The word “connectivity” has become something of a buzzword in international policy circles. It appears in government white papers, academic journals, and diplomatic communiqués with remarkable frequency. But what does it actually mean? And more importantly, does it offer anything concrete for a region as complex and conflict-ridden as the Middle East and North Africa?
This article argues that connectivity, understood not merely as internet cables or transport links, but as a broader strategic framework for linking states and societies, may offer one of the few viable paths toward greater regional stability in MENA. It will not solve everything. But it may gradually change the logic of regional engagement.
What Do We Mean by “Connectivity”?
In its original, technical sense, connectivity, referred to and still refers, to digital and communications infrastructure: the systems that allow data and information to travel across borders. Over the past decade, however, the term has taken on a far broader meaning in policy and international relations.
Scholars and policymakers now use ‘connectivity’ to describe a strategic approach to linking countries through multiple, overlapping forms of connection. The concept works on two levels. First, there is the physical layer: roads, railways, ports, energy grids, and undersea cables that tangibly tie economies together. The most well-known example is China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which links China to its trading partners through a dense web of infrastructural corridors.
Second, and equally important, is the non-physical layer: the people, institutions, regulations, and cultural exchanges that flow through those infrastructures. The European Union’s Erasmus+ programme is a useful illustration here. Although it involves no roads or pipelines, the EU itself describes it as a connectivity initiative. In the case of non-physical connectivity, the connection is not primarily material but human, fostering long-term social, cultural, and professional ties across borders.
This dual nature is what gives ‘connectivity’ its strategic weight. Infrastructure alone does not transform political relations. But infrastructure combined with sustained human interaction, shared institutions, and mutual economic interests can gradually shift how states and societies perceive one another.
Connectivity and Interdependence: A Contested Relationship
One of the most interesting debates within the connectivity literature concerns its relationship with interdependence. Does linking countries together make them more stable? Or does it create new vulnerabilities?
Chinese scholars and policymakers tend to argue that dense economic and infrastructural ties reduce the incentives for conflict. The reasoning is straightforward: when disrupting a relationship becomes costly, states are less likely to do so. Connectivity, from this perspective, creates shared interests that make confrontation politically and economically irrational. Of course, not all actors act in a rational way and, this is a behavior that should always be taken into account.
European thinkers, on the contrary, are more cautious. Scholars such as Mark Leonard, whose 2021 book Age of Unpeace examines how globalisation can itself generate conflict, warn that not all interdependence is stabilising. Asymmetric dependencies, ergo where one side needs the relationship far more than the other, can become tools of coercion rather than cooperation. From this view, the goal of connectivity should not be maximum integration, but resilient, balanced, and diversified links that reduce vulnerability rather than concentrate it.
Despite this tension, both perspectives agree on one fundamental point: physical connections generate political effects. Trade routes, transit corridors, and mobility programmes do not remain confined to the economic sphere. They reshape incentives, create the basis for peace, and gradually change the terms on which states engage with one another.
Why Does Connectivity Matter for MENA?
The MENA region presents one of the most challenging environments for regional cooperation in the world. It is marked by unresolved territorial conflicts, fragmented political orders, deep historical grievances, and the ongoing interference of external powers. Traditional diplomacy, built on formal alliances and ideological alignment, has largely failed to produce durable stability.
Connectivity offers a different logic. Rather than requiring states to agree on values or resolve long-standing disputes before they can cooperate, connectivity-based approaches focus on practical, interest-driven engagement. States can share a railway corridor or an energy grid while still disagreeing, even competing, on other fronts.
This idea was articulated clearly by former Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, who in a 2022 article for Foreign Affairs described what he called “Connectivity Statecraft”: a form of foreign policy that treats other countries not as unified blocs, but as complex networks of interests. In his framing: “Governments can cooperate in some areas even when they disagree, compete, or clash in others. In this way, if we work correctly, we can build new kinds of ties and alliances, ones that we haven’t seen before. I call this path Connectivity Statecraft”.
For MENA, where ideological convergence remains a distant prospect, this is potentially significant. Indeed, if Connectivity Statecraft generates cooperation rooted in practical interest rather than ideological alignment or historical trust, then, crucially, practical cooperation, once established, has the potential to build trust over time on issues beyond the original project. When parties work together on infrastructure or trade, they develop relationships, establish communication channels, and demonstrate reliability. This creates what scholars call “spillover effect”; where cooperation on one issue opens the door to deeper connections across other domains. Over time, this accumulation of trust can reshape perceptions and make conflict less attractive as a solution to disputes. This is, ultimately, what makes connectivity valuable for a region marked by longstanding tensions.
Does Connectivity Reach MENA? A Bird’s-Eye View of Regional Initiatives
Connectivity is not merely an abstract concept for the broader Middle East. A range of concrete initiatives (some progressing, others stalled) illustrate both the potential and the fragility of this approach. Here follow some notable examples.
The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Established around shared energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the EMGF created a diplomatic platform where producing and transit countries could coordinate. Most notably, representatives of both Israel and Palestine sat on the same board: a rare moment of institutional coexistence that would have been unimaginable through conventional diplomatic channels. Although the forum has lost momentum in recent years, it demonstrated how resource-driven connectivity can open lines of engagement otherwise absent from formal diplomacy.
The Zangezur Corridor illustrates both the promise and the political obstacles to connectivity. Armenia and Azerbaijan had been locked in conflict for decades, with Turkey also deeply involved. For about 5 years, the three actors negotiated the corridor, conceived as a transport link connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenian territory, without reaching any agreement. The practical benefits were clear: Armenia would gain access to regional trade networks; Azerbaijan and Turkey would strengthen economic ties. Yet political will remained fragile, as Armenia, with the most to lose, repeatedly obstructed the process in the absence of guarantees from the other parties.
The breakthrough came when an external actor, the United States, became more actively engaged as a mediating presence in August 2025. The US was perceived as a balancing actor without direct territorial stakes in the outcome, which gave it credibility with all parties. With this external mediator present, negotiations accelerated dramatically and a deal was reached. The case demonstrates a critical real-world pattern: when regional actors face mutual distrust, a respected external power can overcome political will barriers by providing assurance and guaranteeing implementation. This suggests that for MENA connectivity initiatives, mediation by outside powers can be the catalyst that transforms years of stalled negotiations into concrete agreements when local actors’ goodwill is not sufficient.
The Iraq–Turkey Development Road. This ambitious corridor would reimagine Iraq as a North-South transit hub, linking its southern ports to Turkey and onward to European markets. The route passes through Arab-majority areas, the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRG), and into Turkey, connecting communities historically marked by tension. By offering a development-centred narrative and concrete economic incentives, the initiative challenges the image of Iraq as a fractured battleground and proposes instead a vision of Iraq as a regional linchpin.
Other initiatives reinforce this broader trend. The Middle Corridor positions Turkey as a Eurasian transit hub connecting Central Asia to Europe. The Gulf Railway seeks to deepen economic integration among GCC member states. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) envisions linking India, the Gulf states, and Israel through structured economic cooperation. This is a project that, if realised, could anchor diplomatic engagement in shared material interests rather than ideological alignment.
Taken together, these initiatives suggest that connectivity-driven thinking is increasingly embedded in the region’s strategic landscape. Even when stalled or contested, these projects reveal a significant shift: states are experimenting with infrastructure, trade, and mobility as new instruments of political recalibration.
Conclusion
Connectivity will not “save” MENA from its accumulated conflicts. No single framework could. But it offers something that purely political or security-focused approaches have struggled to provide: a logic of engagement rooted in practical interests rather than ideological alignment, one that can generate cooperation even in the absence of trust.
This is, however, only the starting point. What makes connectivity genuinely promising is what it may lead to. When states and societies cooperate on infrastructure, trade, or energy (even for purely self-interested reasons) they build communication channels, demonstrate reliability, and develop relationships that did not previously exist. Over time, this practical cooperation has the potential to spill over into deeper connections, gradually building the kind of trust that makes conflict less rational and less attractive across a broader range of issues. This is the whole logic of the approach: not that connectivity resolves disputes directly, but that it creates the conditions under which resolution becomes imaginable.
Whether this potential is realised depends on local political will, careful design, and the willingness of external actors to play a constructive mediating role when regional goodwill alone is not enough. Connectivity, ultimately, is not a destination. It is a method: one that the MENA region, for all its complexity, may increasingly need.
Questions for the Reader
- The Zangezur case suggests external mediators may be essential to making connectivity work. Should MENA states welcome this, or does it raise concerns about sovereignty?
- The article draws a distinction between Chinese and European approaches to connectivity. Which model seems more appropriate for the MENA context, and why?
- Who stands to loose from greater regional connectivity? Thinking about spoilers and vested interests, how might opposition to these projects be anticipated and managed?
- Which of the initiatives discussed do you think has the most realistic chance of reshaping regional dynamics, and why?
Suggested Further Reading
- 1. Leonard, Mark. Age of Unpeace: How Globalisation Sows the Seeds of Conflict. Bantam, 2021. —Even if outdated, it is an accessible and thought-provoking book of how interconnection can generate conflict as well as cooperation.
- 2. Lapid, Yair. “Statecraft in the Age of Connectivity: How Countries Can Work Together Even When They Disagree.” Foreign Affairs, December 2022. —A short, readable first-person account of connectivity as a foreign policy doctrine, written by a former Israeli Prime Minister.
- 3. Buzna, Viktor, Péter Goreczky, Gergely Salát, and Zsolt Trembeczki. Connectivity: Exploring the Concepts behind Today’s Geoeconomic Buzzword. 2024. — A rigorous but easy to understand conceptual overview of how connectivity is used across different policy and academic traditions.