[REPORT] The Broken Nation: Myanmar’s Struggle Towards a National Identity

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Bryan Kerr Marco

Content Writer, Asian Affairs at The New Global Order

Bryan Kerr is a Filipino who recently graduated with a Bachelor’s degree in Consular and Diplomatic Affairs. He mainly specializes in the fields of international security and defense studies and is currently a freelance researcher and analyst for political and security risk consultancy firms. Before this, he was an intern for the Philippine Coast Guard, as an advisor directly under the Deputy Chief of Coast Guard Staff for International Affairs, where he provided insights to guide policy formulation and decision-making. Bryan Kerr was also a delegate for two Model United Nations events with a few commendations. In 2020, he was also a writer and editor for The Kalinaw Initiative, which was a short-term project he helped found that have similar goals as TNGO.

Latest posts by Bryan Kerr Marco (see all)

• Fold or Call: Is the Philippines’ POGO Problem a National Security Threat? - October 29, 2024
• [REPORT] The Broken Nation: Myanmar’s Struggle Towards a National Identity - July 29, 2024
• BRP Sierra Madre: The Waves of Uncertainty Surrounding the Sentry of the Second Thomas Shoal - May 29, 2024

Identity is something we don’t think about very often, but it influences how we act and interact in our daily lives in various ways. Friendship groups, corporate offices, and many other organizations have distinct identities–even nations. Similarly, nations can experience identity crises; one such country is Myanmar. Myanmar has been embroiled in an ongoing ethnic war since its inception, fueled by inequity and brutal persecution. This changed in 2021, when the Tatmadaw, the country’s military, gained control for the second time, sparking civil war. Although ethnic tensions have not ceased, a semblance of unity–an identity–is emerging.

To understand Myanmar’s conflict is to know its people and history. This article will neither focus on the recent coup d’etat nor the ongoing civil war. Rather, it addresses Myanmar’s struggle towards the creation of an unifying identity. Regardless, it can be said that the ongoing civil war will determine not only the future of Myanmar, but its identity to live on as one united nation. 

Troubled Beginnings

Myanmar is a Southeast Asian country sitting along the Indian Ocean, surrounded by India to the west, China to the north, and Thailand to the east. As of present, there are 135 ethnic groups recognized in the country. It is difficult to determine the demographics of Myanmar due to varying statistical data (Drennan 2014). However, they can be grouped into eight encompassing groups: the Bamar (Burman), Karen (Kayin), Rakhine, Shan, Mon, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, and other non categorized minorities. The Bamar, specifically, are the dominant group by a large margin (Pritzker Legal Research Center n.d.). 

There is little known about the histories of each ethnic group in Myanmar. However, some contend that the concept of ethnicity in pre-colonial Myanmar was never fixed but rather fluid. Even though many minority groups were placed under the supervision of the Bamar majority, some minorities were granted autonomy to reign within their territories (Lieberman 2021). Meanwhile, individuals outside the Bamar dynasty were free from subjugation. Ethnic disputes, such as the Bamar-Karen rivalry, persisted but did not result in significant grievances (Zeiner-Morrish 2022). Simply put, pre-colonial Myanmar produced an environment of self-governance that undermined unity.

The British colonial presence that began in 1824 exacerbated existing tensions and shattered any pretense of unity. The British capitalized on existing ethnic problems by strengthening rivalries. Furthermore, the British politically supported certain minorities and granted them power over their old rulers, such as the Bamars. These privileged minority groups living in the so-called Frontier Areas were given more freedom from direct authority. Essentially, by politicizing and militarizing their disputes, the British established demarcations between the various ethnicities (Rutherford 2018, Dy 2024).

The solidified differences inflamed pre-colonial ethnic dynamics, creating a climate of distrust rather than solidarity. Furthermore, these groups solidified their own unique identities during this period of self-governance. This fostered hostility toward one another. The hostility that arose during this period will effectively influence Myanmar’s internal dynamics far into the future. 

Religious and ideological beliefs would also be significant factors. The former was compounded by the colonial era, undermining Buddhism’s dominance in Myanmar. When Islam and Christianity arrived in Myanmar, many minorities abandoned Buddhism due to their animosity toward the Bamar people (The Asian Foundation 2017). Meanwhile, the British favored ethnic groups that converted to Christianity, granting them more privileges (Ghelani 2019). These precedents sparked a rebirth of Buddhist nationalism to preserve dominance over other communities (Yutthaworakool 2017). Simultaneously, ideological divisions added another dimension to the ethnic split. (Min Ye Paing Hein 2016). Even before gaining independence, Myanmar had been shattered into several fragments.

By the time WW2 came to Asia in 1941, these harbored rivalries would appear on the frontlines. The Bamars would fight alongside the Japanese to attain freedom from the British, while ethnic minorities would fight under the British for the same reasons (Smith and Martin 2010). Later on, the former would be disillusioned by the Japanese and change sides. Three years post-war, these unresolved issues led to an ineffective independent government. By 1948, the world’s longest intrastate conflict began with the immediate disintegration of a newly-independent nation (Marston 2023).

This section shows the conflict’s root lies in complexity covered by layers of other factors. Nevertheless, what can be inferred from all of this is that the environment Myanmar was originally placed in was disadvantageous to the formation of a national identity. The resultant lack of belonging was fueled by mistrust, and therefore, there was no sense of unity. Yet, it is this disunited free-for-all that would set the stage for opportunistic actors to take matters into their own hands to usher in unity and stability. That would come in the form of the Tatmadaw—Myanmar’s armed forces.

A Nation Shattered and Oppressed

Given the preceding consideration of various historical factors, it is vital to identify what constitutes a national identity. Even before independence, Myanmar’s central government made multiple attempts to establish a national identity, but all were unsuccessful (Bellamy 2016). According to Francis Fukuyama, identities can be formed by a set of lived and shared experiences. He believes that external influences such as environment and shared history influence how people perceive themselves (Fukuyama 2018). When similar experiences are confined to one another, what emerges is a group identity. This notion relates to a sense of belonging that exists among a group of individuals who share the same culture, traditions, and many other characteristics (Petric 2020).

When placed within the context of Myanmar’s ongoing conflict, it provides a fundamental explanation as to why there are so many factions. When a group with similar identities is endangered, that group is more likely to confront those attempting to repress them (Mele and Siegel 2017). In effect, this instability prompted the Tatmadaw to stage a coup in 1962. The regime would declare that their takeover is intended to maintain national unity (Taylor 2015). Under Ne Win’s regime from 1962 to 1988, he created his own ideology he referred to as the “Burmese Way of Socialism,” which attempted not only to introduce rigid economic policies but to instill nationalism under one unified culture (Htoo and Waters 2024). 

Ne Win’s coup d’etat against U Nu’s civilian government was fuelled by the latter’s perceived weakness in managing conflicts and the economic situation. The military feared that federalism would undercut the Bamars’ dominance and risk the secession of minorities (US Office of the Historian 1962). This would pave the door for Burmanization, which is a policy that refers to the use of brutal force to remove and replace minority ethnic identities (Bella n.d.).

In reflection, one could assert that the Tatmadaw’s approach to nation-building is through force. Benedict Anderson famously described nations as imagined communities of individuals with similar identities–a social construct. He posited that it is the mental image of a nation that constricts it and leads to the majority discriminating between who’s a part of the nation and who is not (Anderson, 1983). This is evident in how hardliners in Myanmar prop up Buddhist nationalism and Bamar supremacy, which have been forcefully ingrained into their society (Minn Tent Bo 2023). 

In relation, some minorities do not discriminate between the Bamar majority and the Tatmadaw, as they are both regarded the same (Ramsbotham and Wennman 2014). However, it is misleading to generalize that the Tatmadaw is purely made up of a single entity. Instead, due to the several layers added to Myanmar’s ethnic split, some armed ethnic groups have allied with the Tatmadaw and instill similar policies against minorities (Grafecco 2024). 

During the dictatorship, attempts to forcefully assimilate minorities have led to more instability and economic degradation (Central Intelligence Agency 1966). When the contemporary approach failed, the new regime in 1988 under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later the State Peace Development Council (SPDC), pacified and assimilated groups individually (Concilation Resources n.d.). The regime changed the name from Burma to Myanmar to better represent a national identity and reflect the ethnic diversity, which continues to go unrecognized by minorities who do not identify themselves as part of the nation (Thoe Than Aung 2019). This is in response to their alienation by the state.

Hence, successive governments failed to instill a sense of unity due to the ongoing perpetuation of inequality and repression, even after the restoration of democracy in 2010 (Lynn 2020). A few argue that Myanmar was never a nation to begin with. Rather, it is a collection of different groups forcefully trapped by a regime (Gagnon and Paul 2021). However, the continuing civil war in Myanmar since 2021, albeit ethnic in nature, is not solely motivated by ethnic conflict.

In actuality, the motive of the coup d’etat is debated. Some claim that the Tatmadaw feared losing authority and influence as the country’s political reforms proceeded steadily. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that the Tatmadaw did not benefit from the coup and subsequent civil war. (Lian Bawi Thang 2023). With these factors, the Tatmadaw’s coup immediately reignited old disputes and created new ones. Although mostly ineffective, the military’s actions ended hopes for reconciliation after a decade of continued peace talks (International Crisis Group 2022). 

Yet, if this is indeed the case, then how come recent reports indicate a sense of unity forming between the resistance against the regime in the ongoing civil war? To recall, identities form when several individuals share the same experience and characteristics. With that newly-formed identity comes unity–-a nation. What effectively united a disunited country like Myanmar is the very notion of subjugation and the pursuit of freedom.

A New Identity Forged in Fire

In August 1988, after months of protests, the then-capital, Rangoon, was almost overrun by pro-democracy protesters initially made up of students. Momentarily, the lines between differing identities were removed as minorities joined in to support the protesters. The 8888 Uprising was not the sole example of this; between 2007 and 2008, the Saffron Revolution happened, which was primarily a Buddhist-led protest. Then before the civil war in 2021, the Spring Revolution occurred with all the same scenes (Irrawaddy 2013, Meixler 2018, Vrieze 2022). 

One might ask that, if pro-democracy movements united these peoples, why did the democratic government failed to establish unity? The answer is due to the democratic government’s lackluster efforts to negotiate the demands of minorities, especially establishing federalism. Additionally, ethnic repression continued, specifically, the genocide of Rohingya Muslims (Kurlantzick 2018, Solomon 2017). At the same time, the Tatmadaw still maintained influence in the civilian government via the 2008 Constitution. Effectively, what Myanmar had between 2011 to 2021 was an illiberal democracy, wracked with an abundance of issues (Thiha 2020, David, Myat, and Holliday 2023).

Dankwart Rustow argued that there exists a sequence towards democratization, and preceding all of this is the formation of a national identity. He believes that without such, divisions may appear, which democracy would not be able to completely resolve. Rustow added that the timing and means of achieving this identity are irrelevant, as this requirement is only met if the populace accepts the identity unconsciously (Rustow 1970). Further, others argue that ethnic national identities, compared to a civic national identity, can cause instability within a democracy (Beissinger 2008). 

In tandem, the 8888 Uprising, the Saffron Revolution, and the Spring Revolution were shows of civil resistance. These civil resistance movements draw their power by amassing a diverse support base. These movements provide a chance for different people across society to incubate unity (Delgado 2022). In the case of these pro-democracy movements, what attracted both the Bamar majority and non-Bamar minorities was the shared experience of being oppressed by the Tatmadaw. Specifically, Myanmar’s youth rarely distinguish their ethnic identity apart from a national identity, and are less likely to espouse the regime’s ideology post-coup (Chang and Jap 2023). 

Currently, four years into the civil war, reports of the Tatmadaw’s defeats at the hands of a united resistance movement and defections are becoming all too common (Kurlantzic 2024). At the helm of the resistance is Myanmar’s government-in-exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), which promises to establish a democratic government that is inclusive of all ethnic minorities (Oo 2024). This conflict mobilized people across different groups with the uniting goal of ousting the Tatmadaw regime (Ioanes 2023). 

Post-coup, the Spring Revolution led to wide-scale protests that created a rare moment of unity across Myanmar’s society in opposition to the regime (Bynum 2021). Years prior to the coup and civil war, news of military and government oppression against minorities rarely provoked reactions among the Bamar people, but this changed post-coup (Fishbein and Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2021). Gravely, the Tatmadaw miscalculated the response of not only the minorities, but their major support base, the Bamar people. The aforementioned younger generations who lived under an era of liberalization for the past decade now demand freedom (Bandow 2024). 

Of course, it is not known whether the NUG will survive the conflict or be effective in establishing a democratic and multi-ethnic government. It is also unknown if the Tatmadaw’s continued defeats will end the civil war shortly. What is clear is that decades of intrastate conflict in Myanmar, fueled by issues in ethnicity, religion, ideology, and various other things, have a chance to finally cease. 

The ongoing conflict is the clearest opportunity in the entirety of Myanmar’s existence as an independent state for the country to form a shared national identity. The constant struggle, back and forth repressions, and mistrust were effectively ended by the threat of oppression. If this emerging unity remains intact and further develops, there can be a chance for peace and democratization. This conflict’s end may very well determine whether or not Myanmar will become a nation that identifies itself as wholly united in its diversity. 

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