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- [Report] Türkiye’s Military Presence in the MENA Region: National Security and Foreign Intervention - 8 April, 2026
- [Analysis] The Arab League’s Role in the Israel-Palestine War: Between a Belligerent Actor and a Diplomatic Mediator - 2 March, 2026
- [Analysis] Mattei Plan from North African Countries’ Perspective - 23 February, 2026
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Security and Military Goals of Erdoğan’s Türkyie
The management of Turkish foreign policy has experienced a significant shift in the past ten years. Its the domestic defense industry has progressed from a minor supporting role to a crucial driver of regional influence and strategic independence. Ankara has diminished its dependence on foreign suppliers, through increasing investment in producing domestic military equipment. This change has ranked Türkiye as the world’s tenth-largest arms exporter in 2025.
After the Arab uprisings, the security landscape has worsened and heightened Türkiye’s view of itself as an “island of instability.” Additional regional threats, for instance the Kurdish militia and maritime sovereignty, highlighted the dependency from Western-backed infrastructures and fueled the pursuit of military autonomy. Currently, the government offers substantial assistance to leading companies in the military-production industry, such as TAI, ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, and Baykar. These companies developed advanced combat systems, particularly the Bayraktar TB2 drones, which were used in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Ukraine. In 2025, Turkish defense exports reached a historic $10 billion, reaching both neighbouring Asian countries and Latin America (Shahbazov 2025).
Parallel to the industrial grwoth, Türkiye reshaped its military doctrine introducing the normalization of the “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) ideology. Initially it marginally emerged in 2006 by secular nationalist naval officials who supported extensive maritime claims, encompassing 462,000 square kilometers throughout the Aegean and Mediterranean. The doctrine prioritises a transcontinental approach that sees naval supremacy as vital for survival amid Western “encirclement” over international agreements such as UNCLOS. At first, President Erdoğan opposed the ultranationalist creators of the doctrine but, after the coup attempt in 2016, he established a strategic partnership with them. He has since integrated Blue Homeland into a broader neo-Ottoman foreign policy, justifying military operations in Libya and gas exploration in disputed waters.
This neo-Ottomanism implies a detachment from the West. In fact, its goal is to restore Türkiye’s political influence on the former Ottoman region and it is possible through leveraging its success in the military-industrial sector: Ankara is positioning itself as a substitute to Russian weapon supplies and to restrictions imposed by the West. Türkiye is establishing enduring security allies and, at the same time, implementing its military doctrine thanks to the export of drones and naval assets (Erdemir and Kowalski 2020).
In the end, Türkiye’s foreign policy is a pragmatic and adaptable strategy. Ankara’s application of soft power is critical to its current position, that is being a NATO member and a Middle Eastern nation countering its own threats while and counterbalancing foreign influences, like Washington and Moscow. Türkiye asserts its role in the Eastern Mediterranean through its military advancements and its nationalist naval strategies. Furthermore, it is now dedicated to reclaiming its historical position as a stabilizing authority in a fragmenting global landscape (Kunz Saponaro 2025).
Securing the Borders
In the early 2010s, Türkiye began a Peace Process with incarcerated Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan. This era encouraged considerable hope, marked by the formal acknowledgment of the Kurdish matter and unparalleled changes concerning Kurdish-language rights. Nonetheless, the effort fell apart in 2015, due to spillover effects of the Syrian civil war and changing domestic political priorities. The renewed outbreak of hostilities initiated one of the conflict’s most lethal periods, characterized by intense urban combat in Kurdish-populated cities and thousands of casualties, including many civilians (Arab Center Washington DC 2025).
After the 2015 downfall, the Turkish government adopted a strict nationalist position. Erdoğan called the state of emergency following the 2016 coup attempt to legitimize an extensive crackdown, targeting not only alleged coup conspirators, but Kurdish political organizations as well. Thousands of members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) were detained, and democratically elected Kurdish mayors were consistently substituted by state appointed officials. This suppression, along with increased military actions against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq through initiatives like “Operation Claw,” moved the possibility of a negotiated resolution far into the background (Center for Preventive Action 2026).
By the end of 2024, the political environment changed once more. Confronted with economic challenges and regional turmoil, the Turkish government hinted at a possible shift. In an unexpected development, ultranationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli proposed that Öcalan’s imprisonment terms might be eased if he effectively urged the PKK’s disarmament. Analysts interpreted this gesture as a tactical domestic strategy by Erdoğan, possibly aimed at gaining pro-Kurdish parliamentary backing for his pursuit of another presidential term in 2028 (Tol 2026).
This diplomatic initiative resulted in important advancements in early 2025. After reestablishing contact with his supporters, Öcalan declared that the age of armed conflict was no longer relevant. On March 1, 2025, the PKK responded with a one-sided ceasefire, and by May 12, the group formally announced its dissolution and intention to dismantle its insurgency. Though this marked a significant change in the long-standing conflict, profound distrust persisted. While the PKK moved toward disarmament, the Turkish government persisted in detaining Kurdish activists, and Kurdish leaders stressed that lasting peace would require solid assurances of democratic rights (Center for Preventive Action 2026).
The regional aspect of the conflict continues to be a major challenge, especially concerning the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Türkiye perceives the U.S.-supported SDF as a direct extension of the PKK and a significant threat to national security. Although the PKK is progressing towards dissolution, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has made it clear that Öcalan’s request for disarmament does not necessarily apply to the SDF’s autonomous governance in Syria. Türkiye’s long-term strategy includes dismantling Kurdish autonomy in Syria to stop the establishment of a Kurdish state near its border (Salih 2025).
Additionally, Türkiye’s involvement in Syria and Iraq is shaped by larger geopolitical conflicts. Ankara aims to establish a leading position in the rebuilding of Syria after the war, all while handling conflicts with the United States and Israel. Türkiye sees Israel’s military presence in Syria as a possible hurdle that could strengthen Kurdish factions. On the other hand, Türkiye’s growth of military bases and radar systems has faced resistance from neighboring countries (Tol 2026; Salih 2025).
Following the announcement of the peace process in 2025, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), located in Iran, declined to disarm, despite a request from its parent organization PKK (Özçelik 2025). In February 2026, PJAK and other five prominent Iranian Kurdish opposition groups came together to establish the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. Their common objectives encompass toppling the Islamic Republic, securing Kurdish self-determination, and creating a democratic framework in Iranian Kurdistan. Significantly, the alliance refrains from complete separatism, opting for a federated structure instead (Atlantic Council 2026).
In the end, addressing Türkiye’s “Kurdish question” could contribute to stabilizing the Middle East’s “Kurdish belt.” This transformation could provide Türkiye considerable moral, internal, and strategic benefits, although the way ahead is hindered by local political considerations and intricate regional alliances.
Military Cooperation with Neighbouring Countries
Syria
Following the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Türkiye has significantly intensified its strategic military presence in Syria. Under a bilateral agreement with the new administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Ankara has established a notable footprint, with more than 20,000 personnel and around 80 military bases across northwestern Syria. Important centers include al-Mastumah and Taftanaz Airport, as well as upgraded facilities at Menagh and Kuweires to manage areas once controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey’s intent to be the primary arbiter of Syrian security is demonstrated through an approved three-year deployment extension in October 2025.
A comprehensive military cooperation framework was signed in August 2025, which is central to this presence. This partnership focuses on the fundamental restructuring of the Syrian army, whose 85% of its assets were destroyed by Israeli operations during the regime’s transition. Ankara is currently modernizing Syria’s command structure through weekly delegations and the appointment of a military attaché. Infantry maneuvers, commando tactics, and cyber defense are just a few of the extensive training programs. Notably, Türkiye has prioritized air defense training for Syrian forces to create a defensive barrier against Israeli air superiority, which continues to be a primary strategic concern for Ankara.
The establishment of this relationship involves shaping Syrian officer academies according to Turkish standards. Turkish institutions are sending Syrian cadets and officers to improve their skills, while ensuring that the new Syrian military’s doctrine and organizational culture align with Turkish interests. Moreover, the transfer of equipment, which ranges from surveillance systems to armored vehicle maintenance, is strictly coupled with operator training to ensure sustainability. This strategy aims to restore Syrian capabilities without shifting the regional power balance and seeks to avoid triggering a direct confrontation with Israel.
Alongside the official reorganization of the state military, Türkiye maintains its influence via the Syrian National Army (SNA). Consisting of different Turkmen and Islamist groups, the SNA receives direct support from Turkish intelligence and serves as a critical lever of influence over Syria’s internal security architecture. This dual approach of professionalizing the national army while maintaining loyalist militias allows Ankara to project power into Syrian territory (Emirates Policy Center 2025).
A key factor behind this collaboration is Türkiye’s increasingly tough position with the SDF. Ankara has grown increasingly frustrated with the stalled implementation of a deal intended to integrate the SDF into state institutions in March 2025. The SDF’s policies have been described as “separatist” by the Turkish Defense Ministry, which has also threatened to use force if the group continues to obstruct national unity. As a result, Turkish troops have strengthened their presence in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad to surround regions controlled by Kurds (Syrian Observer 2025).
This strategic change has caught the attention of regional rivals. While the Syrian Air Force commander was in Turkey in September 2025, Israel launched attacks on Palmyra, Latakia, and Homs. Ankara has reaffirmed its commitment to the training mission and denied any impact on its soldiers, despite Israeli allegations that it destroyed assets of Turkish origin.This finding suggests that regional dynamics have significantly changed. As a counterweight to both internal Kurdish autonomy and external Israeli military pressure, Turkey has transformed from being only a border observer to the primary technical provider to the security of the new Syrian state (Kenez 2025b)
Iraq
Following years of tension, Ankara and Baghdad have embarked on a significant strategic warming, marked by President Erdoğan’s visit in 2024 and Prime Minister al-Sudani’s reciprocal journey in 2025. This diplomatic adjustment establishes Iraq as a key element in Türkiye’s regional stabilization and trade plan. Confronted with turmoil in the Middle East, such as the Israel-Gaza conflict and the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye aims to ensure Iraqi collaboration to address regional instability and prevent Iraq from transforming into a proxy battlefield for Iran and Israel (Tanriverdi Yasar 2025a).
A primary driver of this partnership is the establishment of security cooperation targeting the PKK. In a historic policy change, Baghdad classified the PKK a “banned organization” in 2024, leading to the dissolution of affiliated political groups and the closure of their offices. This move reflects Iraq’s pragmatic recognition that it cannot handle the “Kurdish question” alone. To mitigate long-standing concerns regarding Iraqi sovereignty, Türkiye is transforming its unilateral military presence into joint initiatives. This includes the conversion of the Bashiqa (Zilkan) base into a joint training facility and the establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Centre in Baghdad (International Crisis Group 2025).
In addition to counterterrorism, intelligence sharing and a defense industry agreement from 2025 are two ways that Turkey is incorporating itself into Iraq’s security framework. These accords enable regular discussions on border control and migration, as well as Turkish training of Iraqi personnel. From a strategic standpoint, Ankara sees this strengthening alliance as a way to offset Iranian hegemony, which has traditionally restricted Turkish influence in Baghdad. Türkiye sees a chance to increase its power while Iran’s “axis of resistance” confronts Israel in the area (Altunışık 2025).
By moving beyond a narrow, border-security paradigm, Türkiye aims to establish a diverse partnership with Baghdad. This evolution secures Türkiye’s southern borders while incorporating Iraq into a wider economic and energy alignment which involves Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The current trajectory indicates a fragile but significant alignment focused on mutual stability, military professionalization, and the reduction of non-state armed actors across the region.
Türkiye’s Military Plans With Gulf States
Turkey has been quietly building a network of defense relationships across the Gulf. Erdoğan’s governemnt have been signing bilateral agreements, military deployments, and industrial partnerships in order to solidify Türkiye’s regional military stance in the region.
In early 2026, Türkiye started multitaleral talks with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to join their already-established defense pact, signed in September 2025. This Saudi-Pakistani agreement is a result to growing regional instability and to a sense that Washington has been stepping back from its traditional commitments. However, Turkish analysts claim that it is too early to higligh this approchement to the Arabian Peninsula as a strategic realignment or as a calculated message to outside powers (Chattell 2026). Through the high-level meeting between Erdoğan’s and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, Saudi-Turkish relationship has produced tangible outcomes, notably the creation of the Saudi Defense Electronics Company, increasing deliveries of Bayraktar AKINCI drones, and a shared interest in rebuilding Syria (Hayatsever 2026; Geldi 2026).
With regards to Qatar, they intensify their military cooperation thanks to a 2021 agreement which enables Qatari aircraft and personnel to fly to Türkiye for training. Their relationship has improved as proven by the increased number of joint operations after 2021. In August 2024, the two countries lauched a Joint Air Squadron in Doha during which they paired Turkish F-16s with Qatari Rafales, of French origins. Since these latter jets have been operated by Turkish longtime rivel, Greece, the joint operation carried a deeper strategic meaning: to show that Turkish army knew strengths and weaknesses of those French jets. In addition, they have strengthened their naval ties: Qatar and Türkiye have been operating in the Gulf under a shared command structure (Kenez 2024). At the start of 2026, they signed an additional memoranda to promote joint research, co-production, and technology transfer (Avcioglu 2025).
In May 2024 , Kuwait’s Emir visited Ankara and this high-level meeting produced six agreements, notably on strategic dialogue, trade, infrastructure, and emergency management. The $376 million Kuwait investment in purchasing Baykar TB2 drones, highscored Türkiye’s ability to draw Gulf partners into lasting security relationships with its defense industry (Dogan Akkas 2024). Senior military exchanges, between Kuwaiti officials and Türkiye’s Chief of General Staff, General Metin Gürak, continued into 2025 and the conversations have focused on advanced technological collaboration (Kuwait Times 2025).
Oman’s relationshio with Türkiye has traced a similar trajectory to the previous contries. Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tarik’s visited Türkiye in 2024 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman 2025) and, in October 2025, Erdoğan followed second with a state trip to Oman (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye 2025). The two leaders agreed on cooperating for regional stability and on the Palestinian cause. Their meeting culminated in the Türkiye-Oman Coordination Council, which ensures that the agreements both sides sign actually get implemented. Afterwards, they signed several memorandums of understanding which cover military affairs, defense industries, mining, technology, and energy cooperation emerging (Republic of Türkiye 2025).
The most structured and institutionalised military cooperation has been with the United Arab Emirates. The main achievements include a legal framework governing the exchange of classified defense information, which covers four tiers of classification from restricted to top secret, and the mutual recognition of each other’s security clearances for both personnel and facilities. Furthermore, in accordance with the agreement, it is explicitly restricted and prohibited to share jointly developed materials to designated purposes with unauthorized third-parties. This latest protocol, which emerged from earlier cooperation from 2022 and 2024, is designed to remove the regulatory friction that has historically complicated joint programs in air defense, naval systems, and cyber warfare (Kenez 2025a).
Through its engagement in the region, Ankara is positioning itself as a trustworthy military ally and producer of advanced military equipment. Türkiye is shaping an institutional frameworks that turn episodic transactions into something resembling a genuine strategic presence across the Gulf.
Expansion to Libya and the Reponses from Greece and Cyprus
The Turkish Parliament has approved a 24-month extension of the country’s military presence in Libya and granted President Erdoğan broad authority to deploy armed forces until 2028. This mandate allows the President wide discretion over troop numbers and geographic boundaries. This extension highlights Türkiye’s transition from a diplomatic actor to a primary military stakeholder. The government justifies this continued presence as a security necessity, and it cites the ongoing absence of a durable political resolution, the risks posed by foreign fighters, and the vital importance of protecting Turkish maritime interests in the Eastern Mediterranean (Kenez 2025c).
Ankara’s primary intervention in 2019 concentrated solely on backing the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) against Khalifa Haftar’s attack. Türkiye has begun a strategic reconciliation with its former rival, Khalifa Haftar, and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). This change was solidified through diplomatic and military exchanges in 2025. This shift is motivated by the goal of securing the ratification of the 2019 bilateral maritime agreement regarding Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). By gaining the Tobruk-based parliament’s backing of the LNA, Türkiye aims to legitimize its maritime claims against Greece and secure access to eastern Libya’s oil and gas reserves (Michalski 2025).
From the Libyan perspective, the Haftar family is leveraging ties with Ankara to secure international legitimacy and diversify support alongside a militarily weakened Russia. In exchange for potential weapon supplies, including UAVs, and the training of around 1,500 LNA troops, Haftar has given initial guarantees regarding the 2019 maritime deal. Furthermore, improved relations between Türkiye and Egypt have facilitated this wider involvement in eastern Libya while reducing previous political obstacles.
By involving both the Tripoli and Benghazi governments, Ankara aims to diminish Russian political sway and promote a security environment which can alleviate internal conflicts. This approach entails offering military advisers, trainers, and advanced defense technologies to enhance the professionalism of security institutions across Libya. Ankara final objective is, therefore, to ensure that its long-term economic and maritime interests remain protected, regardless of the internal political fragmentation within Libya. This multifaceted approach secures Türkiye’s southern border and cements its position as a primary mediator in the region until 2028 (Tanriverdi Yasar 2025b).
The Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical dynamics have been significantly and frequently disruptively shaped by Turkey’s “Blue Homeland Doctrine.” Ankara makes it plain that it intends to pursue an autonomous maritime strategy defined on its own terms by refusing to recognize UNCLOS and rejecting the Exclusive Economic Zone agreements that Cyprus has formed with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. An especially notable example of this strategy is the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, which essentially circumvents the recognized maritime rights of Greek islands like Crete and Rhodes. The worries voiced by regional players seem well-founded if allegations of a similar agreement with Syria’s new government turn out to be true.
Cyprus has responded with a methodical, multi-layered approach.Nicosia has bolstered regional alliances, actively participated in UN and EU frameworks, encouraged energy cooperation through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and backed the imposition of targeted sanctions when Turkey’s actions blatantly violated the law. At the same time, Cyprus has reminded the UK of its obligations under the 1960 Treaty as a Guarantor Power, which are becoming harder to ignore in the current geopolitical environment (Evriviades 2025).
Greece, however, has turned from declarative policy to tangible measures. Its intentional attempt to strengthen its maritime rights through legal procedures is seen in plans to expand territorial waters and create a second marine protected area in the Aegean. Greece’s stance is grounded in international law and bolstered by European solidarity, while Turkey’s doctrine is seen in Athens as expansionist and undesirable, as Foreign Minister Gerapetritis has emphasized (Yeni Şafak 2026).
Greece and Cyprus are carrying out similar legal and diplomatic measures to oppose Turkish aspirations and safeguard the rules-based order in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Future Military Projection in the Region
In an effort to bridge the gaps left by Assad’s fall and defend its Blue Homeland maritime doctrine, Turkey is strengthening its regional involvement against a Western-backed axis that encompasses Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Ankara worries that its strategic influence will be diminished by multilateral frameworks aimed at Hezbollah’s disarmament. In order to do this, Turkey is interacting with Sunni groups in Lebanon, such as Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah; nevertheless, the U.S. alignment of Syrian authorities and possible tensions with Saudi Arabia continue to hinder mediation efforts (The Arab Weekly 2026). Despite the Turkish parliament’s extension of USIFIL’s mandate for an additional two years, the Defense Ministry still remains committed to bolstering the Lebanese army and ensuring Turkey’s position in the developing Mediterranean security architecture (Gumrukcu 2025).
Turkey is expanding defense alliances around the area on a bilateral level. During discussions at the Armed Forces headquarters with Jordan, the focus was on analyzing regional trends and enhancing military cooperation (Jordan Armed Forces-The Arab Army 2025). More importantly, during President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo, Egypt and Turkey inked a framework military agreement that included a $350 million purchase for the Tolga Short-Range Air Defense System and the development of Egyptian factories for the production of artillery and ammunition. By combining regional security goals and industrial integration, this accord is a revolutionary change in bilateral relations (Middle East Monitor 2026; Soylu 2026).
To conclude, in the last ten years Türkiye has experienced a significant strategic shift, becoming a prominent arms exporter by 2025 due to the swift growth of its local defense sector, supported by companies like Baykar and ASELSAN. This industrial expansion has coincided with the Blue Homeland doctrine, embodying a neo-Ottoman perspective on maritime supremacy and diminished dependence on Western partnerships. Within the country, the breakdown of the peace process in 2015 led to a stringent stance on the Kurdish issue, while the PKK’s dissolution in 2025 indicates a cautious change, hindered by ongoing conflicts regarding Kurdish forces in Syria. Regionally, Türkiye has consistently increased its military footprint in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Gulf, utilizing defense partnerships, training operations, and arms sales to strengthen its influence. Together, these advancements illustrate a practical and flexible grand strategy, merging hard and soft power to establish Türkiye as a key player in a progressively fragmented regional landscape.
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