![[Report] High Politics in the High North: Assessing Transatlantic Policy in the Arctic](https://i0.wp.com/thenewglobalorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/image-4.png?resize=941%2C200&ssl=1)
- [Report] High Politics in the High North: Assessing Transatlantic Policy in the Arctic - 26 January, 2026
- (Analysis) Finland Finds its Footing in NATO - 28 March, 2024
- [REPORT] Table for Two?: Italy and Other Upper-Middle Powers in Modern Global Affairs - 20 October, 2023
By: Christopher Ynclán Jr and María Vallés González
The United States Capitol Building Source: Photo by Joshua Tsu on Unsplash
Nearly a year ago, Donald Trump was reelected as the 47th president of the United States, surviving assassination attempts and enduring legal cases that were largely dropped in the aftermath of his win (Ware, 2024). Due to the electoral gains among more diverse voters, in addition to his party recapturing control of the Senate through the defeat of Democrats by MAGA-aligned candidates (Owen, 2025), Trump has come to believe that he has a robust mandate in both the domestic and international policy arenas (Nicholls, 2024).
Further compounding his conviction in his distinctive brand of inflexible foreign policy were polls that saw him as more favorable on foreign policy issues than Kamala Harris (Stagwell, 2024). Also, his campaign garnered the support of traditionally democratic and marginalized constituencies who were dissatisfied with Biden’s handling of Middle Eastern affairs (McCammon, 2025). However, the assertive policy of Trump’s second term has not been without points of contention, especially with America’s traditional allies.
One such prominent obstruction to transatlantic unity has been Trump’s renewed insistence on acquiring Greenland from Denmark, which was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Ott et al., 2025). The Arctic island is not the only object in his sights, as he has also threatened to annex Canada, along with retaking the Panama Canal, which has been firmly under the sovereignty of the Panamanians for nearly three decades (Yousif, 2025). Trump’s turbulent road to his second term has shaped his agenda, and the new precedents set by the Supreme Court have provided him with the framework to accomplish it (Breidbart, 2024). His determination to leave his mark on American history is evident in his sustained interest in Greenland, originating from his first term (Deutsche Welle, 2019). Though the prospect of Greenland’s status changing in the near future is minimal, it is prudent for Europe to develop the will and capabilities to become a more credible actor in the Arctic.
The United States an Unreliable Partner or Shifting Priorities?
Since leaving the presidency in 2017, many of President Obama’s policies concerning national politics and those of his successor Joe Biden have been dismantled by the current President Trump (Taheri, 2025). In contrast to Obama’s diminishing influence within national politics through the Democratic Party that has lasted nearly a decade since exiting office, the conception of pivoting to Asia in foreign policy has remained a near paramount academic aim well past his administration (Lieberthal, 2011). Such stated goals have not gone disregarded by Europe, which has advocated for its own strategic autonomy as well as China expressing its willingness to underwrite the continent’s largest conflict since the Second World War via its support of Russia (Torreblanca, 2023).
Perhaps one of the most defining moments that sparked calls for European strategic autonomy was the tumultuous American withdrawal from Afghanistan, which occurred in 2021. Following the bungled withdrawal of Afghanistan, introspection within the United States ranged along ideological lines (Inhofe, 2022). Among those who sought to correct for Trump’s reluctance to reaffirm America’s commitment to its European partners in his first term (Wright, 2017), there were discussions of signaling commitment to allies by providing logistical support to evacuees, especially those who had risked their lives as interpreters (Hoffman, 2021). Others in this camp made suggestions such as conditioning an American withdrawal on an inter-Afghan peace deal between the Taliban and the now exiled Ghani government, as it promoted a diplomatic option (Afzal, 2021). However, the inter-Afghan deal would have most likely failed, provided the political violence enacted by the Taliban following the collapse of the Afghan government (Cunningham and Parker, 2021). Moreover, this should serve as a lesson to recognize that not all political actors are intent on sharing political power, and largely, said actors will exhibit a pattern of behavior demonstrating their aversion to diplomacy.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, conservatives mainly pointed out the tragic loss of American life that was caused by a terrorist attack during the mismanaged withdrawal (Venable 2023). Additionally, they believed that Biden’s diplomatic failures would welcome more aggressive foreign policies by America’s conventional adversaries. It is to be noted that within the American foreign policy ecosystem, specific discussions of what the withdrawal would mean for NATO were less numerous than bare maintenance of relationships abroad within Democratic circles and American strength to unilaterally confront peer powers or terrorists among Republicans.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Europeans also faced a reckoning following the rapid capture of Kabul by the Taliban in 2021 (Weigand, 2022). Militarily, many European states had been involved in Afghanistan since 2003 through the NATO mission in the wake of the alliance invoking Article 5 after the September 11th attacks (De Nesnera, 2006). On the economic front, Afghanistan, before the Taliban, had been the largest beneficiary of European humanitarian aid for 20 years. In diplomatic reflections, the European Union reviewed lessons through the auspices of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (Hassan, 2023). The study catalogues quite a few shortcomings on the European side, such as intelligence failures, a lack of imagination for alternative policies to American ones concerning strategy, and foremost, a failure of autonomy.
The landscape of Kabul Afghanistan Source: Mohammad Husaini on Unsplash
While the commissioned study laments the lack of European strategic autonomy, there are some points within the study and more broadly that should be addressed. Although the study did correctly state the Europeans lacked strategic autonomy in Afghanistan, the context of their entrance into Afghanistan was predicated on the invocation of Article 5. Furthermore, the mission in Afghanistan was seen as critical to Western security. The issue for the transatlantic partnership now is that there is no consensus on what constitutes Western security. For Washington, it is concerned with its ontological security through successfully competing with China predominantly in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, there is an existential threat to Ukraine and the European project, as made evident through the recent Russian incursions into European airspace (Kimmage, 2025). Lastly, the Europeans must define where they wish to exercise strategic autonomy and what their mission in a post-war Ukraine will entail. Though this will be determined by Europe through deliberation, this can only be achieved through a sustainable peace in Ukraine backed by all Transatlantic partners. In the meantime, the European Union can make concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment by using frozen Russian funds to fund both the reconstruction of Ukraine but also to finance the armed forces of Ukraine in order for them to build a sustainable capacity to deter Russian aggression (Kolyandr, 2025). On the diplomatic front, the EU can establish a special representative to the country in an effort to provide the war-torn nation with the attention it deserves.
The emerging rift between Washington and Brussels was made evident in the growing ideological divide and disagreements in how they envision their intelligence partnership. Differences in ideology with the second Trump administration began with former Trump advisor Elon Musk endorsing the German far-right party AFD ahead of the elections within Germany (Ruhiyyih Ewing, 2025). This has been compounded not only by Trump’s personal preference in dealing with Europe through his warm relationship with Italian far-right prime minister Giorgia Meloni, but also Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Council (Martin, 2025). In Vance’s speech, he berated what he saw as a retreat of free speech from European countries despite the efforts of the Trump administration to deport students for their political opinions over American foreign policy in the Middle East (Quinville, 2025).
Additionally, the preference within the administration for European far-right parties and an immigration policy that explicitly favors those of European descent in places like South Africa may reveal what the administration sees as underwriting the transatlantic partnership (Kanno-Youngs and Aleaziz, 2025). Members of the current administration may believe that the relationship between Europe and Washington is driven by superficial characteristics such as skin color rather than genuine security interests. Such a flimsy notion to conduct foreign policy on the part of Washington will likely not ensure Europe assumes more of the burden for its security, but it would also be a prescription for isolation with a more assertive Global South.
While the latest tense meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy has once again raised the question of whether Trump, along with his populist movement, is ideologically predisposed to illiberal Russia, history has shown in the Sino-Soviet split that two ideologically similar states are destined to stay together (Miller et al. 2025). That being said, some geopolitical actors wish to divide the Transatlantic partnership with the same vigor as American policy makers who wish to complete a so-called reverse Kissinger by pulling Russia away from China’s orbit (Danylyuk, 2025). This is unlikely to occur with the Trump administration, as Putin has stalled diplomatic progress over the matter of Ukraine after Trump had achieved ceasefires in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Associated Press, 2025). However, the most immediate objective for the Russians is the use of clandestine activities to gain an upper hand in the war it started, but also to weaken overall support for Kyiv (The Kyiv Independent news desk, 2025). A secondary objective for the Russians is to weaken the resolve of NATO signatories to utilize the alliance for its stated purpose of being a defensive alliance.
Moscow was unable to marshal support from the CSTO for its aggression against its sovereign neighbor (Dyner, 2023). Such divisiveness among the successor organizations to the Warsaw Pact discloses the change in status of Russia from a superpower to a great power since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The hegemony of the United States has no doubt been challenged in the 21st century, but it still remains a superpower largely through its basing agreements and alliances. Moreover, the dissolution of NATO would not only pave the path for Putin to once again subject areas like the Baltics to Russian rule, but it would irrevocably harm the credibility of the United States to protect those who depend on it for security.
A fictional spy conducting surveillance Source: Photo by David Sinclair on Unsplash
Intelligence sharing between the United States and its NATO partners in the 21st century has largely been shaped by the demands of the alliance. The alliance had begun operations outside the confines of its signatories before the new millennium in the Balkans, but it was only after the alliance invoked Article V in the 21st century that intelligence sharing became more formalized through the establishment of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center under American auspices (Gordon, 2017). This relationship concerning the dissemination of secrets has not been without setbacks, even before Trump. One of the most prominent intelligence scandals within the Transatlantic partnership was when the United States was caught spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel with the assistance of the Danish (Berry, 2021). The scandal briefly soured relations between Washington and Berlin as the Germans summoned the American ambassador to investigate the matter (Deutsche Welle 2013).
In the present day, America’s European intelligence partners are concerned with an eroding rule of law as well as the growing politicization of intelligence itself (Modderkolk 2025). A key incident of concern that has been cited was the firing of the chief of the NSA for a supposed lack of loyalty to the Trump administration (Mehrotra 2025). These stated conditions have caused their allies to not only grow closer but also to be more selective with the information they share with the Trump administration (Roussi 2025). While the sharing of sensitive information has not been completely ceased, it shows that the intelligence capabilities of the American intelligence community cannot be replicated by the Europeans, but caveats should be given. The nature of the partnership has changed, and those across the Atlantic must be concerned with the potential weaponization of intelligence due to heightened polarization within the United States.
This concern is not without precedent as Trump previously requested Zelenskyy to interfere in the democratic process of the United States (Weissert, 2025). Furthermore, Trump has paused both military aid and the sharing of intelligence to Ukraine in hopes that it would lead to a diplomatic breakthrough between Moscow and Kyiv (Walton, 2025). Zelenskyy would later deny he was asked to obtain blackmail in a balancing act to have a positive relationship with both American political parties, as he is fighting for the sovereignty of his nation (Karmanau, 2019).
Although Ukraine is a short-term security partner, such events have a bearing on Europe as a whole. With long-standing allies, Trump has routinely sown doubt as to whether the United States would uphold its mutual defense obligations for NATO (Sullivan, 2024). Moreover, just as it has done with Ukraine, it can also withhold intelligence from Europe, which would be vital should Russia have larger ambitions than the confines of Ukraine. Europe has faced an assault on its energy security through the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it faces a similar geopolitical shock should it be overreliant on actors without vested interests in European security (Majkut, 2024).
With these challenges ahead of Brussels, it has attempted to burden share through an increase in its defense spending to appease Washington (Castilla, 2025). This strategy has also included an unequal trade deal between the United States and itself (Burwell 2025). This strategy shows that Europe has proverbially put all its eggs in the basket of the United States, but what else can Europe do? The answer is complex. As stated previously, NATO signatories have deepened cooperation with one another to placate Trump through burden sharing (Raik, 2025). Beyond that, Europe may have more tools than it realizes. Certain European countries have bolstered partnerships to facilitate the sharing of intelligence in the context of NATO’s troubled eastern flank. This can be further built upon by a formal consolidation of the Weimar Triangle with the Bucharest Nine for both matters of intelligence and possibly mutual defense (Weber, 2025).
The suggested consolidation can provide an instrument for burden assumption should Europe’s geopolitical conditions deteriorate, and presents the bonus of signaling a deeper commitment to burden sharing within NATO. Also, the states within this new group could commit to a deeper investment in open-source intelligence to bolster their shared capabilities and build resilience against hybrid warfare efforts directed at undermining European unity (Luberisse, 2025).
Moreover, this may mitigate intelligence leaks like Signalgate, where the editor of an American magazine was added to a group chat consisting of top American national security officials (Daalder, 2025). In the group chat, JD Vance cast aside the importance of the Suez Canal to American interests and placed it more as a concern for Europe. To mend the divide of interests and to be diplomatically proactive, Europe can make the United States stronger at the negotiating table with Russia by impressing upon them their missteps. Missteps such as hosting a summit in Alaska, whose symbolic value to Putin may have lowered the domestic pressure he is supposed to feel through sanctions (Murray, 2025). While the Americans may have assessed that hosting the Russians in Alaska may have been a way to show the Russians need to be seen as a peer to the United States, it misses the reality of Russia’s actions. Moscow has not accepted diplomatic concessions since it invaded Ukrainian territory 11 years ago.
Putin has committed to a full invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to upset the balance of power in Europe and will likely see what it can get unless the West can get behind Ukraine militarily and diplomatically. Additionally, America’s drawdown in Romania during ongoing hostilities is unlikely to impress upon Putin the credibility of America’s commitment to NATO (Serban and Dickinson, 2025). Lastly, a potential invasion of Venezuela by the United States would not demonstrate the sanctity of sovereign borders nor international law (Delgado, 2025).
Why Trump wants Greenland
American involvement in Greenland dates back to the Cold War, when the United States built a now-abandoned base under the ice to host nuclear weapons and troops (Price, 2025). The base was ultimately abandoned because of the impractical nature of building a base under ice that shifted, but it did not leave the imagination of Americans. However, the desire to acquire the Danish possession traces back to the tenure of American Secretary of State William Seward, who wanted Greenland to control the Atlantic in hopes of making the United States a great power on par with the Europeans (Ghisetti, 2025). The nature of Trump’s wish to acquire Greenland has been rooted in a desire to extend the hegemony of the United States through control of the Arctic, while its geopolitical stock has risen in recent years. He also wishes to gain access to rare earth elements and minerals within Greenland in the backdrop of a race against China for technological superiority (Schröder and Nxumalo, 2025).
The U.S. and China have recently come to a temporary agreement regarding rare earth materials, but Europe should be regarded as it is, temporary (Breuninger et al. 2025). The current administration does not have a comprehensive strategy beyond shipbuilding, as it does not address the status of the artificial islands in the South China Sea, as well as a diplomatic strategy to counter the growing influence of China on states in the Indo-Pacific (Lopez 2025). Creating a perfect strategy for containing China will likely not be solved by those across the aisle. For example, leftist foreign policy thinkers may correctly assess the failures of relying too heavily on conventional military means, but stating that the Chinese cannot presently threaten Hawaii misses the point (Kavanagh 2025). The balance of power in Asia is what is at stake, and America’s allies are being threatened by Beijing on a routine basis. This comes at a perilous time for the region as there have been wars in Southeast Asia along with border clashes between the Taliban and Pakistanis, which together reveal a declining regional order (Hussain 2025). If a coherent American strategy for China is not formed, it will have an increased interest in acquiring the rare earth minerals possessed by its allies.
The once quiet region has become a larger focus of interest to the United States, as shown through the increasing instances of its navy entering the Barents Sea (Devyatkin, 2025). Russia has also shared in this regional trend of militarization, as they have established infrastructure in the Arctic through its Harmony Project to protect its nuclear sites through monitoring NATO movements (Baruch and Michel, 2025). This new normal in the Arctic is a departure from the historically peaceful cooperation that has existed between states in the High North (Gricius and Jouan, 2025). Europe is not spared from this increased competition in the Arctic, as they have included both Finland and Sweden in NATO in recent years (Mitchell, 2024). These inclusions are likely to draw more immediate Russian activity to their continental borders, especially regarding the historic neutrality of Finland. However, the most pressing problem for Europe in the Arctic is the disunity among allies in how to approach the region. Perhaps the most evident sign of this is earlier this year, when Denmark summoned their American ambassador over allegations that the United States was conducting covert operations to promote secession from Copenhagen (Kirby, 2025). Washington prefers a primacist approach in the region where the purchase of Greenland through the framework of NATO can be the foundation for a new Arctic strategy (Gunasekara-Rockwell, 2025).
Granted, this policy may be benevolent on the surface, but it dresses up self-interest in the language of multilateralism. Both the alleged meddling in Danish affairs and the purchase of Greenland would be poor attempts to bolster the security of NATO signatories. First, the people of Greenland would be unlikely to be receptive to becoming citizens of a country with an eroding rule of law. Additionally, such efforts come at a time when NATO countries have increasingly invoked Article 4, which stipulates that parties will consult with one another when their territorial integrity is threatened (Poast, 2025). With China increasing its presence in the Arctic, the United States and Europe face a greater challenge to their security (Pezard et al., 2025). Both sides of the Atlantic have the possibility to overcome these issues by strengthening cooperation with allies outside the region with likewise interests (Ku, 2025). The Arctic, alongside the Pacific, stands to be the two contested regions in the 21st century. As a result, coordination between NATO partners and respect for the territorial integrity of one another are paramount for their security.
From a colony to self-government. What is Greenland’s legal status under International Public Law?
Once considered a colony, Greenland’s path toward autonomy has unfolded steadily over the past century. After the founding of the United Nations in 1945, Greenland was listed as a non-self-governing territory, that is to say, a colony under Danish control (Snævarr, 2017). That status began to shift in 1979, when Denmark introduced the Home Rule Act.
In 2009, the Act on Greenland Self-Government replaced the earlier arrangement and significantly expanded local authority (The Danish Parliament 2009). Crucially, it formally recognized Greenlanders as a distinct people under international law, with the right to self-determination.
Proposed image:
Source: Statsministeriet
The preamble of the Act explicitly states that the people of Greenland may one day choose full independence. In the meantime, the law allows for a gradual transfer of power in areas where it is constitutionally permissible. However, some key exceptions remain under Danish control, including citizenship, the Supreme Court, foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy.
Today, Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, with its own parliament and government (The Prime Minister’s Office n.d). While Denmark still handles foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy, Greenland manages everything from education to natural resources.
The situation of Greenland under International law is different from other territories like the Island of Diego Garcia, in the Chagos Archipelago, and New Caledonia. The case of Diego Garcia Island, a strategically important island in the Indian Ocean that has long hosted a joint UK-US military base, was resolved recently (Ministry of Defence et al., 2025). It has been part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) since sovereignty was ceded to Mauritius in 2025. This remote island in the Indian Ocean has a geopolitical interest and hosts a joint
In 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion declaring that “the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible” (International Court of Justice, 2019). The United Nations General Assembly followed suit with resolution 73/295, which endorsed the ICJ ruling and urged the UK to end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago within six months (United Nations General Assembly, 2019).
After years of diplomatic work, the United Kingdom signed an Agreement on May 22, 2025 (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office 2025). According to Article 1 of the agreement, “Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago in its entirety, including Diego Garcia”. However, under Article 2, Mauritius authorises the UK to continue exercising administrative, judicial, and enforcement powers necessary to operate the military base on Diego Garcia, effectively allowing continued UK–US military cooperation while affirming Mauritian sovereignty.
While Mauritius now holds sovereignty over Diego Garcia Island, the status of New Caledonia remains more complex and unresolved. Officially designated as an “Overseas Territory” of France, New Caledonia is also listed by the UN as a non-self-governing territory (United Nations n.d). Its history is a colonial history (González 2015). Colonized by Napoleon III in 1853, New Caledonia was initially considered part of Polynesia until it was administratively separated in 1860. It was subject to the Code de l’indigénat, a series of special laws for the native inhabitants of the French colonies, which remained in effect until its abolition in 1944. That abolition marked a turning point, initiating a slow and uneven process of decolonization. The territory was later granted the status of “Overseas Territory”, which included the extension of voting rights to its residents.
Proposed image:
Source: United Nations – Non-Self-Governing Territories
During the 20th century, demands for political and economic autonomy intensified. All this led to violent clashes during the 1980s, Les Événements. In response, France and local leaders negotiated the Matignon Accords (1988) and later the Nouméa Accord (1998) was signed (United Nations 1988; United Nations 1998). Both agreements sought to establish a progressive framework for autonomy. They also defined a clear process towards decolonization. This included the holding of three independence referendums, held in 2018, 2020, and 2021.
Each of these territories, Diego Garcia, New Caledonia, and Greenland, occupies a different place within the framework of international law, marked by distinct legal statuses, degrees of self-governance, and paths toward self-determination.
Greenland, though geographically and politically unique, stands apart. As an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, it has steadily expanded its self-rule since the adoption of the Self-Government Act in 2009. Unlike the cases of Diego Garcia and New Caledonia. Its journey under international law reflects a different model—less about contested sovereignty, and more about negotiated autonomy within a constitutional framework.
Can you buy a country? The legal and political limits of sovereignty for sale
The rhetorical question, “Is it possible to buy a country?”, may sound like a geopolitical thought experiment, but it has, at times in history, been a reality. However, the answer today is far more complex, both legally and politically.
To find real examples of a country acquiring another’s territory through purchase, one must look deep into the past, to a very different international order. In 1867, the United States paid 7.2 million dollars to Russia to acquire Alaska, which eventually became one of the country’s current states. Years later, it would also end up buying a territory from the Danes. It was in 1917, and it was the Virgin Islands.
Today, there are essentially two pathways through which a state might attempt to acquire another’s territory. The first is the cession of sovereign territory, that is to say, a State may cede part or all of its territory to another State by means of a treaty, as in the above example of the cession of Alaska. Under current international law, it would only be valid if the right to self-determination of the affected population is respected. An agreement between governments would not be sufficient.
The second path is less peaceful; the annexation of a state or part of a state by invasion or use of force is prohibited by modern international law. It contravenes the principle of territorial integrity constituted in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, and the prohibition of the use of force.
In conclusion, buying Greenland is not feasible under the principle of self-determination in international law. Moreover, common sense dictates that to “buy” something, someone must be willing to “sell” and Greenlanders insist that they are “not for sale”. For this reason, the US offer consists of providing them with a more favorable relationship than the current one with Denmark: voting rights, Nordic-style welfare benefits, a strong healthcare system, generous social security, free tuition, and scholarships for all levels of education (Gad 2025). However, the U.S. offer does not appear very attractive to Greenlanders.
Unanimous reactions from the international community
NATO could find itself navigating turbulent waters if one of its most influential members—namely the United States—were to exert territorial pressure within the alliance. Greenland, though autonomous, is tied to Denmark—a NATO member—raising concerns about internal coherence. NATO’s principle of collective defense relies on unity and mutual respect for sovereignty. Any perception of coercion could strain alliance solidarity.
The European Union has weighed in with a strong show of support for Denmark. European Commission spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated: “The EU stands fully in support of the Kingdom of Denmark. We will continue to uphold the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will not waver in defending them, particularly when the integrity of an EU member state is questioned”(Sevinc 2025).
This episode may serve to accelerate Europe’s broader strategic shift toward greater autonomy from the United States. For many EU leaders, the situation reinforces calls for more robust European defense capabilities and a more independent geopolitical posture.
Conclusion
Greenland’s unique legal status under international law—as an autonomous territory with a recognized right to self-determination—places clear limits on any external ambitions, including those from powerful allies. Any attempt to bypass Denmark or pressure Greenland directly would not only breach international legal norms but also risk fracturing trust within NATO. The firm EU backing of Denmark underscores how seriously European institutions view these principles. In an era of renewed great-power competition, Greenland stands as a reminder that sovereignty, consent, and legal process remain the pillars of legitimate international engagement.
References:
Afzal, Madiha. “Biden Was Wrong on Afghanistan.” Brookings, November 9, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/biden-was-wrong-on-afghanistan/.
“America Shouldn’t Pivot to Asia | Lowy Institute.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/america-shouldn-t-pivot-asia.
Baruch, Jérémie , and Anne Michel. “Russian Secrets”: How Russia Built an Arctic Spy Network Using European Equipment. October 23, 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2025/10/23/russian-secrets-how-russia-built-an-arctic-spy-network-using-european-equipment_6746699_8.html.
Berry, Alex. “Danish Secret Service Helped US Spy on Merkel: Report – DW – 05/30/2021.” Dw.Com, May 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/danish-secret-service-helped-us-spy-on-germanys-angela-merkel-report/a-57721901.
Breidbart, Samuel. “The Supreme Court’s Presidential Immunity Ruling Undermines Democracy | Brennan Center for Justice.” October 1, 2024. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/supreme-courts-presidential-immunity-ruling-undermines-democracy.
Breuninger, Kevin, Anniek Bao, and Evelyn Cheng. “Trump Cuts Fentanyl Tariffs on China to 10% as Beijing Delays Latest Rare Earths Curbs by a Year.” CNBC, October 30, 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/30/trump-cuts-fentanyl-tariffs-on-china-to-10percent-says-us-reached-rare-earths-deal-.html.
Burwell, Frances. “Trump and von Der Leyen Made a Deal. But the US and EU Are Drifting Apart on Trade.” Atlantic Council, July 29, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trump-and-von-der-leyen-made-a-deal-but-the-us-and-eu-are-drifting-apart-on-trade/.
Castilla, Juan. “Burden Sharing: Real Solidarity or Arbitrary Mathematics in NATO and the EU?” Elcano Royal Institute. Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/burden-sharing-real-solidarity-or-arbitrary-mathematics-in-nato-and-the-eu/.
Cunningham , Eric, and Claire Parker . “Taliban Hunting for ‘Collaborators’ in Major Cities, Threat Assessment Prepared for United Nations Warns.” The Washington Post, August 20, 2021.
Daalder, Ivo. “What Signalgate Really Tells Us.” POLITICO, March 28, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/journalist-donald-trump-nato-us-signal-group-chat-officials/.
Danylyuk, Oleksandr. “Criticism of the ‘Reverse Kissinger.’” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.
De Nesnera, Andre. “NATO’s Role in Afghanistan.” August 10, 2006. https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.
Delgado, Antonio Maria. “War in Venezuela? How a U.S. Military Attack against Maduro Would Play out Read More at: Https://Www.Miamiherald.Com/News/Nation-World/World/Americas/Venezuela/Article312693557.Html#storylink=cpy.” Miami Herald, October 31, 2025. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article312693557.html.
Deutsche Welle. “Germany Summons Ambassador – DW – 10/24/2013.” Dw.Com, October 24, 2013. https://www.dw.com/en/german-foreign-minister-summons-us-ambassador-over-merkel-spying-allegations/a-17180294.
Devyatkin, Pavel. “The Rising US-NATO-Russia Security Dilemma in the Arctic | Responsible Statecraft.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/arctic-nato-russia-2673981485/.
Dw.Com. “Trump Confirms Interest in Greenland Purchase – DW – 08/19/2019.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/trump-confirms-interest-in-greenland-purchase/a-50073701.
Dyner, Anna Maria. “CSTO Ambiguous on War in Ukraine and Faces Regional Challenges.” Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 27, 2023. https://pism.pl/publications/csto-ambiguous-on-war-in-ukraine-and-faces-regional-challenges.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. “Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Mauritius Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Including Diego Garcia .” 2025. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/682f25afc054883884bff42a/CS_Mauritius_1.2025_Agreement_Chagos_Diego_Garcia.pdf.
Gad, Ulrik Pram. “Why Would Greenlanders Take a Deal from Trump That Gives Them Less than They Already Have? | DIIS.” February 10, 2025. https://www.diis.dk/en/research/why-would-greenlanders-take-a-deal-from-trump-that-gives-them-less-than-they-already.
Ghisetti, Marco. “‘Buying Greenland Is Foolish’ – or Is It?” The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, October 30, 2025. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/buying-greenland-is-foolish-or-is-it/.
González, David. “New Caledonia, the 194th State?” El Orden Mundial, April 7, 2015. https://elordenmundial.com/nueva-caledonia-el-estado-numero-194/.
Gordon, Joseph. “Intelligence Sharing in NATO.” Atlantisch Perspectief 41, no. 6 (2017): 15–19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48581386?seq=1.
Gricius, Gabriella, and Nicolas Jouan. “Losing the Dividends of Neutrality in the Arctic.” The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, August 19, 2025. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/losing-dividends-neutrality-arctic/.
Gunasekara-Rockwell, Dr. Ernest. “Proposal for US–Greenland Integration: A Path to the Future.” Strategic Horizons, September 24, 2025. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Strategic-Horizons/Article-Display/Article/4313897/proposal-for-usgreenland-integration-a-path-to-the-future/.
Hassan, Oz. Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt from 20 Years of Supporting Democracy, Development and Security. Study. Directorate General for External Policies of the Union , 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/266950/Study%20on%20Afghanistan_final.pdf?
Hoffman, Elizabeth. What’s Next? Honoring the Promises to U.S. Allies in Afghanistan Post-Withdrawal. September 15, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/whats-next-honoring-promises-us-allies-afghanistan-post-withdrawal.
Hussain, Abid. “Pakistan, Afghanistan to Resume Talks amid Tensions over Border Clashes.” Al Jazeera. Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/30/pakistan-afghanistan-to-resume-talks-amid-tensions-over-border-clashes.
Inhofe, Jim. “Afghanistan Was a Predictable, Preventable Disaster.” Foreign Policy, August 15, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/15/afghanistan-withdrawal-pullout-military-taliban-chaos-evacuation-biden-inhofe/.
International Court of Justice . “Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 .” March 5, 2019. https://docs.un.org/en/A/73/773.
Kanno-Youngs , Zolan, and Hamed Aleaziz . “Trump Considers Overhaul of Refugee System That Would Favor White People.” The New York Times, October 15, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/us/politics/trump-refugee-white-people.html.
Karmanau, Yuras. “Ukraine President Says There Was ‘no Blackmail’ in Call with Trump.” PBS News, October 10, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ukraine-president-says-there-was-no-blackmail-in-call-with-trump.
Kavanagh, Jennifer. “America Shouldn’t Pivot to Asia | Lowy Institute.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/america-shouldn-t-pivot-asia.
Kimmage, Michael. “Europe Is at War.” Foreign Policy, November 3, 2025. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/20/russia-putin-drones-airspace-europe-nato-war/.
Kirby, Paul. “Greenland: US Tells Denmark to ‘calm down’ over Alleged Influence Operation.” August 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0j9l08902eo.
Kolyandr, Alexander . “Has the EU Found a Way to Use Frozen Russian Assets to Help Ukraine?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 21, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/10/europe-russia-assets-strategy?lang=en.
Ku, Chan Mo. “A Canada-Japan-Korea Trilateral Framework for Arctic Defence, Critical Minerals.” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/canada-japan-korea-trilateral-framework-arctic-defence-critical-minerals.
Lieberthal, Kenneth. “The American Pivot to Asia.” Brookings, December 21, 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/.
Lopez, C. Todd. “Hegseth Says Shipbuilding, Golden Dome, Nuclear Deterrence Make Up DOD Budget Request for Billions in Funding.” The Department of War, June 11, 2025. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4213571/hegseth-says-shipbuilding-golden-dome-nuclear-deterrence-make-up-dod-budget-req/#:~:text=However%2C%20Hegseth%20noted%20that%20the,immediately%20upon%20arriving%20in%20Washington.&text=Defense%20Secretary%20Pete%20Hegseth%2C%20Air,Washington%2C%20June%2011%2C%202025.
Luberisse, Josh. “Democratized Intelligence: How Open-Source Intelligence Is Reshaping Asymmetric Advantage.” Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University, October 17, 2025. https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/17/democratized-intelligence-open-source-osint-revolution/.
Majkut, Joseph. The Future of European Energy Security. October 16, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-european-energy-security.
Martin, Tim. “German Chancellor’s Pushback at Vance Brings US-Euro Tensions into the Public at Munich.” Breaking Defense, February 15, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/german-chancellors-pushback-at-vance-brings-us-euro-tensions-into-the-public-at-munich/.
McCammon, Sarah. “Arab and Muslim Voters Helped Deliver Michigan to Trump. They’re Not All Happy so Far.” Politics. NPR, March 4, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/03/03/nx-s1-5249686/arab-muslim-voters-dearborn-hamtramck-trump-gaza.
Mehrotra, Dhruv. “NSA Chief Ousted Amid Trump Loyalty Firing Spree.” Wired, n.d. Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.wired.com/story/security-news-this-week-nsa-chief-ousted-amid-trump-loyalty-bloodbath/.
Miller, Christopher, Henry Foy, Max Seddon, and Amy Mackinnon. “Donald Trump Urged Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Accept Putin’s Terms or Be ‘Destroyed’ by Russia.” Financial Times, October 20, 2025.
Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, John Healey , and David Lammy. “UK Secures Future of Vital Diego Garcia Military Base to Protect National Security.” GOV.UK. Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-secures-future-of-vital-diego-garcia-military-base-to-protect-national-security.
Mitchell, A. Wess. “What Sweden’s Accession Shows About NATO’s Future.” United States Institute of Peace, April 17, 2024. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/what-swedens-accession-shows-about-natos-future.
Modderkolk, Huib . “Dutch Services Share Less Information with the US: ’Sometimes We Don’t Tell Things Anymore.” De Volkskrant, October 18, 2025. https://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/nederlandse-diensten-delen-minder-informatie-met-de-vs-soms-vertellen-we-dingen-niet-meer~b4882f19/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dutchnews.nl%2F.
Murray, Yvonne. Ghosts of Russian Imperialism Haunt Alaska Summit. August 15, 2025. https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2025/0815/1528561-trump-putin-summit/.
Nicholls, Flynn . “Donald Trump’s Victory Speech in Full: Transcript.” Newsweek, November 6, 2024. https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-victory-speech-full-transcript-1981234.
Ott, Haley, Aimee Picchi, and Ibrahim Aksoy. “Why Does Trump Want Greenland and the Panama Canal? Here’s What’s behind U.S. Interest. – CBS News.” March 28, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-greenland-panama-canal-why-us-interest/.
Owen, Garrett. “Trump Nearly Won a Majority of Latino Voters in 2024, Pew Study Finds.” Salon.Com, June 26, 2025. https://www.salon.com/2025/06/26/trump-nearly-won-a-majority-of-latino-voters-in-2024-pew-study-finds/?utm_source=website&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=ogshare&utm_content=og.
Pezard, Stephanie, Irina A. Chindea, Naoko Aoki, Domenique Lumpkin, and Yuliya Shokh. China’s Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda? 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2823-1.html.
Poast, Paul. “NATO’s Article 4 Is the New Article 5.” World Politics Review, September 26, 2025. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/nato-article-4-russia/.
Press Release: October 2024 – Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll. n.d. Accessed November 1, 2025. https://harvardharrispoll.com/press-release-october-2024/.
Press, The Associated. “Trump Attends Ceasefire Ceremony with Thailand and Cambodia during Malaysia Visit.” U.S. vs. China: Inside a Great Power Rivalry. NPR, October 26, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/26/nx-s1-5586583/trump-ceasefire-ceremony-thailand-cambodia-malaysia-visit.
Price, Jay. “A U.S. Military Base Built under Greenland Ice Had a Pivotal Role in Climate Science.” Climate. NPR, February 7, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/02/07/nx-s1-5288778/a-u-s-military-base-built-under-greenland-ice-had-a-pivotal-role-in-climate-science.
Quinville, Robin. “Making Sense of the Munich Security Conference | Wilson Center.” February 18, 2025. https://5g.wilsoncenter.org/article/making-sense-munich-security-conference.
Raik, Kristi. “From Burden-Sharing to Burden-Shifting? Europe at Pains to Adapt to The Changing Transatlantic Alliance – International Centre for Defence and Security.” March 24, 2025. https://icds.ee/en/from-burden-sharing-to-burden-shifting-europe-at-pains-to-adapt-to-the-changing-transatlantic-alliance/.
Roussi, Antoaneta . “Europe’s Spies Are Learning to Trust Each Other — Thanks to Trump.” POLITICO, October 22, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-intelligence-spies-donald-trump-russia-security-politics/.
Ruhiyyih Ewing, Giselle. “Musk Tells Germans to Get over ‘past Guilt’ in Speech to Far-Right AfD Rally.” Politico, January 25, 2025. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/01/25/musk-german-afd-rally-weidel-00200620.
Schröder, Patrick, and Phesheya Nxumalo. “The Race for Greenland’s Rare Earth Minerals Is Heating up. The UK Should Work with Europe for a Sustainable Strategy.” Chatham House, October 9, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/race-greenlands-rare-earth-minerals-heating-uk-should-work-europe-sustainable-strategy.
Serban, Alex, and Philippe Dickinson . “What Does the US Drawdown in Romania Mean for European Defense?” Atlantic Council, October 30, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/what-does-the-us-drawdown-in-romania-mean-for-european-defense/.
Sevinc, Necva Tastan. “EU Reaffirms Support for Denmark amid US Delegation’s Visit to Greenland.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/eu-reaffirms-support-for-denmark-amid-us-delegation-s-visit-to-greenland/3518717.
Snævarr, Árni. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Greenland´s Aspirations for Independence in Times of Climate Change. 2017. https://hr.un.org/sites/hr.un.org/files/editors/u439/Greenland%20Aspirations%20for%20Independence%20in%20Times%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf?fbclid=IwY2xjawIHMYhleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHdRqjICwOm705M3GytE5vyISxkLkZlwewDRGs2eyHgy6NP-2Kkc9MUcPfg_aem_0e4Z6xWhse0LloYUxdmj7g&_gl=1*1r0v0q3*_ga*NzU4ODk5MS4xNzUxMjk3NDQw*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*czE3NTEyOTc0NDAkbzEkZzEkdDE3NTEyOTc0NjUkajM1JGwwJGgw.
Sullivan, Kate. “Trump Says He Would Encourage Russia to ‘Do Whatever the Hell They Want’ to Any NATO Country That Doesn’t Pay Enough | CNN Politics.” CNN, February 11, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato.
Taheri, Mandy. “Biden’s Legacy: What Remains after Trump Dismantled Build Back Better?” Newsweek, July 13, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/bidens-legacy-what-remains-after-trump-dismantled-build-back-better-2097514.
The Danish Parliament. “Act on Greenland Self-Government.” June 12, 2009. https://english.stm.dk/media/4vgewyoh/gl-selvstyrelov-uk.pdf.
The Kyiv Independent news desk. “Estonian Court Sentences Soldier for Spying for Russia.” The Kyiv Independent, October 7, 2025. https://kyivindependent.com/estonian-court-sentences-soldier-for-spying-for-russia/.
The Prime Minister’s Office. “Greenland.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://english.stm.dk/the-prime-ministers-office/the-unity-of-the-realm/greenland/.
Torreblanca, José Ignacio. “Onwards and Outwards: Why the EU Needs to Move from Strategic Autonomy to Strategic Interdependence.” ECFR, August 24, 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/onwards-and-outwards-why-the-eu-needs-to-move-from-strategic-autonomy-to-strategic-interdependence/.
United Nations. “Accord Sur La Nouvelle-Calédonie (Accord de Nouméa) | Peacemaker.” 1998. https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9769.
United Nations. “Matignon Accords.” 1988. https://peacemaker.un.org/es/node/9911.
United Nations . “Non-Self-Governing Territories | The United Nations and Decolonization.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt.
United Nations General Assembly. “Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965.” May 24, 2019. https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/73/295.
Venable, John. “Joe Biden Has Failed To Keep America Safe.” The Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2023. https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/joe-biden-has-failed-keep-america-safe.
Walton, Calder. “U.S.-Ukraine Intelligence Sharing: A Conversation with Calder Walton | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.” March 12, 2025. https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/us-ukraine-intelligence-sharing-conversation-calder-walton.
Ware, Jacob. “Trump Assassination Attempt Poses New Test for U.S. Democracy | Council on Foreign Relations.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trump-assassination-attempt-poses-new-test-us-democracy.
Weber, Gesine. “Weimar Is Not Enough | German Marshall Fund of the United States.” Accessed November 1, 2025. https://www.gmfus.org/news/weimar-not-enough.
Weigand, Florian. Why Did the Taliban Win (Again) in Afghanistan? | LSE Public Policy Review. May 2, 2022. https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.54.
Weissert, Will. “Trump and Zelenskyy through the Years: From a ‘perfect’ Call to Pausing US Assistance to Ukraine.” AP News, March 1, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/trump-zelenskyy-past-relationship-shouting-oval-office-88690f790901687fc1587f1bf89f5036.
Wright, Thomas. “Trump’s NATO Article 5 Problem.” Brookings, May 17, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/trumps-nato-article-5-problem/.
Yousif, Nadine. “Trudeau Says Trump Threat to Annex Canada ‘Is a Real Thing.’” February 7, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czx82j5wd8vo.
