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- [Analysis] Italy and European Union’s role in Central Asia - 21 July, 2025
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At the end of May, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni flew to Astana, Kazakhstan, and Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in what appeared to be the continuation of the format “5+1”, initiated by Italy in the Central Asia back during the close of 2019. The visit marked a notable step forward for Italy’s foreign policy within the framework of EU’s Global Gateway Strategy. Meloni’s visit goes a long way in strengthening relations within the region, especially within the realm of economics and trading. Not just for Rome, but for Brussels as well, states such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could play an important role due to their geographical position and their growing relevance in trade routes and in the enrgy sector, even considering the active one of two important players, as well as Russia and China.
First and foremost, it is crucial to note Central Asia’s geographical positioning. The region is landlocked between two of the biggest countries in the world: the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. It is not a coincidence then that these neighbors have both historically exerted influence on regional politics. International geopolitics are also influencing the region as well. With the struggle for political and economic power between different countries, namely between those from the “Western World” and those from the “Revisionist World” – even if we could accept such a partition of the globe – is creating the bases for a new “Great Game”, as Rudyard Kipling depicted in its early-XX century novel “Kim”.
Secondly, Central Asian states are fortunate enough to have what has been called “new oil”. The importance of the demand of rear earths elements (REE) and rare metals (RM) could give the region a boost in economic development and a more active role in international trade. Nonetheless, the presence of these critical resources within an area does not always convey economic prosperity. There is no axiom in international relations, especially in the struggle over raw materials, which could exacerate pre-existing divisions and foster subaltern conditions.
Within this framing, this analysis aims to put in concretely how and why Italy and the EU are playing a new role in Central Asia. In doing so, the relevant agreements that have been signed during Meloni’s visit will be looked at, incorporating to this approach the European Union’s objective to increase its influence capacity in an effort to boost cooperation. Finally, an important focus will be that of The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, an incumbent land trade infrastructure that could be a risky, but may be a fruitful avenue for Europe.
Italy-Central Asia Agreements
Many agreements were signed between Italy and Central Asia Countries (CACs) during Giorgia Meloni’s visits, fostering relations and connections across various fields. As the Joint Declaration on Strengthening Strategic Partnership between Italy and Uzbekistan suggests, efforts focused on promoting dialogue, encouraging economic investment, and creating a shared platform for culture and academic purposes.
As Italy usually does, cooperation is reinforced through agreements between key economic players. Among these are Ansaldo Energia, Sace, and ICE, three of most important Italian firms and agencies. The drivers of the agreements were essentially twofold: energy and connectivity. The former constitutes the main topic Italian foreign policy, often concentrated on providing the best access to energy, reducing dependency from a single partnership within a given country. The latter represents a keystone of the Italian and the European approach across Central Asia, due to the relevance of critical infrastructures and the capability to provide and transport goods, services, and energy. The aforementioned Middle Corridor forms a consistent part of this process.
The Global Gateway is useful to better understand Italy’s aim in improving its relationship with CACs. Since its launch in 2021, the Global Gateway Strategy (GG) experienced a profound change in its own nature. GG was born with the direct intent of promoting sustainable development across five main pillars (Climate and Energy, Transport, Digital, Health and Education & Research), incentivizing coordination with EU foreign policy. Through the years, due to the main challenges occurring across the political landscape, including the Russo-Ukrainian War, the GG strategy started playing a role in geopolitics, providing inroads for the EU into different areas. The strategy is ultimately two-pronged then, with EU member states trying to implement these objectives of the strategy into their foreign policies, as Italy did.
Central Asia is benefiting from GG funds, particularly in respect to energy and transport. As previously noted, the outcome of the Astana Summit, held in the “5+1” format between Italy and CACs, was the realization of the agreements based on cooperation with respect to energy (such as the one signed between Sace, Ansaldo Energia and the Kazakh sovereign fund Samruk-Kazyna). This demonstrates how Italy, while pursuing its own interests in energy supplies and bilateral relations, is keen to create a new role for the EU in the region.
Why is Central Asia relevant for Italy and the European Union?
Since February, 24 of 2022, the EU member states have started following a path towards ending multilayered relations with the Russian Federation. The breakup provoked by the invasion of Ukraine had several consequences. In the last three years to date, competitiveness acquired an important meaning in shaping the EU’s policies. As the 2024 Draghi’s Report explicitly states,
The second area for action is a joint plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness. […] Natural gas prices paid are 4-5 times higher. This price gap is primarily driven by Europe’s lack of natural resources, but also by fundamental issues with our common energy market. […] Over the medium term, decarbonisation will help shift power generation towards secure, low-cost clean energy sources. But fossil fuels will continue to play a central role in energy pricing at least for the remainder of this decade. Without a plan to transfer the benefits of decarbonisation to end-users, energy prices will continue to weigh on growth.
Therefore, the European Union’s competitiveness relies on energy and, specifically, on low energy prices that could boost its industrial base. In this context, the Global Gateway strategy can play a relevant role in helping this process. In recent times, many European firms experienced a loss in profits, competitiveness and productivity due to a couple broad challenges facing the EU.
First, the absence of a common market of capitals increased financial fragmentation across Europe, creating a hostile place for local firms. These same firms had to face several challenges that are coming from external factors, such as inundation of China’s products, and internal factors, such as distrust within the same common market.
Second, geopolitical crises – from the War in Ukraine to turmoil across the Middle East – have not helped in keeping prices low. The aim of the European Central Bank in maintaining inflation under a “safe level” of 2% was only realized again in 2025. For instance, high inflation levels were a main source in halting oil and gas from the Russian Federation following the aforementioned invasion in Ukraine. Energy-intensive plants in Europe had suffered from higher costs, pushing prices higher for consumers.
The Middle Corridor
Given this background, Central Asia is seeking to satisfy the European energy demand. In fact, CACs are an important hub of gas reserves (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and oil supplies (Kazakhstan). Even in an era of cultivating greener energy towards a more sustainable way of production thanks to solar, wind, and hydroelectric energy, to date hydrocarbons are still necessary to meet the energy needs of the EU.
The EU is trying to benefit from this energy supply by strengthening its ties with CACs. In contrast with the PRC approach, the one followed by the EU can be seen in a more integrated perspective. Both the GG strategy and the bilateral attempts made by countries such as Italy do not focus solely on economic and trading agreements; indeed, these agreements were established in tandem with commitments towards political, social and, cultural cooperation. It appears to be an attempt to establish a different narrative in the region, contrasting with that of Russian and Chinese influence.
At the centre of the rapprochement to Central Asia, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is a major tool that both parties could use as a way for maximizing their respective benefits from this kind of partnership. The TITR, or simply put as the Middle Corridor (MC), is a network of infrastructure and transport routes that stretches from the PRC to Europe, with the symbolic value of reproducing the ancient Silk Road. An initial agreement between Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan established the TITR between 2013 and 2014. By 2022, the TITR constituted 10% of the total land trade between the Far East and the Old Continent, but in the last three years its share of trade has increased rapidly.
The invasion of Ukraine has led to a sharp decline of direct trade (especially the Norther Route, which accounted for almost 86% of land trade) between Russia and the European Union, and this situation has led the countries to seek for subaltern or even substitute routes. The TITR started feeding the demand that once was accounted on the Northern Route, even though its capability of handling such an increase of trade volume (an increase of almost 45% of trade turnover in Kazakhstan) was low. Certainly, the TITR has started to satisfy the trade between Europe and Central Asia, but also between Europe and Russia and China.
With respect to what has been covered throughout this analysis, it seeks to establish that the TITR could constitute an opportunity for the EU and EU member states in a bilateral capacity. Since 2022, European partners accounted for almost the half of all the trade occurring along the TITR. The necessity of making investments in infrastructure, as Italy did, is vital for European countries interests in the region. The early 2024 commitment of 10 billion euros agreed upon in Brussels between the EU and CACs followed this explicit intention. Furthermore, the development of new trade routes and the reinforcement of partnerships with CACs could foster EU member states to increase their resilience to possible disruptions in supply chains. In conclusion, the sequential EU rapprochement to CACs indicates an increasing attention towards the region, especially in a time of international uncertainties.
Further readings:
- Khalid, A. (2021). Central Asia. A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present. Princeton University Press.
- Draghi, A. (2024). The Future of European Competitiveness. Publication office of the European Union.
- Kipling, R. (1901). Kim. Mondadori.
