- (Analysis) Trump 2.0: What Does It Mean For Argentina and Brazil? - 2 March, 2025
- What’s going on in Argentine Intelligence? - 1 March, 2025
The US elections and Donald Trump’s victory will undoubtedly bring changes to the formulation of American foreign policy and, consequently, to the entire international system as a whole.
In this article, we aim to analyze how Trump 2.0 could impact American foreign policy in relation to Argentina and Brazil, while also shedding light on what to expect from the relationship between these two countries and the US.
Repercussions, statements, phone calls, and first meetings
Javier Gerardo Milei expressed satisfaction and quickly showed the good relationship he shares with the U.S. president-elect by congratulating him on his “formidable electoral victory” with a post on x.com. Additionally, a week after the election, Milei and Trump had a phone call, during which Trump reportedly told Milei “You are my favorite president.”
The strong connection between the two leaders went beyond statements and phone calls. On November 14, the Argentine president traveled to the U.S. to attend the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) held at Donald Trump’s residence in Palm Beach. Milei became the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump after his election victory. During their meeting, Trump said, “Javier, I want to congratulate you on the work you’ve done to make Argentina great again. It’s incredible how you’re fixing things,” and added, “You are a MAGA person.”
In contrast, on November 08, 2024 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, gave an interview to Christiane Amanpour and stated that he plans to have a respectful relationship with President-elect Donald J. Trump.
The official statement followed a phone call to Trump congratulating him for winning the election and goes hand in hand with the Brazilian International Relations policy of having a sound relationship with the US.
Regardless of Lula’s intent to maintain a respectful relationship with Trump, the letter’s victory has further consequences for Brazil’s political landscape beyond the foreign relations of both countries. Since the American president-elect has a close relationship with former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, Trump’s election has played a key role in rekindling the far-right movement in Brazil, which opposes President Lula’s leftist administration.
What can Trump 1.0 tell us? Background from bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil
President Trump’s first term was marked by a protectionist agenda[SS1]. He raised taxes on multiple products, from washing machines to steel, and imposed higher tariffs on goods coming from China and even Europe.
Donald Trump speaking at CPAC 2011 in Washington, D.C.
Author: Gage Skidmore (licensed under the Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic. No changes were made to the original product)
The imposition of these tariffs has caused ramifications other than simply the rise of trade costs. In 2019, as president, Trump blocked appointments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) appellate body disabling the organ’s dispute settlement system, among other actions that demonstrated Trump’s disdain for multilateralism, the liberal order, and globalization (withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, reduction of funding for United Nations agencies, amongst others)
Regarding Argentina, the first Trump era (2017–2021), the Republican shared the time in the presidency with Mauricio Macri (2015–2019) and Alberto Fernández (2019–2023).
The Macri-Trump tandem found some common ground but fell far short of the “carnal relations” [SS3] of the Menem era. It’s worth noting that Macri pursued a foreign policy more aligned with multilateralism than with the bilateralism preferred by Trump. Additionally, Macri’s administration initially placed its bets on Hillary Clinton winning the U.S. election.
Although Macri managed to balance his support for Clinton with a personal connection to Trump and a shared interest in golf, the Republican administration maintained a protectionist policy and rhetoric against globalization and multilateralism. Despite these differences, Trump didn’t abandon Macri, understanding the importance of having an ally in the Casa Rosada after years of opposing governments in the Southern Cone.
Author: Isac Nóbrega/PR / Agência Brasil
In this context, despite their differing approaches to foreign policy and some tariff measures (steel, lemons, and biodiesel), the Trump administration supported the 2018 IMF loan disbursement and supported Macri’s campaign against the Peronist Front. With Fernández ‘s victory and the onset of the Covid pandemic, relations cooled for the next year and a half, and the Casa Rosada hoped for Biden’s victory.
On the other hand, the relationship between Brazil and the US has varied over time. In the year 2000s Brazil was mostly led by presidents of the Workers’ Party (PT), President Lula from 2003 until 2010 and later President Dilma Rousseff from 2011 until 2016. As their foreign relations agenda focused on strengthening the Global South, they became more distant from the United States and grew closer to southern countries.
In 2016 President Dilma Rousseff was impeached, being replaced by her vice-president Michel Temer from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Temer’s foreign relations policy was different from that of PT’s governments. The first was more rooted in the Liberal World Order than the latter. Whereas from 2009 until 2016 the president of the United States was Barack Obama, whose vision of the international system was shared by Temer, from 2017 on, Donald Trump became president and preached an anti-liberal foreign policy.
As Temer and Trump’s views of how the world should be were different, the first assumed a neutral stance toward the latter. We could broadly say that the Temer-Trump relationship focused on regional issues, mainly the situation of the Chavista government in Venezuela.
Author: Alan Santos / PR
When Jair Bolsonaro became Brazil’s president in 2019, the period of distance between both countries came to an end. Due to the similarity in the policies of both the Brazilian and the United States’ governments in that period, their relationship started to become closer once again.
What to expect?
Regarding his geopolitical vision, it is believed that Trump will prioritize the dispute with China as the main threat to American hegemony. In this context, Trump considers it crucial to eliminate any other uncertainties that might divert the U.S. from its primary concern: China. Trump’s policy toward the Asian country will likely continue along the lines he initiated, followed by Biden, ultimately solidifying China as the U.S.’s primary antagonist, but with the difference of distancing the US from expenses and conflicts that, geopolitically and under Trump’s vision, do not generate any benefit for the US.
For the mentioned purposes, Trump will likely aim to keep the “backyard” orderly and secure. The potential appointment of Florida Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State carries certain particularities. Beyond being the first Spanish-speaking, Cuban-American (and anti-China hawk) to hold this position, Rubio’s appointment would likely bring increased attention to the Latin American region, with a strong focus on pressure against the left and efforts to counter any Chinese interference on the continent.
Author: Gage Skidmore (licensed under the Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic. No changes were made to the original product)
In this sense, it is expected that Milei will become a major ally, not only due to the exotic nature of his discourse and his outsider profile, which resembles Trump but also as a stronghold and key ally for the White House in the Southern Cone and in its global rhetoric against the left.
The relationship between the presidents is in a honeymoon phase, but as with Macri or Menem in the 1990s, this doesn’t guarantee concessions or investments. Milei, however, stands out with his strong anti-left rhetoric, global visibility, and unique position as a right-wing leader with regional influence and political strength, even as the pink tide resurges in countries like Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile.
However, perhaps the main issue Argentina might face in its relationship with Trump is that, beyond their mutual dislike of the left, there are no shared “ideologic political components between their approaches to political communication and the idea of de-bureaucratizing the state. To simplify for the reader, Trump is a nationalist protectionist, while Milei is a libertarian liberal who, in his own words, “wants to destroy the state.”
Regarding Brazil, a brief analysis shows that while personal relationships between the presidents of Brazil and the United States are significant, the deep-rooted ties between the two countries limit the impact of such relationships. Brazil and the United States have historically had a good relationship. The US recognized Brazilian independence in 1824 and they have had an amicable relationship ever since.
Author: Ricardo Stuckert/PR
What we can undoubtedly establish is that Trump’s stance on China holds particular importance for Brazil, as both countries are founding members of the BRICS group. At this year’s BRICS Summit, Brazil proposed an agenda to create a BRICS currency for use in international trade, replacing the dollar. Additionally, Brazil and China have previously conducted transactions using the Real and the Yuan instead of the American currency.
Upon BRICS country’s actions to become less dependent on the dollar, president-elect Trump has stated that if a currency is established by the group or if they trade goods using any currencies other than the dollar, he would impose 100% taxes on all of them. The imposition of 100% taxes by the US on Brazilian products would have a great impact on Brazilian trade since the US is Brazil’s second greatest economic partner, following only China.
It is not possible to know what actions Brazil will take upon such a statement. Nevertheless, the country has the diplomatic tradition of non-alliance, which means that the biggest country in Latin America has a culture of maintaining good relationships with any other state, always open to new negotiations. Such tradition was demonstrated after Brazil refused China’s invitation to become a part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), at the same time that it signaled it was willing to continue having healthy relations with the Asian country. What we can initially expect is concern from Lula’s government over increased tariffs on Brazilian products, support for pro-Bolsonaro sectors in electoral matters, and divergences in international forums regarding environmental policies.
Further Reading
Estaban Actis, 2024, “La Argentina Y Brasil Frente a un Trump,” Panamá Revista, November 17, 2024.
Article by: Ana Clara Oliveira Vilela dos Reis and Sebastian Ariel Staffieri.
