I am currently completing a traineeship in social media at ALDE Party in Brussels, where I research political developments and produce strategic content for social media platforms. Previously, I worked at the United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, within the social media and web team, where I supported the production of content for social media, conducted policy-related research and monitored EU-UN relations.
The first individual to ever successfully navigate the Northwest Passage, a direct maritime route linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was by Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen in 1905. Ever since that exploit, other nations bordering the Arctic region and some more remote from the territory have had to fight to establish their own sovereignty claim over the Arctic territory.
Historically, Canada’s presence in the Arctic was shaped by exploration, voyages, sovereignty patrols and partnerships with Indigenous communities to populate some islands in the region. For much of the 20th century, the Arctic’s extreme climate and year‑round ice kept most foreign actors away and made it difficult for Canada to assert effective control over its northern territory. Climate change, especially the rapid melting of sea ice, has completely changed this situation, opening the region to greater access and interest to all.
Source: Hector John Periquin via Unsplash
As the ice melts, the Northwest Passage becomes increasingly navigable, turning the Arctic into a potential global shipping corridor and a zone of strategic competition. This shift not only increases access to valuable natural resources in the region, but also creates new opportunities for global powers to expand their commercial, political, research and military presence in the region.
The Arctic today is no longer defined by its remoteness but by the new opportunities created as the region becomes more accessible. This unprecedented shift in balance pushes Canada to move beyond its historical claims of territorial sovereignty and demonstrate credible and modern sovereignty claims through long-term presence, military investment, and modern infrastructure. The question is no longer if Canada has sovereignty claims over the Arctic territory but whether if Canada is prepared to defend its sovereignty in a rapidly militarizing Arctic?
Why is the Arctic militarizing?
Russia is driving the militarization of the Arctic because the retreat of sea ice is transforming the northern region into a strategic space it seeks to get control of. Moscow views the Arctic as a core engine of its future economic power; the area holds vast reserves of oil, gas and other critical minerals that Russia considers essential for their national revenue and geopolitical influence.
As the region becomes more accessible, Russia has also rebuilt and modernised many Soviet‑era military installations, turning them into fully operational bases. These facilities allow Russia to deploy advanced forces and house a significant portion of its nuclear assets, strengthening its strategic position across the Arctic’s vast expanse.
So much so that they explicitly link resource development to national security and long‑term economic stability in their Arctic Strategy for 2020-2035. Furthermore, as the region becomes more navigable, Russia saw this as an opportunity to restore and modernise numerous Soviet‑era military installations, making them fully operational in today’s era. With these military infrastructures positioned across the Arctic, Russia can house a significant portion of their nuclear engines, strengthening the country’s strategic position across the Arctic’s vast territory.
China’s interest in militarizing, or more accurately, strategically positioning itself in the Arctic rests on two main pillars: dual‑use infrastructure and long‑term strategic positioning. Although China is not geographically close to the Arctic, they approached the region as a global power seeking access to the economic and geopolitical opportunities created by climate change. Unlike Russia, China has the financial capacity to “finance infrastructure, shape supply chains, saturate weak-governance environments with investment, and capture strategic sectors such as telecom, satellites, logistics, minerals and data.”. China’s scientific research in the Arctic also serves a strategic purpose: by maintaining research stations and regular expeditions, China gains a physical presence in the region and collects information that can support surveillance, navigation systems and future operational planning.
For the United States, the Arctic is seen as a central territory of great-power competition, especially as rapid sea‑ice melt coincides with growing Russian and Chinese activity in the region. The Arctic is also the most direct route for any long‑range missile aimed at North America. Any nuclear strike on the United States would pass over the Arctic and Canadian territory. It is for this reason that a strong U.S. military presence and constant surveillance capabilities are now considered essential to maintaining strategic stability, particularly since neither Russia nor China is part of NATO. Also, the growing strategic importance of the Northwest Passage has also made Greenland a central issue in Arctic security discussions. A 1951 U.S.-Danish agreement allows the United States to operate military sites and bases on Greenland, a presence that is still in accordance with NATO plans, as both countries are members of the alliance.
Canada’s position in the Arctic
Canada’s presence in the Arctic is constrained by chronic underinvestment, limited capabilities, slow modernization and gaps in surveillance. Despite these challenges, Canada still maintains a year‑round presence through roughly 300 full‑time military personnel in the North, supported by 1,700 Canadian Rangers and additional Canadian Armed Forces members. This presence is reinforced by recurring operations such as NANOOK‑NUNAKPUT (2022) and NANOOK‑NUNALIVUT (2023), which demonstrate Canada’s intention to remain active in the region. However, these efforts also highlight the country’s limited permanent capacity to monitor the Arctic effectively, respond quickly to emergencies and assert sovereignty across an increasingly strategic territory.
Furthermore, Canada has long talked about investing in the Arctic but has repeatedly failed to follow through, creating a pattern of promises without the necessary funding to support them. This chronic underinvestment has put Canada behind many of its international partners in critical domains in that area such as infrastructure, military preparedness, equipment and maritime capability. A recent example came in July 2024, when Canada pledged to meet NATO’s target of spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2032, while the United States has consistently spent well above 3% of its GDP on the alliance.
Another example of Canada’s limited investment is their aging icebreaking fleet. In November 2024, Canada, Finland and the United States, three NATO allies and partners, launched the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact) to help modernize Canada’s icebreakers and align the country with its own Arctic foreign policy goals. This initiative is seen as a turning point because it signals an end to Canada’s long‑standing complacency and its dependence on outdated, unreliable equipment.
Source: Gaël Gaborel – OrbisTerrae via Unsplash
Conclusion
In a region where Russia expands its military presence, China deepens its strategic and scientific reach and the United States strengthens its missile‑defence and airspace surveillance network, Canada’s ability to uphold Arctic sovereignty now depends on three pillars: credible and reliable year-round presence, modern infrastructures and sustained and long-term investment, not just political declaration.
As it was demonstrated, Canada is not fully prepared to affirm their northern sovereignty: limited permanent forces, aging infrastructure and slow procurement continue to undermine its credibility. Defending the Arctic does not mean militarizing it, but ensuring Canada can have access and can act quickly across its own territory. We will have to see if Canada can turn a long time commitment in the Arctic into tangible results.
Questions for Further Reflection
Is Canada’s pledge to reach 2% defence spending by 2032 sufficient to close the capability gap in the North?
How much military presence is enough to credibly defend a region as vast and strategically important as the Arctic?
What risks does Canada face if it continues to underinvest in Arctic infrastructure and surveillance systems?
Further reading
Christopher Ynclán Jr. “Finland Finds its Footing in NATO”. The New Global Order. 28 March 2024
The Honourable Tony Dean and the Honourable Jean-Guy Dagenais. “Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape”. Senate Canada. June 2023
The Honourable Ahmed Hussen. “MORE THAN A MOMENT: INVESTING IN CANADA’S ARCTIC SECURITY Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development”. Senate Canada. April 2026
image sources
- hector-john-periquin-6y3q5-9BwmI-unsplash: Unsplash | CC0 1.0 Universal
- 33824: Statista | CC BY-ND 3.0 Unported
- gael-gaborel-orbisterrae-5o34qOu9oQs-unsplash: Unsplash | CC0 1.0 Universal
