Map of Moldova with Transintria (Source: Own work, diwar File:Transnistria-map.svg. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license. No changes to the original image were made)
The rising competition between the Russian Federation and the European Union, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is also evident in neighboring countries, like Moldova. The Republic of Moldova has been following a European path since its independence in 1991, but in the last few years, it has become the main driver of its foreign policy, through Maia Sandu’s presidency and the stronger position of the pro-EU party PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity). Over the years, Moldova’s position shifted strongly towards the European Union direction, leaving the Russian Federation behind.
But this is not happening everywhere in the Country. As a matter of fact, since 1992, Moldova has been split into two halves, with the separatist entity of Transnistria trying to legitimize itself as an autonomous government. The recent gas supply crisis put the lights back on in the region, which constitutes part of the multitude of “frozen conflicts” present in the post-Soviet space.
The Roots of a “Frozen Conflicts”
It is necessary to clarify that, despite all the current news related to the topic, cases like the following are not a novelty in Moldova. The importance of gas in the region is surely high, specifically in a small state like Moldova, which faces a crisis of sovereignty and identity.
Due to a specific Soviet conformation, the Left Bank was the industrial core of the state, with plants in Tiraspol, Bender, and Dubaşari. On the contrary, the Right Bank (or Moldova itself) has suffered from a lack of industrial infrastructure, while the main firms sustained the agricultural production. The economic division reflected, in the year of glasnost, the “ethnic” or “national” division between the two parts of the country. On one hand, there were the Moldovan people, who were striving to obtain more autonomy and, later, independence. On the other hand, the people and the leaders of the Left Bank were keen to stay within the Soviet Union and be subordinate to Moscow, due to the powerful links they had.
Simply put, this “labour and national division” constituted the roots for the conflict erupted in 1992, which paused with a ceasefire agreement signed on July 25th between the former (and the first) President of Moldova Mircea Snegur and the President of Russian Federation Boris El’cin. Since then, there have been plenty of attempts and efforts to solve what soon appeared to be a “frozen conflict.”
The Halt of gas supplies in 2025
Dubăsari Dam in Transnistria, Moldova. Source: Public domain, under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication.)
As pointed out before, cuts to gas supplies by Gazprom (the Russian State-owned gas company) in Moldova and Transnistria are not an extraordinary event. In the last twenty years, Russia has developed a new threat to impose its positions in negotiations with other States to obtain what Russia requested: the halt of gas and oil supplies. Through this approach, many Countries have experienced difficulties in covering electricity consumption. Transnistria and Moldova already suffered a major energy crisis in 2006 because of a similar cut operated by Gazprom.
Surely, the last energy supply crisis has had a heavier impact on a series of contingencies. The war in Ukraine explicitly showed Russian intentions of reshaping the European order, according to a Westphalian logic of spheres of influence. In addition, Russian presence in Transnistria since 1992 constitutes a long and steady threat to the sovereignty of Moldova. Moreover, the path of Moldova through the European integrations set a new standard of responses by Chişinau, which has been less inclined to find an agreement with Moscow.
The invasion of Ukraine and Russian forces in Transnistria
Since February 2022, questions have emerged concerning the stability and unity of Moldova as a state, due to the presence of the separatist region of Transnistria. What raised most concern was the presence of what remained of the Soviet 14th Army, now under Russian command as a “peacekeeping force.” The reasons behind such a presence are understandable through the need to keep the region unstable, in the hope and will of reshaping the Chişinau government, creating a Russian influence zone in the region. Furthermore, Transnistria hosts one of the biggest former soviet armouries left, which helps Russia to keep “boots on the ground” and to avoid any retreat.
It is easy to understand that such a status quo, in addition to the war next to Moldovan border, could generate more than a concern from a geopolitical, but also economic and political perspectives. First, to keep an army in Transnistria – made of people born and raised on the Left bank to whom were given Russian passports – is a signal from Russia of trying to maintain influence over a Country which is slipping away from Moscow’s orbit. Second, with the clash of a war in Ukraine, Moldova started to rethink its economic system, almost entirely dependent on Russian gas, provided through Moldovagaz (owned by Gazprom). This caused a strong shift to the European Union and other States that could provide enough energy to keep industry plants active, houses warm, and streets lit.
The European Union and Moldova’s path to integration
The return of war on a major scale in Europe caused consequences in different fields and areas, accelerating processes and beginning others. Moldova’s intentions to achieve the status of candidate to join the European Union are one of those processes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova tried to reemerge as an independent Country, despite all the difficulties of a newly independent State. European integration has become, year after year, a significant political symbol and necessity in this direction, both for the population and the political establishment.
Despite some attempts to keep Moldova nearer Moscow during Communist and Socialist Parties’ governments (even though they implemented the Association Agreement of 2014 signed with the EU), the pro-Europe PAS party of President Maia Sandu grew in consensus. Pools suggested that Moldovans, specifically those who lived in the urban areas, were keener to increase cooperation and to pursue integration with the European Union. This trend was confirmed in the October 20 of 2024, constitutional referendum, too.
The cooperation with the European Union led to a change in Moldova’s foreign policy, particularly in its position towards Russia and its energy supplies. Since 2023, Moldova has no longer been buying Russian gas, which was delivered through Transnistria. In Tiraspol, this was perceived as a menace to its stability, even deciding to call Russia for help against what Transnistrian authorities called, apparently, a “genocide.” Even though it the formal support to the separatists, Russia did not respond to the request.
What happened in the last few months is remarkable. We must notice that after Russia decided in December 2024 to stop Russian gas supplies through Ukraine – and that means that any gas supply would have been stopped in Transnistria, too – and the lack of coverage of electricity consumption by Transnistrian government, Moldova gained political strength.
While in Tiraspol, there were intentional blackouts, in Chişinau, people kept living their lives without any trouble. After almost a month, on February 1st, the Moldovan state-owned energy company Energocom started delivering gas to the separatist entity for 20 million euros. Furthermore, this achievement was acquired after many refusals by the Transnistrian government to similar proposals in January.
Conclusions
The recent gas supply crisis in Moldova and Transnistria ended with changes in the relative power gains between Moldova (and the EU) and Russia. Transnistria is suffering from a lack of consistent support from Moscow, while it is experiencing more integration with Moldova. On the other bank of the river, Moldova is conceiving itself in the international community as an assertive actor capable of dealing with major problems, like the halt of gas supply could be.
If in the past Moldova would have suffered, the new approach in foreign policy adopted since 2020 with Maia Sandu’s presidency has led the Country to inner stability, an increasing collaboration between itself and the EU, and a gain in power against Transnistria.
Further questions:
- Will Moldova increase its cooperation with the European Union?
- Is Transnistria a threat any longer for Moldova?
- How is Russia losing power and influence in the region?
Suggested readings:
- King, C. (1999). The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture. Hoover Institution Press
- Aslanli, K. (2024). Russia’s foreign energy policy. Routledge
- Katchanovski, I. (2006). Cleft Countries. Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Ibidem Press
