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The handshake between Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Cheng Li Wun and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jin Ping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing marked the restoration of a CCP–KMT leadership meeting after nearly a decade. The meeting took place during Cheng’s visit to China from 7 to 12 April 2026, making it the first high-level engagement between Xi and the newly elected KMT leader.
While the CCP and KMT have historically been political rivals, party-to-party engagement became more institutionalised during earlier periods of cross-strait rapprochement. Previous leadership meetings included the 2005 “Lien-Hu meeting,” the 2008 “Wu-Hu meeting,” and the 2016 “Hung-Xi meeting.” These engagements often served as platforms for cross-strait stability. It also facilitated policies such as tourism, trade, and civil exchanges.
Following the election of Tsai IngWen and the return of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to government in 2016, cross-strait relations became increasingly strained. Beijing suspended official and semiofficial engagement channels since Tsai did not recognise the “1992 Consensus.”
Cheng’s China Visit and the CCP–KMT Meeting
The meeting itself was conducted in a formal but cordial atmosphere. During the meeting, both sides reiterated, “Cross-strait relations should be discussed on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence.“
Xi JinPing reaffirmed, “Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all members of the Chinese nation,” framing cross-strait ties as a historical and cultural inevitability. Meanwhile, Cheng called for a peaceful and constructive framework for engagement and emphasized the need to avoid escalation. Media access was limited in the middle of the meeting, with the press suddenly asked to leave during Cheng’s speech and the talk moving into a closed-door session.
Following the meeting, Beijing announced “Beneficiary Measures,” which includes expanding direct flight routes, reopening tourism, increasing Taiwan imports, and offshore fishery cooperation. Many of these initiatives represented the continuation of earlier Taiwan-focused policies. Beijing specifically includes measures such as youth exchanges and the entry of Taiwanese film and television products. These measures suggested that Beijing’s outreach was directed not only toward business sectors but also toward broader social and younger demographics in Taiwan.
Apart from the meeting itself, another notable moment was Cheng’s homage at the Sun YatSen Mausoleum. She remarked on Sun as a “mentor for the liberation of the Taiwanese people” and referenced the term “台灣民族” (Taiwanese Minzu), with “Minzu” referring to ethnicity or people. These remarks were notable because in past KMT leadership visits, “中華民族” (Chinese Minzu) was used rather than explicitly foregrounding the term “Taiwanese.” No official comment from Beijing on these remarks may suggest either prior coordination or that the framing remained within expected parameters of CCP–KMT engagement.
Limits of the renewed engagement
The restoration of the CCP–KMT meeting following Cheng’s election as the new KMT chairperson carried symbolic and political significance. However, the meeting itself also reflected certain structural limitations.
While CCP–KMT engagement has long taken the form of party-to-party dialogue, such meetings carried greater political weight in earlier periods when the KMT represented Taiwan’s ruling authority. With DPP currently being the ruling party, the CCP–KMT engagement operates more as a party-level communication. Its direct implications for current cross-strait policy remain more limited compared to earlier periods.
Although both party leaders advocated cross-strait peace and stability during the meeting, military and diplomatic tensions across the Taiwan Strait continued. Continued PLA fleet and naval vessel activities around the Taiwan Strait highlighted the persistence of cross-strait security tensions despite the party-to-party engagement. Taiwan President Lai ChingTe’s planned Africa visit also encountered difficulties after Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar reportedly denied overflight transit permissions. A move widely seen as reflecting Beijing’s continuing diplomatic pressure on Taiwan.
What explains the restoration of CCP–KMT dialogue?
KMT New Chairman:
Cheng’s election as the new chairperson of KMT contributes to the restoration of CCP–KMT engagement. After Cheng’s election as KMT chair, Xi sent a congratulatory message, widely interpreted as a signal of Beijing’s approval of Cheng’s political stance. Against this backdrop, the subsequent CCP–KMT meeting reflects Beijing’s readiness to re-engage with the KMT under its new leadership.
Beijing’s Strategic Calculation:
The restoration also reflects Beijing’s strategy of selective engagement toward Taiwan. Even though KMT is no longer Taiwan’s ruling party, it remains one of the island’s major political forces. Through engagement with the KMT, Beijing is able to reinforce the narrative that cross-strait dialogue and stability remain possible under certain political conditions, particularly through acceptance of the “1992 Consensus” and opposition to Taiwan independence.
The “1992 Consensus” itself remains interpreted differently. Within KMT discourse, it has traditionally been associated with the consensus of “One China, different interpretations” (一中各表). However, Beijing has increasingly framed the “1992 Consensus” with the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and its position that Taiwan is part of Chinese sovereignty, placing less emphasis on the “different interpretations.” This interpretation has been rejected by the DPP, who does not recognise the “1992 Consensus” as a basis for cross-strait engagement. Against this backdrop, the KMT leadership’s reference to the “1992 Consensus” during the meeting allowed Beijing to reinforce its broader cross-strait narrative.
The meeting also allowed Beijing to portray cross-strait communication as still possible, while indirectly reinforcing its narratives that Taiwan Strait tensions are due to the rejection of the “1992 Consensus” by the DPP government. The meeting served as a form of political signalling that negotiation and stability remain achievable if adherence to Beijing’s interpretation of the “One China principle” and “1992 Consensus.”
The implications for Taiwan
For Cheng and KMT
Being the first sitting KMT chair to visit Beijing since 2016, Cheng was able to show that the KMT is still the only Taiwanese party with direct connections to Beijing. The trip quickly elevated her to a genuine political heavyweight with an international reputation. In the long run, it is not erroneous to assume that Cheng will try to use the attention boost gained by the visit to position herself as a frontrunner for the 2028 presidential elections. Although it remains to be seen if this will also change the party’s overall internal balance of power towards its ‘China doves.’ Cheng is not the party’s most famous politician, and she would have to challenge other, more moderate KMT politicians who hold different stances on the China.
The visit was a crowning moment of a so far adventurous career, in which Cheng made a 180-degree political turn. Back in her days as a student activist in the 1980s, she organized mass rallies advocating for Taiwanese independence. In a speech in 1988, she denounced the ruling KMT as “despicable rulers.” Cheng also participated in the Wild Lily student movement in 1990, calling for democratic elections. The objective was fulfilled in 1996, when Taiwan held its first presidential elections. That year, she joined the National Assembly for the DDP.
Her early times as a legislator had not been without controversies, and she quickly became known as an outright critic of the DDP government. The breaking point came in 2002, amidst a scandal involving sexual harassment allegations against Taiwan’s health minister. Cheng was urged to leave the party after she publicly insulted her own party members.
Cheng then joined the KMT and became a member of the Legislative Yuan in 2008. Already in 2005, she had accompanied the KMT’s then chairman, Lien Chan, on a historic trip to Beijing as a spokesperson. This marked the first visit by a KMT party leader to China. Although she never ceased her sharp rhetoric in the following years, Cheng appeared to have finally found a political viewpoint she could stand behind.
Yet her rise to become the KMT’s chair in 2025 surprised many, even in her own party. Her rhetorical talent, seizing every opportunity to criticize the ruling president, allowed her to rally party members behind her. Her speeches resonated with those inside the KMT who, after having lost three consecutive presidential elections, felt that the party had stagnated and too timid.
The role of Cross-Strait affairs in Taiwanese Politics
Taiwan’s relationship to China is the core question that divides the party lines. There is no classical right-left spectrum but a division among colors: the pan-Green camp is centered around the ruling party DDP, emphasizing an independent and unique Taiwanese identity and culture and, to some extent, demanding independence. The pan-Blue coalition mainly consists of the KMT. Contrary to the DDP, the pan-Blue calls for engagement with China while highlighting the Chinese roots of the majority of Taiwanese people. Taiwan’s People Party (TPP), also known as white, a rising new party to break the two- parties dominance. The party has had notable success in attracting young voters while they are currently cooperating with KMT to attain a legislative majority. TPP calls for pragmatic handling of Cross Strait relations.
This deep polarization has deep consequences for Taiwan’s security policy. Recently a months-long dispute between the two camps over Taiwan’s defense budget finally came to an end, and President Lai was forced to concede a bitter defeat against the majority-holding KMT. Here, too, Cheng played an instrumental role, warning against giving the DDP a “blank cheque.”
While cross-strait issues have traditionally carried greater significance in Taiwan’s presidential elections, this is not the case for local elections. National security has increasingly become part of broader political discussion within Taiwan. In this context, the meeting with Xi allowed the KMT under Cheng’s leadership to project the image that it remains capable of maintaining communication with Beijing and reducing the risks of cross-strait escalation. This may carry political value ahead of Taiwan’s local elections in November.
At the same time, the KMT’s presidential defeats have also shown the political limits of being perceived as overly close to Beijing, reflecting broader public caution in Taiwan toward cross-strait engagement that is seen as undermining Taiwan’s security. According to recent polls, three out of four Taiwanese dislike the CCP. While Cheng says that she hopes to see “Taiwanese proud to be Chinese” one day, the past decades have seen a clear trend among especially young people in Taiwan who identify themselves more and more with an exclusively Taiwanese identity.
Taiwan’s society remains divided over the visit
Major party lines largely divide public perception of the visit. Lev Nachman and Wei-Ting Yen show that DDP supporters showed strong antipathy against the meeting, while KMT and TTP voters were more in favor. Most importantly, independent voters, who represent the fastest-growing voters group, tend to envision accommodation with China more positively and particularly value symbolic gains instead of real material benefits. Many Taiwanese are at least open to engagement with China, although with limits: A new study suggests that the more that Taiwanese feel that PRC is influencing their democracy, the more they are likely to protest. Nachman and Yen conclude that “This stark divide between KMT and TPP voters, on the one hand, and DPP voters, on the other, shows just how fundamentally different Taiwanese voters see this trip and the idea of cross-Strait engagement.”
What comes next for Taiwan politics?
Although still far away, the trip and the underlying discussions reveal what to expect from the next presidential elections in 2028. While thin in substance, the symbolic meaning of the visit and Cheng’s handshake with Xi will likely have far-reaching implications. Most notably, it will strengthen the pan-blue opposition block between the KMT and a crisis-ridden TTP. With the question of how to deal with China remaining at the center of Taiwanese politics, the hyper-partisan gridlock in the legislature will likely continue in the following years.
To Learn More About:
- The Domestic Politics of Cheng Li-wun’s China Trip, Brian Hioe, The Diplomat, 13 April 2026.
- What the Taiwanese opposition leader’s recent China visit means for Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, Wen Ti Sung, The Atlantic Council, 14 April 2026.
- Taiwan’s Opposition Leader, Once for Independence, Turns Toward China, Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, The New York Times, 4 December 2025.
- Beijing’s choice of magnanimity over menace would better woo Taiwan, Zhiqun Zhu, East Asia Forum, 11 October 2025.
