- (Analysis) Trump 2.0: What Does It Mean For Argentina and Brazil? - 2 March, 2025
- What’s going on in Argentine Intelligence? - 1 March, 2025
The role of the Argentine Intelligence System holds significant importance. Firstly, Argentina is located in a region (Southern Cone) which has been characterized by the absence of major interstate conflicts but the country faces serious issues related to drug trafficking, extremist groups, porous borders, and organized crime — among others. Additionally, recent history shows that Argentina is not immune to the phenomenon of terrorism. During the 1990s, the country suffered two attacks: on March 17, 1992 against the Israeli Embassy and on July 18, 1994 against the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA).
The head of the Argentine Intelligence System, the SIDE (by its initials in Spanish for Secretaría de Inteligencia de Estado), previously named AFI (Agencia Federal de Inteligencia) between 2015 and 2024, has been the target of various criticisms: being associated with human rights violations during the Military Dictatorships of the last century, participation in internal political espionage, being connected to the two mentioned terrorist attacks and even being tied to the death of prosecutor Alberto Nisman.
Argentine Intelligence System: Structures and Regulation
The structure of Argentine intelligence, along with the laws that shape National Security (Internal Security Law 24.059 of 1992) and Defense (National Defense Law 23.554 of 1988), is framed within a particular context. The decision to separate Internal Security from state type external threats was made throughout the 1980s and 1990s, after the dictatorship “Proceso de Reorganización Nacional” (1976-1983), when Argentina’s political leadership decided to limit military influence to areas specifically related to armed conflicts and external threats. The objective was to diminish the power of the military, who throughout the past century has been interfering in Argentina’s democratic life with coups d’état.
In 2001, the National Intelligence Law 25.520 was added to the mentioned body of laws. This regulation is the main framework for the National Intelligence System (SIN). Until then, intelligence in Argentina was still influenced by the National Security Doctrine of the 1960s, whose primary focus was combating communism and subversion, and also associated with serious human rights violations.
In this sense, the spirit of separating internal security from the defense against external threats also influenced Law 25.520. This law established an Intelligence System with components that follow the same logic of dividing internal from external intelligence: SIDE (renamed as AFI after the 2015 reform; renamed to SIDE again from 2024) as the leading entity within the structure, National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence ( in Spanish: DINIEM) under the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for the production of strategic military intelligence related to external threats from state actors or war-related threats and National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence (in Spanish: DINICRI) under the Ministry of Security, responsible for producing criminal intelligence.
Law 25.520 provides the definitions of activities under jurisdiction of the Argentine National Intelligence System, as well as the limits to intelligence activities. It establishes protocols for the collection and storage of information, declassification timelines, and affirms that communications are inviolable, except when they are authorized by a judge.
Beyond the idea of separation of the military forces from the internal political life of the country, the goal of this law was bringing transparency to intelligence activities. The most significant change introduced was the creation of a Bicameral Commission (composed of members from both legislative chambers) to control and audit reserved expenses. The issue of reserved expenses is particularly important, as they were never subject to review before the induction of this law. From this point on, secret regulations in intelligence matters in Argentina were eliminated, and the country became the first in Latin America to establish a specific legislative body to control and regulate intelligence activities.
Reform:
Law 25.520 aimed to bring transparency to the system. However, the 2000s were not free from scandals for Argentine intelligence. The critical point came in 2015 during a period of institutional crisis and general questioning of the intelligence services following the death of Prosecutor Alberto Nisman who was in charge of investigating the 1994 AMIA bombing. His death remains a subject of controversy; he died just hours before he was set to file an accusation against then-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner for allegedly covering up the AMIA bombing and making a pact with Iran.
In this context, a reform process took place, leading to the enactment of the reforming Law 27.126. The main change involved an image makeover, with the SIDE being rebranded as the AFI. However, the most significant change concerned phone surveillance and wiretapping. Until 2015, the Directorate of Judicial Surveillance (known in Spanish as DOJ and colloquially as OJOTA) was responsible for intercepting communications and was part of the SIDE. Although judicial authorization was required, the transfer of this Directorate to the judiciary (Public Prosecutor’s Office) meant that the newly formed AFI no longer had the ability to conduct wiretaps.
Starting in 2015, a trend emerged in which the AFI gradually distanced from functions related to the judiciary. The main change was mentioned transfer of the “OJOTA.” The final blow came during the government of Alberto Fernández, who, through a Decree, prohibited intelligence agencies from acting as auxiliaries to the judiciary in judicial investigations. Since 2020, Argentine intelligence only produces information relevant to national security, directed solely to the president.
The current state of Argentine Intelligence
With Javier Milei’s arrival in December 2023, things did not change much at “La Casa” (as the SIDE is often referred to colloquially). Milei came to power with libertarian ideals, such as minimal state intervention in the economy and reducing the deficit and public sector spending. As Rawlings Mitema Onserio points out “The candidate has also endorsed the individual right to freely sell organs, in addition to rampant privatization of state companies, pension cuts, and charging for public hospital services.” The government’s approach to intelligence was no different from its agenda for other areas: staff cuts, especially targeting those agents hired during previous presidential administrations. The difference was in the budgetary aspect, where the AFI was among the least affected by the “plan motosierra” (Milei’s economic plan, which refers to cutting public spending with a chainsaw)
On the other hand, Argentina’s intelligence agenda aligned with the positive shift in the country’s foreign relations towards the United States. This shift in agenda materialized in February 2024, when Nicolas Posse (Chief of Cabinet) and Silvestre Sívori (Director of SIDE) traveled to Washington to meet with William Burns, the director of the CIA, and officials from SOUTHCOM.
The new SIDE director, Sívori, was aligned with the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, Posse. Six months after taking office, Posse was removed. With the fall of Posse, Sívori also resigned. The context of their departure was shaped by events familiar to the history of the SIDE: internal political espionage on Cabinet members close to Milei. In response to this situation, Milei chose to delegate the appointment of the SIDE director to Santiago Caputo. Caputo’s voice has become one of the President’s main influences, and he has become one of the most trusted and strategic figures within the current government. With his strong strategic abilities, Caputo earned the status of “star advisor” and the “brain” behind Milei’s presidential campaign.
But that was not all, in mid-July of this year, through Decree 614/2024, the government announced the dissolution of the AFI, which was replaced by the new SIDE (yes! with the same historic name it had before 2015). The decision to delegate SIDE related matters to Caputo was intended to create the impression that intelligence once again reported directly to the President rather than to the Chief of Cabinet (as had been the case during the short-lived Sívori-Posse period). The leadership of the AFI was entrusted to a close associate of Caputo: Sergio Neiffert.
The SIDE’s leadership was established along with four sub-agencies. The first is the SIA (Servicio de Inteligencia Argentino), responsible for external intelligence. Then, there is the ASN (Agencia de Seguridad Nacional), aimed at gathering information on complex federal crimes. The third is the AFC (Agencia Federal de Ciberseguridad), tasked with planning solutions and responding to cyberattacks. There was also the addition of an Internal Affairs Division that supervises and audits the other three sub-agencies.
Why is this important?
In addition to the recent historical context in which Argentina suffered two attacks in the 1990s, there are a series of factors that could make Argentina a potential target for fundamentalist terrorism.
Milei’s foreign policy is characterized by a highly direct and personal approach to international relations. Milei’s geopolitical shift towards closer ties with Israel deviates from Argentina’s historical position of balanced diplomacy in the Middle East. In this context, statements such as his desire to move the Argentine embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, choosing Israel as the destination for his first official visit, and designating Hamas as a terrorist group, among others, could make Iran or proxy groups potential enemies of the Argentine state. In fact, Teheran Times, a media outlet close to Iranian authorities, warned Argentina that it would “regret their enmity with Iran”
Argentina’s geographic characteristics make it a place with “porous” borders. The Triple Border area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina has historically been identified as an operational hub for various transnational organized crime groups and is still considered a potential site for the transit, establishment, and financing of terrorist groups. Additionally, a new factor could impact Argentina’s security: Bolivia and Iran have strengthened their ties in technology, security, defense, and intelligence. This has raised concerns not only because of the proximity between Argentina and Bolivia but also due to the porous border between the two countries. In this regard, the Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich, expressed concern about the presence of Iranians with Mercosur passports who are allegedly linked to the Quds Forces (special unit of the Iranian IRGC)
We invite our readers to consider some questions:
- Will Milei’s government be able to adequately reconfigure intelligence services to meet Argentina’s challenges, or is the new SIDE just another rebranding with no real change?
- Will the role of intelligence services increase during Milei’s administration when it comes to the country’s internal political life?
- Are the factors presented and the international context enough to consider Argentina a potential target for radicalized terrorist groups?
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