The Energy Crisis in the EU
Europe’s energy crunch has forced a dramatic rethink of its supply chains. While Moscow manufactured an initial energy crisis by not maintaining Gazprom’s storage capacity, they simultaneously prepared for the full-invasion of Ukraine. Then, on the 24th February 2022, the European Union was caught unprepared to cut off Russian energy supplies when the war broke out, continuing to “indirectly” finance the war.
Therefore, 2022 marked a turning point for Europe’s energy strategy. Until then, the EU had built its policy largely on cost efficiency, even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Dependence on Moscow only grew, as Russian gas was the cheapest and most reliable than other alternatives, such as LNG or supplies from the MENA region. For a time, Russia was a stable partner providing cheap natural gas — until the war in Ukraine forced Europe to confront the risks of this reliance.
A New Energy Order
A new energy order dawned in March 2022 when the European commission responded with the REPowerEU, a plan to reduce Europe’s overdependence on Russia through the enhancement of domestic energy production and the diversification of its energy suppliers. Europe’s push to decarbonise and break free from Russian fossil fuel reshaped its energy mix and partnerships.
Within this framework, the MENA countries appeared as the most prominent candidates for a renovated energy cooperation, being well positioned to responded to EU gas diversification plans thanks to their geographical vicinity, vast resources and existing infrastructure.
The European Union and North Africa have therefore intensified their cooperation, through new gas and LNG supplies agreements, and the development of trans-regional infrastructures for the development and transmission of renewable energies, such as green hydrogen. The EU relies on Algeria in particular for its energy security, being its main buyer. Correspondingly, Algeria depends on the European market to secure demand for its exports.
Algeria
Algeria is the second-largest total liquid fuels producer and the largest natural gas producer in Africa. It falls within the definition of the rentier state: a country that derives its revenues from external rents, such as oil and gas exports. The incomes flow directly to the central government, which maintain its legitimacy of power by distributing wealth through subsidies, jobs, and welfare — often tied to clientelist networks. Yet, rentier states ends up being dependent on international markets and hydrocarbons prices. When prices fall, governments are not able to feed their legitimacy.
To complicate things further, Algeria is lacking in energy efficiency. Sonatrach investments, Algeria’s national oil company, is absorbed by an increasing domestic demand. The energy subsidies discourage energy efficiency and saving behaviours, which, in face of a demographic growth, results in energy consumption growing at a faster pace than economic growth. Moreover, infrastructure itself needs to be enhanced to ensure productive efficiency. Sonatrach has to therefore invest in its gas fields, but within the context of lower returns due to low prices, which can ultimately result in social unrest — such as the “Hirak”. To deal with this, Algeria strengthened its cooperation with the EU.
EU-Algeria cooperation
EU-Algeria strategic collaboration in the energy sector started in 2005, with the enactment of the EU-Algeria Association Agreements. Following the Memorandum of Understanding in 2013, the following years saw a strategic partnership between the two sides flourish. The partnership between Algeria and Italy in particular has been a cornerstone of this economic relationship over the past decade, with Italy serving as the largest customer for Algeria’s natural gas and crude oil exports. In contrast, Algeria’s relationship with Spain has been more strained.
In 2021, the multiannual gas contract between Algeria and Morocco expired amid disputes over Western Sahara. As a result, Algeria halted gas exports to Spain through the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline. Bilateral relations worsened after Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez backed Morocco’s position. Algeria, in contrast, has consistently supported the Polisario Front, the pro-independence movement in the occupied region. Despite regional frictions, the EU is trying to intensify cooperation with the MENA region, driven by the deployment of renewable energy.
The Green Cooperation
While a new Pact for the Mediterranean is in preparation, concrete projects are already materializing. Officially launched on April 2025, the TaqatHy+ project is a joint initiative between Algeria, the EU, and Germany. Backed by €28 million in funding, the programme represents the latest stage in Algeria’s ambition to become a regional hub for renewable energy and a central partner in Europe’s energy transition.
These initiatives builds on two flagship megaprojects: the Medlink, a submarine cable electricity interconnection project, and the SouthH2 Corridor, an hydrogen pipeline that will connect North Africa with Italy, Austria, and Germany. These projects are promoted as key contributions to Europe’s green transition. Yet, the narrative surrounding them reveals how the EU primarily frames them through the lens of its own energy security.
But what’s the catch?
Green Power for Europe, Unmet Needs in Algeria
Mega-projects in Algeria, and in the MENA region overall, are a limitation of the EU’s approach to renewable energy cooperation. Although the EU promotes them as development-led initiatives and tools for the country’s green transition, they often harm local communities. Indeed, renewables’ adoption is often associated with democratization, because they have potential for a decentralized, community-based management. In reality, the mega-projects are managed between governments and large energy companies, where local populations are excluded from decision making processes. In the DESERTEC project (Morocco), it also resulted in land dispossession.
Moreover, as long as the development of the renewable energy sector is functional to European energy security, these projects are far from promoting democratization. They reinforce authoritarian regimes by enhancing regime legitimacy through adoption of renewables, without transforming energy governance at home. In practice, renewables free up hydrocarbons for domestic consumption while exports flow to Europe. The result is a European path toward net-zero, achieved at the expense of local populations who remain excluded from the transition, despite already suffering the devastating consequences of climate change.
Questions
- To what extent can the expansion of renewable energy potential in the country drive a transition toward a post-rentier state?
- How will the development and deployment of renewable energy projects affect local communities and their socioeconomic dynamics?
- Is the governance structure of the energy sector undergoing transformation in response to the renewable energy shift, or are centralized and rentier practices likely to persist in the new energy era?
Suggested readings
- Adrià Rivera-Escartin (2025). Stability source or curse? Fossil fuel and Algeria’s regime stability in the light of EU’s green transition, Mediterranean Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2025.2455763
- Alke Jenss & Benjamin Schuetze (2024). Prefiguring politics: transregional energy infrastructures as a lens for the study of authoritarian practices, Globalizations, 21:6,1076-1091, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2023.218154
- Talbot, V. & Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (Milan, Italy) (Eds.). (2022). Energy politics in the Mena Region: From hydrocarbons to renewables? (First edition). ISPI : Ledizioni Ledipublishing.
