- Exploring Lebanon’s Sectarian Status Quo: How the Political System Colonized the Social Mind - 24 November, 2025
- Unseen and Under Siege: What’s Next for Queer Lives in the MENA Region? (Analysis) - 10 September, 2025
- The MENA Region’s Culture of Repression of Dissent: Is a New ‘Arab Spring’ in Motion? - 21 May, 2025
Protesters in front of the Grand Serial, Beirut, carrying a sign that reads “No to Sectarian Rule”. 23 October, 2019. (Author: Nadim Kobeissi, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license. No changes to the original image were made)
Born as a result of colonialism and the reign of foreign countries, Lebanon has long presented itself as a living paradox: its sectarian system, introduced since 1943 under the National Pact agreement, was explicitly designed to ensure equitable parliamentary representation and peaceful coexistence among its diverse religious communities, some of which include Maronites, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Druze. Over time, however, that system backfired and betrayed its very own purpose. It has done less to unite and more to reinforce identity politics, so deeply that sectarianism seeps into not only formal institutions, but also into people’s everyday minds.
Even Lebanese individuals who strongly openly oppose sectarian politics these days frequently find themselves bound by it since it influences their social interactions, implicit presumptions, and what constitutes “normal” politics. Therefore, learning to envision politics outside sectarian logic is not just an institutional problem, but also a psychological and social one.
The Origins of Sectarianism in Lebanon
The National Pact of 1943
The emergence of sectarianism in Lebanon can be traced back to the country’s independence from French forces in 1943. At the time, President Bechara El Khoury and Prime Minister Riad Al Solh were in charge of determining what the country’s religiously diverse government would look like. In order to do that, the two referred to a census conducted by France in 1932, relying on the included data to estimate the proportions of religious groups in the country. By allocating parliamentary and leadership spots in accordance with the distributions of religions, El Khoury and Al Solh helped form the basis of the National Pact, an agreement that would later become an integral part in Lebanon’s governance. The National Pact, which established a representative democracy, had multiple requirements. Those involved reserving a tiny majority for Christians over Muslims in the Lebanese Parliament due to an existing 6:5 ratio. Additionally, only Maronites were eligible for presidency, only Sunni Muslims were allowed to be prime ministers, only Shia Muslims were allowed to be Speaker of the House of Representatives, and only Druze were allowed to be Chief of Staff.
By ensuring each group has a part in governance, this accord aimed to promote mutual trust and national unity. It was a “compromise between competing national identities” that sought to avoid any one group taking over, as historian Farid El-Khazen observes.
However, by making religion the primary principle of political representation, the Pact reinforced sectarianism even as it attempted to balance diversity. Instead of tying state legitimacy to universal citizenship, it essentially linked it to the allocation of communal power. In a 2016 research paper exploring Lebanon’s long-standing sectarianist nature, Bahout points out that the National Pact, while by no means the first overt manifestation of sectarianism in Lebanese politics, allowed corruption to swiftly become a form of political behavior. This, in turn, led to state inefficiency and decision-making paralysis. More significantly, and this is the primary weakness of the sectarian structure, unity and the concept of a shared identity were sacrificed to strengthen sectarian identities and grant them full political and legal authority.
Taif Agreement and the Institutionalization of Sectarian Power
Despite a drastic change in population realities, the 1932 census used for the National Pact was never revisited, and the Pact’s sectarian allocations remained in place. It was believed by political leaders that changing the formula would endanger elite privileges or upset the delicate coexistence. An article by The Nation summarizes it as “ In Lebanon, a census is so powerful that it is impossible to implement.”
Through the use of their community’s influence, sectarian leaders (zu‘ama) established networks of patronage, allocating public resources, jobs, and favors through sectarian channels. This meant that the initial objective of ensuring equality and political representation for everyone was overridden by each leader’s desire to assert political dominance. By the 1970s, tensions were rising, and the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) finally broke out due to imbalances and grievances within the confessional system, especially among Muslim communities who felt marginalized. By the late 1980s, it was evident that to put an end to the violence and bring the country back together, Lebanon needed to formally restructure its system of sectarian power sharing.
The goal of the Taif Agreement, which was mediated by the Arab League in 1989, was to restore equilibrium between the power of Muslims and Christians and put an end to Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. It limited the Maronite president’s vast powers, equalized parliamentary representation between the two communities, and explicitly called for the gradual eradication of political sectarianism. However, in practice, it did not establish explicit procedures for eliminating sect-based politics and maintained the confessional distribution of important positions: the speaker of parliament, the prime ministership, and the presidency were still associated with particular sects. At the same time, long-standing networks of patronage persisted in allocating funds, positions, and services in a sectarian manner. While the agreement succeeded in ending the civil war, its core principles rendered its efficiency limited, particularly since it strengthened the importance of sectarian identity in politics by guaranteeing that social influence and political allegiance would always be tied to communal ties rather than the state.
How Sectarianism Serves as a Governance Method Through Identity Politics
In Lebanon, sectarian networks are used by political elites to provide favors, jobs, and services, strengthening communal allegiance above state commitment. To get political and social support, for instance, Maronite Christians usually turn to the Frangieh family in Zgharta or Gebran Bassil (Free Patriotic Movement), whereas Sunni Muslims usually turn to Saad Hariri and the Future Movement. Druze populations frequently support Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, whereas Shia Muslims typically support Hezbollah, which offers both political leadership and social services. These leaders largely directed aid and jobs to their sectarian constituents during the economic crisis of 2021, guaranteeing reliance on sectarian leaders rather than government agencies.
Sectarian differences are further reinforced by state organizations, educational institutions, and the media. History courses promote communal identities rather than national cohesion, and education frequently adheres to sectarian quotas. Sectarianism is additionally rampant among religious leaders, who hold significant power over their communities because they manage clerics’ employment, endowments, and personal-status tribunals. Regardless of whether they follow or practice the religion in question, residents are bound by the rules and courts of their recognized religious group when it comes to social institutions like marriage, inheritance, and child custody. The election of President Michel Aoun in 2016 served as an example of how sectarian bargaining, as opposed to popular agreement, drives national politics. Aoun, a Maronite and the founder of the Free Patriotic Movement, secured the presidency after a 29-month presidential vacuum, only after a cross-sectarian agreement was reached: Hezbollah supported him as part of its long-standing alliance with the FPM, and Sunni Future Movement leader Saad Hariri endorsed him in exchange for taking back the position of Prime Minister. This political agreement mirrored the transactional character of Lebanon’s confessional system, in which appointments to positions of leadership are determined by elite sectarian agreements rather than by democratic processes. Because key sectarian leaders must concur on all significant policies, appointments, and elections, political gridlock is common. This further illustrates that allegiance to sectarian leaders is more important than allegiance to the country, which in turn sustains a zero-sum identity politics that impedes progress.
Lebanese people protesting against the sectarian system. (Author: Farfahinne, licensed under the CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, No alterations made to the original image.)
The Subconscious Politics of Sectarianism
Sectarian politics continues to influence Lebanese people’s unconscious attitudes, social interactions, and identity views, even when they profess dissatisfaction with it. Decades of living under a confessional system have made sectarian belonging an almost instinctive aspect of daily life. Lebanese people tend to automatically and subconsciously classify leaders, political parties, and even crises according to their sectarian affiliations. Hezbollah’s import of Iranian petroleum in 2021, for instance, was characterized by some as a “rescue plan for the Shia community,” while detractors from Sunni and Christian regions saw it as a parallel economy that undermined national sovereignty. This demonstrates how national emergencies are more often than not processed through sectarian narratives rather than shared civic experience.
Everyday life in Lebanon also makes such unspoken divides more evident. A person’s sectarian background might be inferred from their name, accent, or place of origin, which can influence perceptions of their political allegiance or reliability. According to research by The Century Foundation, social interactions in companies and universities still frequently perpetuate communal boundaries, with people establishing groups based more on perceived sect than on common civic or professional objectives.
Even movements rejecting sectarianism often fall back into its grip. The slogan “All of them means all of them” brought demonstrators together during the October 2019 uprising, but elites quickly reframed the movement through sectarian fear, warning followers that reform threatened their neighborhoods. Similar to this, independent candidates took home roughly 13 seats in the 2022 legislative elections, although the parliament swiftly reverted to sectarian blocs rather than ideological coalitions. The persistence of sectarian logic shows how ingrained it is in both political practice and communal psyche. In Lebanon, sectarianism has evolved beyond a model of government to become a way of thinking that many people use to understand survival, belonging, and even power.
Cracks in the Hegemony
Although sectarianism is deeply embedded in Lebanese society, recent years have shown a slight improvement in terms of reducing its impact. A rare instance of national solidarity was witnessed during the October 2019 protests, when Lebanese residents of all sects took to the streets to call for accountability, openness, and an end to corruption. The protests, which were first triggered by a proposed charge on WhatsApp calls, rapidly expanded into a larger movement opposing the state’s dominance by the sectarian elite. The system, however, proved robust in spite of the unity displayed across confessional lines. Lebanon’s sectarian governance was further exposed by the August 2020 Beirut Port Explosion and the ensuing catastrophic economic collapse, when political solutions were once more channeled through networks of communal patronage rather than national mechanisms. While initiatives like public protests and call for political change seemed promising, the deeply ingrained sectarian-centered system proved far more resistant than expected.
Exploring Regional and International Dimensions
External players have historically influenced and strengthened sectarian politics in Lebanon. For instance, Iran and Hezbollah have reinforced Shia dominance not only through parliamentary participation but also by supporting armed militias and providing social services, which solidify loyalty within Shia populations. In order to offset Iranian influence and preserve the regional balance of power, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations have historically supported Sunni groups by providing funds for political parties and social initiatives.
Syria used sectarian alliances to preserve its strategic interests and install loyalists in important government positions during its decades-long military and political dominance over Lebanon. Former colonial power France has often served as a mediator in Lebanon, but its efforts have tended to concentrate on settlements between specific communities rather than encouraging national reform or tackling the fundamental causes of sectarianism. This external interference makes domestic reform more difficult, particularly as Lebanese leaders consistently prioritize foreign alliances over national interests. Historical examples include Iran’s 2006 funding of Hezbollah and Syria’s support of the Amal Movement and Hezbollah throughout the civil war, both of which deepened regional power while strengthening communal differences. Therefore, in addition to reflecting sectarian divisions within the country, Lebanon’s confessional system also acts as a platform for wider regional rivalry, strengthening identity-based politics at the expense of civic nationalism.
Dismantling the Sectarian Mindset
Lebanon’s main challenge is not only reforming its political system but also overcoming a sectarian mindset ingrained in elites and citizens. From the Taif Agreement and the National Pact to daily encounters, sectarianism influences social networks, politics, and identity conceptions. The demand for civic nationalism is evident in popular reform movements such as the October 2019 protests or the independent gains in 2022, but sectarian allegiance is nevertheless reinforced above national unity by confessional bargaining and outside influence from countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and France.
Gradually overcoming Lebanon’s sectarian system requires a combination of civic education, non-sectarian political platforms, merit-based state appointments, and media reforms. Initiatives like Kulluna Irada support administration based on competency rather than sectarian quotas, whereas programs like those of the Asfari Institute prioritize national identity above communal loyalty. The public conversation can also be further shifted toward civic unity via growing independent media. Together, these actions could potentially drive sustainable change by replacing inherent communal allegiance with a more expansive sense of citizenship.
Additional Questions
- Could technology, social media, or digital civic platforms help bridge sectarian divides in Lebanon, or would they risk reinforcing echo chambers?
- How would Lebanon’s politics and society change if economic incentives and public services were fully detached from sectarian patronage?
- What lessons could Lebanon learn from other countries that have successfully reduced identity-based politics without erasing cultural or religious diversity?
Suggested Readings
- Cammett, Melani Claire. Partisan Activism and Access to Welfare in Lebanon
- Duarte, Raul. How Sectarian Political Groups in Lebanon Use Welfare Services to Gain Support: CID Faculty Research Insights (Harvard Center for International Development)
- Lebanon’s politics and politicians. Chatham House. August 11, 2021
