![[ARTICLE] European Narratives and Strategies to Survive in a Changing World](https://i0.wp.com/thenewglobalorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/European-Union-1.jpg?resize=640%2C200&ssl=1)
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Key Research Question:
How can the European Union develop a strategic narrative that makes it a relevant partner in a global context, where other geopolitical powers are rising and the Old Continent is losing geopolitical relevance?
Introduction:
The European Union is facing a period of geopolitical decline driven by internal divisions and the rise of more decisive global powers. While the strategies of individual member states traditionally serve the interests of their governments, and rarely pursue common goals, the EU is often unable to design a common strategic path to address challenges that are relevant for all the member states. Unsurprisingly, major geopolitical powers do not see the EU as a reliable partner or serious adversary, and often prefer to deal with individual member states bilaterally. This lack of credibility and the hostility of external actors, interested in undermining a united Europe by following a logic of divide et impera, are the main factors that are likely to decrease the relevance of the EU on the global chessboard. In this context, the EU has to rethink not only its structure but also its strategic narrative in order to position itself globally.
Section one: Strategic narratives
One of the main challenges affecting the EU structure is the absence of a shared strategic narrative to unite all member states and develop a common strategic path to navigate global uncertainties. This narrative would be a geopolitical compass based on geopolitical necessities and threats, that would guide the EU’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Many possible strategies have been proposed for the EU in the past years, but the urgency to develop a solid one is more relevant than ever in the current global situation.
While some scholars and observers view the EU as a geopolitical actor unable to develop a common strategy, others consider a strong and integrated EU the only existing option if European countries want to maintain their relevance. Much thought has been given on how to develop effective common strategies. A clear example is the EU’s Strategic Foresight Report from 2025 (a first one was provided in 2020), in which 4 pillars are taken into consideration: 1) the simultaneous quest for economic competitiveness and strategic autonomy; 2) balancing the approach to technology; 3) pressures on people’s well-being and societal resilience, and 4) threats to democracy and fundamental values. The first area is especially relevant given the current situation of the EU in global affairs. Concerning security, many plans have been proposed, such as the 2022 EU Strategic Compass, which aimed at making the EU a capable security provider. These strategic programs and reports all prove the increased EU’s awareness of its current geopolitical weakness and the willingness to react to it by identifying threats and designing strategies. Naturally, they also show a European willingness of taking action to prepare for perilous times. Another example of the renewed awareness is the European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry proposed by the Commission in 2024. However, while these projects provide an initial base for a common strategic narrative, they still lack the dimensions, the political attention and willingness to become effective in the long run.
European Political Community Summit on 18 July 2024 by Ben Dance / FCDO is licensed under CC BY 2.0
Section two: Internal divisions
If one chooses to analyse the EU as a projection of the urgencies of its member states, integrated in an economic and political system that was shaped to guarantee social development and the pursuit of common interests, it is mandatory also to view the challenges that have emerged in the course of the last decades. The EU project was often considered by many states’ ruling classes as a mere path to economic development, ignoring the obligations towards the union and the common burdens (the refusal of the Visegrad countries to contribute to the migration plan is a prime example). Secondly, the internal divisions concerning domestic matters (monetary, social and fiscal) and foreign policy goals make the EU slow and ineffective when urgent decisions must be taken. Particularly, the individual states’ political alliances and relations with external actors are often obstacles to shape a common foreign policy. These different relations are the products of the single countries’ strategic and economic interests in external areas, and with foreign powers, developed across decades of bilateral foreign policy. Furthermore, the inability to address external security crises and conflicts is proof of the EU’s inability to act as a single geopolitical actor: while some member states opposed increased support to Ukraine and maintained a more friendly dialogue with Russia (like Hungary) others sought to avoid clashing with the US over Greenland. Different sympathies and alliances, originating from varied foreign policies and historical necessities, often represent an obstacle to the development of a single strategic path whose goals and decisions are shared by all EU members.
Section three: Military and security issues
When it comes to military power, the EU is not only unequipped but also culturally unready to measure itself with other global powers. The only completely autonomous atomic power in Europe is France, while other countries such as Italy and Germany have US atomic arsenals that were stationed in their national soils during the Cold War. Even though some European armies still appear in many global military power rankings, the weakness of their societies and the demographic decline experienced by the continent make their power less effective if compared to other emerging powers. Beyond the populous China and India, one can think of middle size powers such as Nigeria, whose population might reach 401.3 million by 2050. A young population often equals a stronger societal resilience and the capacity to better face conflicts. One could argue that while many EU governments have increased military spending after the invasion of Ukraine, European citizens might be more reluctant to embrace arms in the likelihood of a war. This might also be due to decades in which national security was taken for granted and high living standards have led citizens to view the possibility of a war as extremely remote. European societies have embraced a culture that is more reluctant to war, unlike societies from countries with stronger geopolitical and often even neo-imperial ambitions.
A strategic narrative, positioning the EU and its members as security providers with the means to guarantee stability within their borders and in their neighbourhoods has the potential to change the conception of citizens from a purely “well-being oriented” to a “strategic independence” vision of their countries. Another tool that was designed to position the EU as a conflict preventor is the European Peace Facility established in 2021, with the goal to conduct operations and assistance through military and defence-related equipment, and technical support. The facility has already provided assistance to Cabo Verde and Ukraine. However, these initiatives are not enough to position the EU as an independent strategic actor. Naturally, the EU is still largely militarily and economically dependent on external actors as it has been for many decades. This dependency has shaped the economies and strategic urgencies of the EU members. The current challenges and threats might then work as a unifying force and the pursuit of a new strategic identity for the EU in order to be less dependent and more autonomous.
Conclusion:
The EU needs to rediscover a strategic narrative that can place it as an independent global actor. A way of achieving this goal is by designing a strategy that allows all member states to view the same threats and challenges as a shared responsibility. The current critical situation could indeed be an opportunity to design such a strategic narrative if EU members choose to cooperate. By developing a common foreign policy, other powers might then view the EU as a significant partner to take into account when choosing their own strategic paths.
Recently, former Italian Prime Minister and European Bank governor, Mario Draghi, delivered a speech underlining the urgency of a further unified (from confederation to federation) Europe in order to address the external challenges of a defunct global order. Before Draghi, Italian writer and scholar Umberto Eco foresaw a situation in which Europe would have felt under a siege by new powers but united. The hostility of Russia, the imperial ambitions of the US, and the continuous rise of China, as well as other powers, might be the scenario predicted by the author of “The name of the Rose”. The external threats might work as unifying force that will make the European Union merge into a solid and coordinated geopolitical actor. A less optimistic scenario would lead to a further fragmented Europe and a loss of relevance in global affairs, followed by decreased security standards and increased dependency on external actors.
Open-Ended Questions for Further Reflection
1. Will Europe keep declining or will it grow stronger out of all the current challenges?
2. Is a common European strategic narrative possible?
3. Are there similar cases to the European one in other world regions?
Additional readings
