“Let’s lay down arms and talk.”
This was the central message of a letter from Abdullah Öcalan, delivered and read aloud by members of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) at a conference in late February. Addressed primarily to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – the armed group that has led the Kurdish struggle for autonomy since the 1980s – the letter took both Kurds and Turks by surprise.
Although Öcalan – held in isolation on İmralı Island since 1999 – has called for peace in the past, this message felt different. For the first time, he not only reaffirmed his commitment to a democratic resolution but also urged the PKK to take a bold and irreversible step: to disband entirely.
The letter reverberated across Türkiye’s political landscape, igniting cautious hope. Politicians from all sides – government officials and opposition alike –welcomed it as a rare and meaningful opportunity for dialogue after nearly a decade of deadlock, violence, and silence.
With the PKK’s dissolution now officially confirmed, hopes for reconciliation are gaining renewed momentum. In this context, one important question arises: could this mark the beginning of a new era for Turks and Kurds?
The Roots of the Kurdish-Turkish Conflict
Present-day relations between Turks and Kurds have been shaped by a long and complex history. Once coexisting within the Ottoman Empire, the two communities began to diverge following the Eternal State’s collapse and the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. As the newly established state prioritised the construction of a unified national identity, it implemented policies of cultural assimilation and the suppression of non-Turkish identities – including that of the Kurds.
These measures curtailed expressions of Kurdish heritage and representation, prompting waves of resistance – each met with heavy-handed state responses. As a result, what was once coexistence gradually turned into marginalisation, mistrust and unrest.
It was in this context that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, then a student from the Şanlıurfa province. Originally a Marxist-Leninist movement advocating Kurdish independence, the PKK shifted its strategy under increasing state pressure. After relocating its leadership to Syria and Lebanon, the group launched a guerrilla insurgency in 1984 – initiating a conflict that would last for decades.
Missed Chances and the Struggle for Peace
Since its inception, the conflict has claimed over 40,000 lives, displaced hundreds of thousands, and left a profound mark on both Turkish and Kurdish communities. Yet despite escalating violence and a growing human toll, there have been moments when peace seemed within reach.
The first significant opening came in the early 1990s, when President Turgut Özal initiated secret talks with Öcalan, mediated by Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani. The proclamation of a unilateral ceasefire from the PKK in 1993 raised hopes among both Turks and Kurds. However, Özal’s sudden death that same year abruptly halted the process, and hostilities resumed. Further efforts in 1995 and 1999 also failed to produce lasting results.
The most promising attempt occurred between 2012 and 2015, when Erdoğan’s government entered direct negotiations with Öcalan. These talks led to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish territory, sparking hopes for a durable peace and expanded rights for Kurds. Yet this progress proved short-lived. The fragile progress collapsed amid domestic tensions and regional upheaval – especially the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS. Ankara accused the PKK of backing the Syrian Kurdish YPG’s bid for autonomy in Rojava – viewing it as a national security threat. In turn, the PKK accused the Turkish government of supporting jihadist groups to undermine Kurdish influence.
This mutual distrust once again cast the process into violence and silence.
Why This Peace Bid Might Succeed Where Others Failed
Öcalan’s recent letter now marks what could be an important turning point. His unprecedented call for the PKK to disband has been cautiously welcomed by both Turkish authorities and senior PKK figures. Encouraging signals from Ankara – coupled with confirmation that the PKK has agreed to comply with its leader’s directives – suggest a rare moment of alignment and a genuine opening for progress.
But it is not only these developments that indicate this initiative might have a better chance of success than previous efforts. Several geopolitical and domestic factors support this possibility.
First, shifting regional dynamics have weakened the PKK’s strategic position. Strengthened ties between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq have gradually reduced the PKK’s foothold in the region. Meanwhile, political changes in Syria – including the collapse of the Assad regime, the emergence of a more pro-Turkish government, and the YPG’s recent alignment with the latter – have further isolated the PKK. These developments have significantly narrowed its operational capacity and diplomatic leverage, making negotiations with the Turkish government almost inevitable.
Second, Türkiye’s domestic political landscape is evolving. President Erdoğan and the ruling AKP are grappling with economic stagnation and declining electoral support, as evidenced by recent polls. With early elections on the horizon, a breakthrough on the Kurdish issue could serve as a political lifeline – helping Erdoğan reconnect with conservative Kurdish voters while also appealing to centrist constituencies.
The MHP’s Involvement and Its Implications
Among the most unexpected developments is the involvement of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), led by Devlet Bahçeli. Long regarded as one of the most hardline forces in Turkish politics, the MHP’s participation signals a potential strategic shift – one that could profoundly impact the peace process.
Several factors might explain this recalibration. The MHP could be seeking to reposition itself closer to the political center ahead of elections, broadening its appeal beyond its traditional base. It might also aim to shape the process from within – ensuring that any reconciliation aligns with the principle of state sovereignty. By joining the dialogue, the MHP positions itself as a gatekeeper, potentially preventing both domestic rivals and foreign actors from dominating the narrative.
Its involvement is therefore both symbolic and substantive. It signals that even traditionally nationalist actors now recognise the high stakes – and perhaps the necessity – of dialogue. Yet it also raises important questions: is the MHP genuinely willing to support a peace framework that includes recognition of Kurdish identity and rights, or is its participation more about containment than transformation?
Whatever the rationale, the MHP’s engagement increases both the complexity and the potential of the process.
The Role of International Actors
International involvement, as seen in past peace processes in other regions, could prove essential to sustaining this fragile opportunity. The European Union – which has supported previous peace efforts – might provide a neutral platform for dialogue. Likewise, the United States – which has previously backed the peace efforts – could help sustain progress and avert derailments through its influence and relations with both Türkiye and Kurdish forces in the region.
Coordinated international engagement might help transform this moment into a lasting resolution – especially if it reinforces commitments to international law and democratic reform.
Peace Beyond Disarmament
While the PKK’s dissolution is a momentous step, peace cannot rest on disarmament alone. True reconciliation will require structural reforms and a shift in political culture.
For many Kurds, this is not the end of their struggle – but the beginning of a new chapter focused on dignity, recognition, and meaningful participation. Kurdish citizens continue to seek acknowledgment of their language, identity, and political rights. Over the years, peaceful Kurdish activism has often been criminalised under Türkiye’s broad anti-terrorism laws. Thousands remain imprisoned – including prominent former HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş.
Even ethnic Turkish politicians – such as Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu – have faced legal threats for merely advocating Kurdish inclusion and dialogue. This highlights the bigger challenge that Türkiye must face: transitioning from a securitised state model to an inclusive democracy.
A Chance to Build a Shared Future
If this moment is to become a real turning point, Türkiye must adopt a vision of peace that goes beyond symbolism and embraces real, systemic change. This means enacting legal protections for minority rights, ending the misuse of terrorism laws to silence dissent, and building inclusive institutions founded on trust.
Lasting peace will only be possible when Kurdish identity and political participation are recognised as vital expressions of the nation’s democratic character – not as threats. Justice must be impartial, and reconciliation must be based on mutual respect – not silence or submission.
Though the path ahead remains challenging, recent developments have opened a genuine window of opportunity for peace – one unseen in many years. With the first steps toward reconciliation already taken, the key question remains: are all parties ready to seize this chance?
Only time will tell.
Questions for Consideration:
- Who will be the key actors involved in the peace process? Will Öcalan participate? What roles will other Kurdish leaders – such as the imprisoned Selahattin Demirtaş – and opposition parties play?
- What are the primary obstacles that could impede the success of the process?
- How can third parties – like the EU, the US and the UN – engage constructively in the process while maintaining neutrality and avoiding bias?
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