The relationship between Hungary and the European Union has seen the escalation of tensions over the past fifteen years. Since Viktor Orbán secured its parliamentary supermajority in 2010, Hungary has increasingly challenged the EU’s fundamental principles. In 2018, the European Parliament triggered Article 7(1) against Hungary and Poland, citing serious concerns regarding the rule of law. Informally referred to as the “nuclear option”, Article 7(1) allows the Council to suspend a member’s voting rights if it is found that they are repeatedly breaking EU values. Despite the significance of this move, the process quickly stalled due to the need for near-unanimity agreement among member states, which allowed Hungary and Poland to provide reciprocal assistance.
In response to this deadlock, the EU shifted towards financial pressure. Since 2022, approximately €32 billion in EU funds destined for Hungary have been frozen. Under the new Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, which included an explicit cause linking the accessions of funds to compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, €22 billion in cohesion funds were suspended. Additionally, around €10 billion in loans and grants from the Recovery and Resilience Facility are still not available. However, while financial leverage has heightened tensions, it has yielded limited progress on compliance. On the contrary, Hungary has repeatedly used its veto power to change Council decisions. Notably, in early 2024, Hungary threatened to block €50 billion in aid to Ukraine, prompting the EU to release €10 billion in frozen funds to avoid a crisis.
Today, the stakes are higher. The EU is preparing its 17th package of sanctions against Russia and negotiating further support for Ukraine, alongside the opening discussions for the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Hungary is expected to leverage its veto again to oppose EU interests in Ukraine and to demand the release of frozen funds. The issue of how to handle Hungary’s difficulties has come back into focus as geopolitical unity becomes more important than ever. Discussions around fully activating Article 7(1) are gaining momentum, suggesting that Brussels may be preparing to act more decisively to safeguard the Union’s integrity.
The context: Hungary’s democratic backsliding and weaponisation of the veto
The EU rationale to invoke the application of Article 7(1) stems from two main behaviours that Hungary has systematically shown so far: the country’s repeated weaponisation of its veto power within the Council and its widening divergence from the Union’s core democratic values.
First, Hungary has consistently used the unanimity requirement for sensitive issues – such as foreign policy, EU finances, justice, and social security – to obstruct collective decision-making. While a qualified majority is enough for most EU matters, unanimity remains mandatory in these fields. Between 2016 and 2022, Hungary accounted for 60% of all foreign policy vetoes issued in the Union, a strikingly high number for a single member state. Notably, Hungary blocked the adoption of the EU’s budget and COVID-19 recovery fund in 2020, the 15% global minimum corporate tax agreement in 2022, and has repeatedly delayed EU financial aid and accession talks for Ukraine. Most recently, in February 2024, it threatened to stop €50 billion aid package to Ukraine. This forced the EU to release €10 billion of previously frozen funds. Hungary has also consistently tried to weaken or delay sanctions against Russia, and it is likely to do the same with the upcoming 17th sanctions package.
Secondly, Hungary’s adherence to the EU’s fundamental values has significantly eroded. Freedom House currently rates Hungary at 65 of 100, which is the lowest score amid EU countries. Concern regarding the decline in human rights has grown among people in Hungary and governments in the Eurozone, especially for the LGBTQ+ community. The 2020 law that took away legal recognition for transgender people and the 2021 law that made it illegal to show homosexuality to minors have both been widely criticised. The last hit has come recently, with a new law making it harder for people to gather, effectively turning Pride marches illegal.
The freedom of the press has also deteriorated. Journalists are finding it harder and harder to hold those in power accountable, which raises worries about the decline of the rule of law. The 2024 “sovereignty protection law” also lets the government spy on people and groups that are thought to be “undermining Hungary’s sovereignty”. The consequence is an increase in the fear of political repression. Judicial independence is still under a lot of threat, which weakens the checks and balances in the Hungarian state.
Hungary’s foreign policy is diverging more and more from that of the EU. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s participation in the 2024 “peace mission” alongside Russian and Chinese leaders, without an EU mandate, further strained relations. Finally, Hungary’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court in April 2025 marked a symbolic step away from the shared commitments underpinning the EU.
Hungary’s actions at home and abroad are increasingly seen as a threat to the EU’s credibility and unity, and not only as a Hungarian problem.
What now? Roads ahead to deal with the EU’s Hungary problem
The present situation allows for three possible pathways for the European Union to choose among. The first option is to preserve the status quo while continuing a policy that applies financial pressure and increases Hungary’s isolation within the Union. Financial tools (such as freezing funds under CPR, RRF, and MFF leverage) have been effective in applying short-term pressure. Additionally, Hungary has grown increasingly dependent on EU funds. In 2016 the EU funds allocated represented 2% of the country’s GDP; in 2024 the number had grown to 12%. It is possible that, particularly due to domestic political pressure, Hungary will soon or later submit to EU demands. However, previous episodes have shown President Orbán’s government unpredictability and its ability to extract concessions through veto threats, as in the case of aid to Ukraine in 2024. If this dynamic of “money-for-nothing” persists without visible compliance, there is a significant risk of eroding EU credibility in a moment where credibility holds significant value in the geopolitical scene. The fear is that financial pressure could result in the exacerbation of political tensions without securing the deep reforms that the Union wants to see.
A second option is that of fully triggering article 7(1) and suspending Hungary’s voting rights. This option would involve formally declaring Hungary as breaching Article 2 TEU; in that case, voting rights in the Council would be suspended, but actual triggering requires unanimity minus Hungary, which the country has always managed to avoid. With Poland’s political shift in 2023, which has seen the new government led by Donald Tusk reposition Poland firmly within the pro-EU camp, Hungary has lost its historical coverage. However, with the election of Robert Fico in Slovakia, a new potential ally has emerged. Fico has historically expressed Eurosceptic views and has criticised EU actions perceived as infringing on national sovereignty. Slovakia under Fico could now play a role similar to Poland’s former one – thereby shielding Hungary by voting against the final stages of Article 7(1). While the use of the “nuclear option” would be symbolically powerful and send a strong signal to other European countries on the Union’s commitment to its funding values, it does not come without risks of backlash. In fact, it could strengthen East-West divisions within the Union, and it risks antagonising Hungary even further.
The third and most drastic option would be expelling Hungary from the European Union altogether. At the present moment, no legal mechanism exists under EU treaties for expelling a member state unilaterally. Article 50 allows countries to leave the Union voluntarily, as, for example, happened with the United Kingdom during Brexit. Since Hungary still profits from inclusion in the EU, a voluntary withdrawal seems unrealistic. A possible caveat would be for every other member state to leave the Union and form a new EU with 26 countries (all current members minus Hungary). However, this option is extremely difficult to sustain, as it would require an incredible amount of trust that all 26 members follow through, and even then, the amount of uncertainty it would create makes the procedure practically unfeasible. The option holds a bleak future for resolving Hungary’s issue as well. Expelling the country would very likely push it further towards Russia’s sphere of influence, creating an even bigger pro-Putin consensus in the heart of Europe. If this were to happen, it would be weakening Europe instead of strengthening it. Moreover, even if significantly weakened, Hungary does remain a democracy, and as such, it retains a potential to form an opposition which might, in the future, realign the country within EU values, as it happened with Poland. Given these factors, it is highly improbable that the expulsion option will be considered as a viable course of action.
A realistic alternative that could break the deadlock imposed by Hungary’s non-cooperation without the need to fully activate Article 7(1) would be that of relying increasingly in Article 20. This clause allows groups of 9 or more countries to voluntarily form enhanced cooperations and work together on specific fields. Its effect would be that of generating a Europe that moves at different speeds and towards different goals, effectively giving birth to a new “core” and creating parallel institutions within the Union. Promoting enhanced cooperation could yield the most constructive results in dealing with Hungary’s problem. It would neutralise veto power without using coercive measures, which may create more instability, and it would recognise a reality which has been slow to surface: what cannot be resolved through unanimity may yet be achieved through unity of purpose.
Questions:
- Should the European Union work towards a transition from a unanimity voting system to a qualified majority on all matters and how could that be achieved?
- Could enhanced cooperations be the future of business for Brussels and how would that look in practice?
- Would a Europe that moves at different speeds be consistent with EU values of equality and developmental cohesion?
Suggested readings:
- Scheppele, K. L., & Morijn, J. (2024). Money for nothing? EU institutions’ uneven record of freezing EU funds to enforce EU values. Journal of European Public Policy, 32(2), 474–497
- Böttner, R. (2022). The Instrument of Enhanced Cooperation: Pitfalls and Possibilities for Differentiated Integration. European Papers, Vol. 7, No 3, pp. 1145-1164
- Dessewffy, T. (2025). Untying the Hungarian knot: Why the EU might stop spoiling the spoiler state. The European Council on Foreign Relations
