[REPORT] The Broken Nation: Myanmar’s Struggle Towards a National Identity

Bryan Kerr Marco
Hunger Games inspired three-finger salute of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. Source: Wall Street Journal

Identity is often treated as an abstract concept, yet it fundamentally shapes political behavior, social cohesion, and collective action. From small communities to modern states, identity informs how groups define belonging and loyalty. Nations, like individuals, can experience identity crises when shared values and narratives fail to take root. Myanmar exemplifies this condition. Since its founding, the country has been plagued by ethnic conflict, authoritarian rule, and systemic exclusion. The military coup of 2021 reignited civil war, but paradoxically, it also produced early signs of a shared national identity forged through collective resistance.

This article does not primarily analyze the 2021 coup or the ongoing conflict. Instead, it examines Myanmar’s historical struggle to form a cohesive national identity and assesses whether the current civil war has altered that trajectory. Myanmar’s crisis is not solely political or military. It is deeply rooted in questions of identity, belonging, and state legitimacy.

Troubled Beginnings

Demographic map of Myanmar. Source: ReliefWeb

Myanmar’s identity crisis stems from its complex demographic and historical foundations. The country is home to 135 officially recognized ethnic groups, although demographic data remains imprecise (Drennan 2014). These groups are commonly grouped into eight major clusters: Bamar (Burman), Karen (Kayin), Rakhine, Shan, Mon, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, and various unclassified minorities. The Bamar constitute the dominant group (Pritzker Legal Research Center n.d.).

Before colonial rule, ethnic identities in Myanmar were relatively fluid. While the Bamar exercised political dominance, many minority groups maintained significant autonomy within their territories (Lieberman 2021). Although rivalries existed, particularly between the Bamar and Karen, these tensions did not solidify into systemic or institutionalized grievances (Zeiner-Morrish 2022). However, this decentralized political arrangement also limited the emergence of a unified political identity.

Assault on Danubyu during the First Anglo-Burmese War. Source: National Army Museum

The British colonial presence that began in 1824 exacerbated existing tensions and shattered any pretense of unity. The British capitalized on existing ethnic problems by strengthening rivalries. Furthermore, the British politically supported certain minorities and granted them power over their old rulers, such as the Bamars. These privileged minority groups living in the so-called Frontier Areas were given more freedom from direct authority. Essentially, by politicizing and militarizing their disputes, the British established demarcations between the various ethnicities (Rutherford 2018, Dy 2024).

The solidified differences inflamed pre-colonial ethnic dynamics, creating a climate of distrust rather than solidarity. Furthermore, these groups solidified their own unique identities during this period of self-governance. This fostered hostility toward one another. The hostility that arose during this period will effectively influence Myanmar’s internal dynamics far into the future. 

British colonization beginning in 1824 fundamentally altered this balance. Colonial authorities deepened ethnic divisions by empowering minority groups over traditional Bamar elites and granting the Frontier Areas separate administrative status (Rutherford 2018; Dy 2024). By politicizing ethnicity and institutionalizing difference, colonial rule hardened social boundaries that had previously been negotiable. Identity became rigid, and mistrust became entrenched.

Religion further fragmented society. The introduction of Christianity and Islam led many minority communities, already resentful of Bamar political dominance, to distance themselves from Buddhism (The Asia Foundation 2017). British preference for Christian converts intensified resentment and inequality (Ghelani 2019). In response, Buddhist nationalism emerged among the Bamar, reinforcing ideological polarization (Yutthaworakool 2017). By the time of independence, Myanmar’s ethnic and ideological landscape was deeply fractured (Min Ye Paing Hein 2016).

World War II compounded these divisions. Bamar nationalists allied with Japan in pursuit of independence, while many minority groups fought alongside British forces (Smith and Martin 2010). The war’s aftermath left grievances unresolved and promises unfulfilled, weakening the post-independence government. By 1948, Myanmar descended into what would become the world’s longest-running intrastate conflict (Marston 2023).

This historical context reveals why a shared national identity failed to emerge. Autonomy preceded unity, mistrust displaced belonging, and grievances accumulated across generations. These conditions created space for the Tatmadaw to claim legitimacy as the sole institution capable of imposing order and unity.

A Nation Shattered and Oppressed

General Ne Win, Myanmar’s first dictator. Source: The New Mandala

Efforts at nation-building in post-independence Myanmar consistently failed. Early governments attempted to foster unity but lacked the institutional capacity and political trust required to succeed (Bellamy 2016). National identity, as Francis Fukuyama argues, emerges from shared experiences and collective narratives that define group membership (Fukuyama 2018). In fragmented societies, external threats often produce solidarity, but in Myanmar, threats were perceived unevenly across ethnic lines, resulting in fragmented self-defense rather than collective action (Mele and Siegel 2017).

In 1962, General Ne Win seized power, claiming that military rule was necessary to preserve national unity (Taylor 2015). His “Burmese Way to Socialism” sought to impose homogeneity through authoritarian governance, economic isolation, and cultural assimilation (Htoo and Waters 2024). The Tatmadaw rejected federalism, fearing it would empower minorities and weaken Bamar dominance. Instead, it pursued Burmanization, a systematic effort to suppress minority identities and replace them with Bamar Buddhist norms (US Office of the Historian 1962; Bella n.d.).

Tatmadaw-led nation-building relied on coercion rather than consent. Benedict Anderson’s concept of nations as imagined communities helps explain how Bamar nationalism and Buddhist supremacy became embedded in state ideology (Anderson 1983; Minn Tent Bo 2023). However, for many minorities, the state became synonymous with repression. Crucially, minority communities often failed to distinguish between the Tatmadaw and the Bamar population, viewing both as complicit actors (Ramsbotham and Wennman 2014). At the same time, the Tatmadaw was not internally uniform. Some minority armed groups collaborated with the military and committed similar abuses (Grafecco 2024).

1988, the Tatmadaw confronts pro-democratic protesters in Rangoon during the 8888 Uprising. Source: The Irrawaddy

Assimilationist policies destabilized the state and contributed to economic decline (CIA 1966). After the 1988 uprising, the regime shifted toward negotiating separate ceasefires with selected ethnic armed organizations, fragmenting resistance and consolidating military control (Conciliation Resources n.d.). The renaming of Burma to Myanmar was intended to signal inclusivity, but many minorities rejected the change, viewing it as imposed by an illegitimate regime (Thoe Than Aung 2019).

Democratic reforms after 2011 failed to dismantle structural inequality or military dominance (Lynn 2020). Some scholars argue that Myanmar functioned less as a nation-state and more as a coerced conglomeration of unwilling groups (Gagnon and Paul 2021). The 2021 coup, widely interpreted as an attempt by the Tatmadaw to preserve political power, reignited conflict nationwide and collapsed ongoing peace processes (Lian Bawi Thang 2023; International Crisis Group 2022).

A New Identity Forged in Fire

Mass protests in Yangon during the Spring Revolution in February 2021, post-coup. Source: Frontier Myanmar

Despite this history, Myanmar has experienced moments of cross-ethnic solidarity during major uprisings, including the 1988 protests, the 2007 Saffron Revolution, and the immediate aftermath of the 2021 coup (Irrawaddy 2013; Meixler 2018; Vrieze 2022). However, earlier movements failed to produce durable unity. Democratic governments struggled to accommodate minority demands, particularly regarding federalism. Ethnic repression persisted, including the Rohingya genocide (Kurlantzick 2018; Solomon 2017). The 2008 Constitution entrenched military power, resulting in an illiberal democratic system (Thiha 2020; David, Myat, and Holliday 2023).

Dankwart Rustow argues that democratization requires a pre-existing national identity, without which democratic institutions struggle to resolve divisions (Rustow 1970). Others caution that ethnic rather than civic nationalism undermines democratic stability (Beissinger 2008). Yet civil resistance can generate new forms of solidarity rooted in shared experience rather than institutional design (Delgado 2022).

The post-2021 civil war has produced such conditions. Shared suffering under military rule has reshaped perceptions, particularly among younger generations. Ethnic distinctions have become less salient among youth, who overwhelmingly reject the Tatmadaw’s ideology and legitimacy (Chang and Jap 2023). The Tatmadaw now faces battlefield defeats, defections, and eroding authority (Kurlantzick 2024).

The National Unity Government has emerged as a focal point of resistance, pledging to establish a federal democratic system inclusive of minorities (Oo 2024). The civil war has mobilized diverse actors around a single objective: ending military rule (Ioanes 2023). Cross-ethnic solidarity has expanded, and Bamar attitudes toward minority suffering have shifted significantly. Atrocities once ignored now provoke widespread outrage and resistance (Fishbein and Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2021). The Tatmadaw miscalculated the loyalty of its traditional base, particularly Bamar youth (Bandow 2024).

Whether the National Unity Government survives or the Tatmadaw collapses remains uncertain. What is clear is that the conflict has generated the strongest foundation for a shared national identity in Myanmar’s history.

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[REPORT] The Broken Natio…

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