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Introduction
The world’s leading emerging economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) banded together as a cooperative forum, presenting a potential counter hegemonic alternative to that of Western powers. This group has further expanded since 2024 to include the following growing economies: Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. At a time of shifting global power relations, BRICS have sought to amplify their political power by working together expand influence to address existing economic conflicts of interests and to strengthen their political power. The emergence of BRICS was partly out of a strategic response to the intensifying criticism of Western dominated financial institutions (such as the IMF, G7, and World Bank) (Czada, 2013, p. 589). In the past decade, BRICS has increased participation in world trade, requested reforms within multilateral financial institutions, and created alternative international financial institutions to engage in South-South partnerships. This trend has prompted many to consider BRICS as a challenge to the neoliberal global economy and US economic dominance. In fact, the Goldman Sachs report viewed the emerging economies as prospective “engines of growth” that would fundamentally alter the global economy and, consequently, shift the balance of power away from the West (Taylor, 2016, p. 55). The report also predicted that by 2040, BRICS is expected to surpass the traditional economic powerhouses of the G6 (United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy) in the global economy (Taylor, 2016, p. 55). However, some analysts remain skeptical about both the motivations and the ability of BRICS to change the system that has facilitated their rise.
Utilizing a neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony, this essay will discuss the potential of BRICS being a counter-hegemonic challenge to the US-dominated status quo. Applying a neo-Gramscian perspective assists with the examination of the changing conditions of global capitalism and the role of the transnational class in shaping emerging power engagement with global economic governance. This analysis will account for the challenge BRICS potentially poses to the existing multilateral financial institutions and global governance. First, neo-Gramscianism will be introduced as a theoretical framework before the following is discussed: representation in multilateral financial institutions, lending, and the BRICS role in stabilizing or destabilizing neoliberalism. A dual argument will then be made: first, the integration of BRICS into global capitalism has made these emerging economies largely dependent on the existing Western institutional framework. This framework has facilitated their integration into the current system of their integration into the current global economic governance. However, the emerging powers of BRICS are domestically more statist, and therefore, while BRICS’ rise may not disrupt the hierarchy of the global economic system, it may affect aspects of its liberal features (Stephen, p. 913), yet BRICS has yet to appear as a counter-hegemonic force to the neoliberal hegemony. Finally, this essay concludes that BRICS, regarding their current involvement, cannot yet be considered as a radical counter-status quo force. The Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) will be used as a case study, as it is considered a multilateral investment bank and competitor to that of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Wang, 2019). This essay demonstrates that the AIIB does provide a valuable alternative source of infrastructural aid to various developing countries, yet it remains within the structural confines of capitalism.
Neo-Gramscian Hegemonic Rise
The emergence of BRICS has created the question of power transition in the multipolar world and whether this new alliance would constitute a counter-hegemonic challenge to U.S. neoliberal hegemony. In Prison Notebooks, Gramsci draws on critical theory to examine how socioeconomic power is established/maintained and analyzes the potential to build an alternative counter-hegemonic society. The Machiavellian centaur was used by Gramsci to show the embodiment of power as half humane consent and half animalistic coercion; this concept demonstrates hegemonic conformity by procuring consent from the subordinate class while reigning in the revolutionary resistance of the ‘beast.’ This construction of power helped illustrate the resilient survival of the bourgeoisie in response to revolutionary actions (Gramsci, 1971; Cox, 1983, p. 52). The mutual constitution of coercion and consent strengthens hegemony; these are applied through forms of “intellectual and moral leadership,” violence, sanctions, etc. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 182). Therefore, due to the hegemonic preeminence in society sustained through conformity, Gramsci conceived that a counter-hegemonic resistance would require the transformation of national social foundations prior to its international expansion (Cox, 1983, p. 53). The archetype of the international economy is therefore premised on a social group (i.e., the bourgeoisie of the US or BRICS countries) having ‘leadership’ in the ascension to power and the requirement to ‘lead’ to maintain it (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57-58). The paradigm of power is rationalized through Gramsci’s centaur’s ‘consent’ (1971) via processes of cooperation and compromise between dominant and subordinate groups, such as the unequal relationship dynamics between financial borrowers and lenders. In applying this concept of power, the current US financial hegemony has been created through a dominant capitalist ‘leadership’ in social, political, and economic relationships, sustained by the tolerance, normalization, and acceptance of neoliberal ideals (Cox, 1983; Fanon, 1961).
While Gramsci’s view of hegemony emerges from conditions present in the nation state, the current neoliberal superstructure has taken a hegemonic form of its own through sustained predominance in multilateral financial institutions (Torres, 2013). In other words, even if power shifts away from American political hegemony to a multipolar system, capitalist and neoliberal practices are significantly engrained through the operation of the global economy, and these norms constitute a power of their own in reproducing the status quo. This continuation is reinforced by the pervasive international role of the “transnational historic bloc” of the World Bank, IMF, and US dollar (Cohn, 2005, p. 130). The transnational historic bloc, or US-led hegemonic power, links itself with social groups and states to expand its influence through the liberalization of national economies and the creation of a regulatory regime (e.g., the World Trade Organization) (Emre, 2007). The emergence of a largely China-led BRICS has resulted in shifting power dynamics, but the system remains dollar-dominated. In this case, the status quo will prospectively be maintained through a multilateral adoption and preservation of the neoliberal global economy; that is, unless rising hegemonic powers undergo the domestic transformation of social foundations preliminary to an alternative counter-hegemony ideology.
Neo-Gramscianism perceives the global economy to be underpinned by uneven development, which reproduces hierarchical international power relations. Therefore, Western international economic dominance represents a form of hegemony, resulting from Western expansion through imperialism, interventionist foreign policies, and a neoliberal development ideology (Heron, 2008; Rupert, 2020). Similarly, a counter-hegemonic force such as BRICS has the potential to result in these pitfalls if the global capitalist economy is not challenged; that is, a mutually constitutive subordination and domination through institutional hegemonic expansion of inequalities inherent to capitalism. The rise of BRICS has occurred within the superstructure of a neoliberal-dominated global economy, and therefore its stake as a counter-hegemonic threat to neoliberalism comes with considerable skepticism (Parashar and Schulz, 2021). While the rise of BRICS is bringing multi-polarity to the global economy, its power lies not in the condition of the global economy but in its ability to change those conditions. However, BRICS is viewed as a rising power that poses a challenge to the existing system of governance; it is simultaneously engaging with and dependent on the current international economic structures while also challenging certain aspects of their content and policy prescriptions (Stephen, 2014, p. 914).
Multilateral Financial Institutions Lending Conditions and Practices
The World Bank has historically held the position of primary multilateral financial institution lending for development. However, over the years, it has been criticized for issues including the following: insufficient ability to finance infrastructure projects, invasive policy conditionalities, and unsustainable development policies (Park, 2007; Weaver, 2008; Kellerman, 2019). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund impose the following conditionalities: political reform towards democratization, privatization, and market liberalization (Hills, 1994, p. 173). This development strategy consists of neoliberal reforms and imposes a preconceived view of what good governance should be. BRICS has criticized the IMF and World bank for attaching these neoliberal conditionalities and policy reforms in order to obtain loans (Skebba, 2019). Structural Adjustment Programs issued by the World Bank and IMF have had a negative track record with developing countries, including the following results of policies of liberalization: increased austerity, escalating foreign debt, subordination of local politicians, and declining trade terms (Zabadi, 1992; Kofas, 2002). The premature liberalization of markets is also viewed to stunt the growth of developing industries as it catapults them onto the international competitive market with advanced industries that are typically more efficient, of higher quality, and/or cheaper (Santos, 1970). In particular, the privatization of public services has been heavily criticized, such as healthcare and water access, as it erodes the base of welfare that the most impoverished rely on (Wade, 2010).
The AIIB is viewed as a competition for the World Bank and an institution representative of a counter-hegemonic challenge to Western influence in the developing world (Qian, Vreeland, and Zhao, 2023, p. 218). Established by China in 2016 alongside fifty-seven founding members, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) joins two dozen multilateral development banks to facilitate investment in infrastructure development in Asia and beyond (Pratt, 202, p. 95). While the AIIB refrains from imposing policy reforms such as privatization or deregulation, such as those of the IMF and World Bank, the AIIB requires projects to meet certain social and environmental standards (Skebba, 2019, p. 3). Furthermore, the AIIB cooperates with and considers other development institutions’ policies to have these projects undertaken according to conditions that conform to international standards (Wang, 2019). Beyond imposing fewer policy reform requirements while maintaining conditionality standards, the AIIB aims to approve lending more quickly for projects and to provide more emerging economies a voice in development strategy/direction (Skebba, 2019, p. 2). The AIIB has provided important supplementary aid for developing countries, in addition to that of existing financial institutions.
It has been argued that the creation of the AIIB has influenced the World Bank’s shift towards policy-oriented programs, as the AIIB focuses on infrastructure development; initially, the World Bank allocated approximately 70% of its funds to infrastructure projects, but this allocation has decreased to less than 20% by the end of the century (Skebba, 2019, p. 3; Wang, 2019). Furthermore, after the foundation of the AIIB, its founding members received 22 percent fewer infrastructure projects from the World Bank between 2016 and 2019 (Qian, Vreeland, and Zhao, 2023, p. 219). It is evident that the creation of alternative financial institutions has affected the financing patterns of the World Bank. Additionally, the option of alternative financial institutions does not necessarily mean a shift away from the West’s financial development institutions, as the AIIB could potentially provide additional support within the existing options for multilateral development banks without disrupting the World Bank (Qian, Vreeland, and Zhao, 2023, p. 219). In regard to conditionality, the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement contain a stipulation that states a non-interventionist provision in the domestic affairs of its members, yet this provision does not assure that the financing will not interfere with the borrowers’ policy (Wang, 2019). The World Bank contains a similar stipulation; however, the interpretation of it has permitted significant neoliberal conditionalities. Therefore, in respect to conditionality, the AIIB may impose more conditions despite its Articles of Agreement to suit its members’ interests as it grows into an older and therefore more reliable financial institution—especially if the AIIB moves from infrastructure-focused projects to that of policy-oriented projects. In turn, such a shift would affect the perspective of whether the AIIB is counter-hegemonic or a complimentary financial lender. Nevertheless, due to the continued gap in financing development, multilateral development investment institutions maintain prospects for complementarity, cooperation, and partnership.
Shareholder Power in the World Bank, IMF, and AIIB
The American hegemony is partially exercised through its representation in existing dominant multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. These Western-led institutions have been described as twin pillars bearing the structure of the world’s financial order (Danns and Danns, 2015). The U.S. is the largest shareholder and therefore holds paramount voting and veto power in the World Bank and IMF (Kapur, 2002, p. 59). Furthermore, since its creation, every World Bank president has been a U.S. citizen (World Bank, 2020). The U.S. holds a monopolization of decision-making power in these financial institutions—both in whom to lend to, the conditions of the lending, and the organizational structure of the financial institutions themselves (Wade, 2003, p. 622). BRICS members viewed the establishment of the BRICS bank and the AIIB as a means to leverage reforms in the leadership of the World Bank and IMF. The Brazilian president stated that BRICS was not attempting to diverge or compete with the U.S.-based IMF but to “democratize it and make it as representative as possible” (Danns and Danns, 2015). Xinhua News Agency, an official Chinese channel, stated, “The plans of the emerging-market bloc of BRICS to establish a development bank usher in a long-awaited and beneficial alternative to the Western-dominated institutes in global finance” (Danns and Danns, 2015).
The AIIB was founded in 2016 with 57 founding members growing to 103 members by 2020 representing 65 percent of global GDP and 79 percent of the global population (Asian Infrastructure Bank, 2023). China holds the highest voting power as the biggest contributor to the AIIB; China’s vote share (26.58%), followed by India (7.59%), Russia (5.97%), Germany (4.15%) and South Korea (3.49%) (Asian Infrastructure Bank, 2023). China is also the only country in the AIIB with a veto power (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2015). This power is awarded from China, being the largest financial stake at approximately USD 30 million, constituting 29.8% of the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Bank, 2023). If countries are not given equal or adequate representation despite differences in their financial contributions, the AIIB will imitate the hierarchical structure of the World Bank and IMF. Voting power within multilateral financial institutions is valued, as it determines the shareholders’ power to decide on its operations. The AIIB is criticized, as China is a significantly large shareholder in this institution, in fact much larger than the United States is in the World Bank, as exemplified in Table 1 (Center for Global Development). While former financial institutions remain under the hegemonic control of the U.S., the AIIB is to a large extent under the control of China and provides an opportunity to advance Chinese interests (Wang, 2017, p. 114). Therefore, the AIIB would simply replicate the problems of unilateral political influence and accountability that have plagued the history of the World Bank’s American hegemonic influence.
Ultimately, the shareholders’ vote exemplifies a country’s influence over the institution as a whole and provides a potential answer to the following complex question: who is responsible for global economic finance? The AIIB demonstrates that with its rise, it will allocate China a greater role in global economic finance, development decisions, and therefore power. Nevertheless, the U.S. has historically monopolized financial decisions as the largest shareholder out of the traditional bloc of the West and is likely to continue to maintain a predominant shareholder vote in existing institutions (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003, p. 267). The organizational structure of the AIIB is similar to other institutions in that it awards power based on ownership of financial shares; however, it is distinct in its focus on development projects. BRICS financial institutions like the AIIB, led by China, exemplify China’s rise in a multipolar world, but they remain constrained by U.S.-China economic interdependence and the world economy’s reliance on American financial hegemony. Thus, the AIIB has created an additional option within the existing hierarchical development investment regime, rather than establishing a non-hierarchical financial institution to counter Western-dominated hegemonic rule.
BRICS in the ‘New Scramble for Africa’
BRICS is described by Moyo as following neoliberalism and acting like “sub-imperial forces rushing to join the scramble for African resources, only as a tributary component of Euro-American hegemony” (2016, p. 59). BRICS investments have become “new paths for the plundering of resources” as they connect raw materials to logistic hubs to export for foreign markets (Garcia, 2017, p. 40). In fact, China and Brazil have been found to utilize development banks to promote investment while simultaneously advancing political and economic interests abroad (Chin, 2014). The AIIB has offered low-cost finance from a new source, and the non-interventionist approach to Africa helped China provide loans to impoverished countries that may not meet the conditionalities for aid (Gallagher, 2016; Singh, 2021). For example, China’s objective of expanding geopolitical dimensions of power through the Belt Road Initiative has been facilitated by developing AIIB projects along these routes (Wilson, 2017). China has operated to open African markets to the international economy on extractivist terms, as Western multilateral financial institutions aim to do, while simultaneously providing much-needed development infrastructure. In the ‘New Scramble for Africa,’ the activities of BRICS members behave similarly to those of the traditional bloc of financial institutions, such as the World Bank, by providing loans and aid with strings attached to African markets and resources (Garcia, 2017, p. 39).
Applying Gramsci’s concept of power, the subordinate borrower provides power to the lender; that is, through an unequal process of compromise, cooperation, and the acceptance of certain rules and values. Therefore, the Global South’s selection of lenders (World Bank, AIIB, etc.) matters, as it shifts financial power dynamics between lending institutions as well as relations between those lending institutions and the Global South. Through providing investment for economic development, these institutions hold power in the following: deciding which development projects to proceed with, setting the rules and conditions of borrowing, and functioning as an important external source of ideas and guidance to developing-country policymakers. However, the AIIB has provided a degree of representation for developing countries, with several African countries joining to obtain the following benefits: assistance with industrial development, transport connections with Asian markets, and stunting of debt costs (Prinsloo, C., 2019). The AIIB, along with China and BRICS, has played a complicated role in Africa by providing important development funds and a greater degree of autonomy in governance, while also functioning alongside exploitative stipulations and consequences.
Stabilizing or Destabilizing neo-liberalism?
The current hegemonic governance in the predominant multilateral financial institutions, the IMF and World Bank, maintains liberal rules: it favors resource allocation to private enterprises over the public, flexibility of the labor market, deregulation, and the spread of neoliberal economic management practices and values (i.e., individualism and higher consumption) (Hills, 1994). AIIB loans are therefore significantly less intrusive than World Bank loans. The founding of BRICS financial institutions has opened up new aid routes for developing countries and additional options for borrowers compared to that of Western powers. A development model premised on an infrastructure for resources model; that is, extracting resources from the host country and building the required infrastructure to market them for external surplus profit remains based on corporate interests. The foreign-directed integration of peripheral countries into the global economy through BRICS is still based on exploitative dispossession, similar to the historical practices of Western-dominated multilateral institutions. Therefore, BRICS development initiatives establish power in the interest of procuring a neoliberal market, which further expands global commodity chains by capitalizing on accumulation and imposing austerity (Bond, 2017). This influence is politically contentious, as the AIIB is seen as advancing Chinese counter-hegemonic interests in opposition to neoliberalism and undermining American global influence. However, the approach eschews zero-sum game logic and is not attuned to the reality of impoverished borrowing countries (Pass, 2020, p. 90). It is argued that BRICS development model strategies promoted through investment are less a challenge to Western Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-promoted development models than an expansion and adaptation of these models in a changing global economy (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018, p. 887).
Finally, there exist many debates on BRICS’ role in stabilizing or destabilizing neoliberal hegemony. Scholars have also suggested that BRICS have challenged existing multilateral financial institutions through introducing new varieties of capitalism (May and Nölke, 2013). Other scholars have argued that BRICS have sought to ascend within the neoliberal structure and leave these international structures in place, which would ultimately lead towards an intensification of ‘neoliberalization’ (Harvey, 2005, pp. 120–151; Schmalz and Ebenau, 2012). However, the domestic structures of BRICS states sometimes clash with the liberal policy content of Western-sponsored institutions. For example, China’s current internal economy (state-led and market-oriented) and ‘non-interventionist’ foreign development aid without governance conditionalities are argued to challenge the Washington Consensus norms and the free-market individual liberal policies of multilateral financial institutions (Arrighi, 2007; Wade, 2010). China’s interdependence with the neoliberal system exemplifies Gramsci’s concept of power, which involves a conflict between coercive infrastructural restraint and China’s consent through the construction of alternative financial institutions that align with these norms, as well as its pursuit of international initiatives based on certain neoliberal terms. Additionally, according to Gramsci, a counter-hegemonic resistance requires the social transformation of the nation state before its international expansion. Chinese state capitalism, with domestic emphasis on market competition, profit motives, and a large private sector, blends state-led developmentalism with elements of global neoliberalism. BRICS remain nonetheless “functionally dependent on the existing institutional frameworks of global governance to oversee a transnationally integrated global economy” (Stephen, 2014, p. 914). Therefore, the rise of BRICS may be characterized by a further integration into the global economy and an adaptation of neoliberal principles.
Conclusion
The creation of alternative financial institutions has provided outlets for BRICS to exercise a growing role in the global economy. As the increase of lending power strengthens ties between the borrower and lender, as well as creates a space for the borrower to shape development through conditionalities, financial institutions provide BRICS an opportunity to obtain more power and solidify relations with certain states. The AIIB has directed an infrastructure-focused development strategy that has nonetheless opened access to the borrowing countries’ markets and further integrated the country into the neoliberal global economy. The ascension of China-led BRICS has resulted in shifting power dynamics; however, the economic system remains dominated by the traditional historic bloc. So far, BRICS has tended to follow the neoliberal global economic structure that facilitated its rise, which includes themes such as shareholder governance, the ‘New Scramble for Africa,’ and various conditionalities. This positions it as a bloc that may be a counter-hegemonic challenge to the United States, but not to the omnipresent neoliberal hegemony. Furthermore, it is unlikely that BRICS will constitute a counter-hegemonic threat to the neoliberal status quo, as it requires the domestic transformation of the social foundations of the state. BRICS includes many similarities with the current financial system, such as shareholder power in making development decisions, veto power, and a hierarchical governance system. These similarities suggest that BRICS is not necessarily creating a radical change in the current financial organizational system; rather, it is offering an alternative option for borrowing states.
The emergence of BRICS, with China at its forefront, is conceived as a counter-hegemonic challenge to that of the current U.S.-led hegemony. BRICS’ economic rise was through the current neoliberal system, and therefore it seems unlikely, even if BRICS as a bloc, or just China, usurps the US as a dominant hegemony, that the global economic system will be fundamentally altered. This new bloc has provided an additional source of investments, development support, and trade to the Global South. In addition, development banks such as AIIB and World Bank also disseminate political views of member states with the most influence and often follow certain national interests (Liao, 2015, p. 1). While the US still maintains its hegemonic dominance in the financial system, the international economic system is becoming increasingly complicated as BRICS members obtain more power through the creation of international financial institutions. Nevertheless, the emergence of these powers has occurred within the neoliberal structure, and BRICS-created financial institutions have tended to provide supplementary options rather than challenging the foundations of the neoliberal global economy.
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