland, in 2016; the Chinese Arctic Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2017; and the Greenland Satellite Ground Station in Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, in 2017. It should be noted how research and satellite-linked activities conducted by multiple states have often been described as having a dual-use purpose (research and military). This trend is to be viewed as part of the increased militarisation of the space sector. 

However, Norwegian authorities are suspicious of the Chinese presence in the Svalbard. In the 2026 National Threat Assessment, China is framed as an actor using research as a gateway to Norwegian territory in the High North. The Norwegian government has imposed strict accession rules and required all research activities to be in line with Norwegian research priorities. The same skepticism on Chinese activities in the Arctic was evident on multiple occasions, also causing American pressure on NATO allies. 

Conclusion: A Legal Island in a Geopolitical Storm

Svalbard remains one of the most unique legal and geopolitical spaces in the world. It is simultaneously sovereign and internationalised, peaceful and strategically sensitive, economically marginal and geopolitically significant.

The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 created a stable legal framework but also embedded long-term ambiguity. Norway exercises sovereignty yet must accommodate foreign economic presence. Russia maintains a symbolic and strategic foothold despite limited economic returns.

In this sense, Svalbard is not just an Arctic archipelago but a laboratory of international law. It reflects how legal structures interact with shifting geopolitical realities, resource competition, and national identity.

As Arctic tensions grow and global interest in polar resources increases, Svalbard will likely remain a focal point where law and power continuously intersect.

Beyond Norway and Russia, also the USA and China have their share of interest in the islands as part of their global ambitions and security and trade imperatives. While the treaty prevents any power from militarise the islands, research activities might mask monitoring and intelligence-gathering goals from either geopolitical actor. The evolution of global rivalries and the melting of the glaciers will inevitably make the Svalbard islands a key area in global commercial affairs and strategic competition. 

Readings:

1. Falco, Gregory, Nicolò Boschetti, and Ioannis Nikas. Undercover Infrastructure: Dual-Use Arctic Satellite Ground Stations. CIGI Papers No. 291. Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2024. 
2. Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Meld. St. 32 (2015–2016): Svalbard (Report to the Storting). Oslo: Norwegian Government, 2016. 
3. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Arctic Policy. Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2018.

Three further questions:

1. Is any other geopolitical power going to take any concrete interest in the Svalbard islands in the future?
2. Will Norway become more hostile to Russia or China or the USA if tensions around the islands escalate?
3. Could Russia’s position on the Svalbard Islands be considered a hybrid threat?

Related TNGO articles:

1. Wong, Chung Yu Aloysius. “A Security Economic Dialogue? The Deft Diplomacy Behinds Oslo’s Joint Statement with China on Their Green Cooperation.” The New Global Order, April 29, 2025. 
2. Iovine, Francesco. “The European Union in the Arctic: Objectives and Challenges.” The New Global Order, January 19, 2026. 
3. Wong, Chung Yu Aloysius. “(Analysis) Watch Out – The Looming Arms Race in the Arctic.” The New Global Order, September 27, 2024.