- (Analysis) Yemen: New Prospects After January 2026 - 27 March, 2026
Yemen became a key country on the international stage when, on 19 November 2023, the Houthi group, controlling Yemen’s north, attacked and captured the cargo ship Galaxy Leader, headed through the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. During the next two years, the attacks on ships, a response to the Israeli “Operation Iron Swords”, would be nearly one hundred, reducing in frequency in 2025, and ceasing in the autumn of the same year.
Only two months later, on 2 December 2025, the world woke up to a new Yemeni conflict. This time the news came from the south, where the secessionist group known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and backed by the United Arab Emirates, had started an advance which, within a week, would lead them to control most of the southern Yemeni territory. The Internationally Recognised Government (IRG), run by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and backed by Saudi Arabia, would quickly strike back, leading on 9 January 2026 to the dissolution of the STC.
The aim of this analysis is to review the events of the past three months and delineate Yemen’s new prospects after January 2026, as it remains a key geopolitical pivot, at the intersection of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and of Saudi, Emirati, and Iranian interests.
Source: Hardscarf / Wikimedia Commons, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
The Southern Yemen Campaign
Southern Yemen, nominally under IRG control, has been for years de facto split among different actors and areas of influence. The STC originated as a splint of the Southern Movement, which since 2007 had been pushing for an independent Southern Yemen, which existed prior to the 1990 unification. Other groups include the tribal confederations, especially in the west, as well as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The STC, backed informally but substantially by the UAE, has engaged in occasional hostile behaviour, such as the takeover of the island of Socotra in 2020, and has pursued their secessionist interests against IRG, tribal, and AQAP interests. In 2025, the STC focused its attention on the Hadhramaut region, claiming that the Houthis, as well as AQAP, were using it as a smuggling corridor. As Saudi-backed local tribal alliances fortified the oil-producing area, the STC began amassing troops, leading to the 2 December 2025 offensive.
Source: جسور نيوز / Wikimedia Commons, licensed under CC BY 4.0
The conflict proper can be divided into two sections: the STC offensive constitutes a first phase, which in around a week, on 9 December 2025, led the group to control approximately 90% of Southern Yemen. The IRG counteroffensive followed, with the help of Saudi Arabia, starting in January 2026, and lead to the seize of Aden on 7 January and the dissolution of the STC on 9 January (although their leaders fled to the UAE). The IRG achieved complete control of previously STC areas on 10 January.
Reactions to the Campaign
Saudi Arabia initially acted diplomatically, calling for the STC to cease the escalation and withdraw from the seized territory. The first commitment came on 30 December 2025, as a Saudi coalition airstrike on al-Mukalla port hit two UAE vessels allegedly delivering weapons and vehicles to the STC. The support continued throughout the January counteroffensive, especially through airstrikes. After the attack on al-Mukalla, Riyadh was very open about its accusations towards the UAE. With the UAE out of the picture, Saudi Arabia will try to take advantage of its influence on the Presidential Leadership Council to reform Southern Yemeni political and military structures. A new PLC Cabinet has already been formed, which will be outlined below. However, it is important to remember that, while the STC was the strongest faction in Yemeni politics, it was not the only one, as tribal interests and smaller factional loyalties remain a dividing factor.
The UAE supported the STC through the Security Belt Forces and Elite Forces, according to ACLED, although its foreign ministry always rejected Saudi accusations and called for stability and development in Yemen. Crucially, after the fall of the STC, the UAE withdrew its forces from the Yemeni territory, as well as from the islands of Socotra and Perim. The two major losses for the UAE are those of the ports of Aden and al-Mukalla. The UAE is now virtually out of the competition for influence in Southern Yemen.
The Houthis did not react significantly to the crisis and maintained their posture of enmity towards both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which they accused of engaging in divide-and-rule politics. Between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the Houthis show a stronger dislike toward the former due to its closer ties with Israel. Before 2023, the international situation might have favoured an agreement and peace settlement between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia; however, with the UAE out of the picture, the Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping with the ensuing American designation of the group as a terrorist organisation have complicated the matters. Talks can now happen only through backchannels. The current Israeli and American engagement against Iran will also make rapprochement more complicated, as the group remains within the Iranian sphere of influence.
Northern Yemen: The New Houthi Approach
The last Houthi attack on shipping took place in September 2025, following a Houthi declaration in July that the attacks would escalate. Such an escalation ceased quickly. Houthi prime minister al-Rahawi, as well as much of the government, was killed by an Israeli strike in August, signalling stronger Israeli intelligence capabilities, following initial struggles to locate the headquarters of the Houthi government. Secondly, Chief of Staff al-Ghamari was killed in October, once again proving the growing capabilities of Israeli intelligence.
In November 2025, General al-Madani announced a halt to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, following the 3 October 2025 Gaza ceasefire. Despite al-Madani’s declaration that “if the enemy resumes its aggression against Gaza” the halt would be reversed, no attack took place after the announcement, and the last one occurred four days before the ceasefire agreement, on 29 September. Traffic through Bab-el-Mandeb resumed in December 2025, with shipping company CMA CGM announcing that they would be faring through the Red Sea.
Throughout December 2025 and January 2026, the Houthis shifted their approach to a closer focus on Somaliland (including threats to the Israeli presence there) and expressed their interest in controlling both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In December, CENTCOM killed one of the key personalities in Houthi drone warfare. All considered, the Houthi approach has been one of general de-escalation, of observation of the developments in the south, and of reorganisation after a second half of 2025 which saw many of their most eminent figures killed.
Future Prospects: A New War in Yemen?
The first scenario is linked to the reorganisation of Southern Yemen. Formed on 10 January 2026, the Supreme Military Committee (SMC) intends to centralise military activity under the PLC and Saudi Arabia. A major obstacle remains in formerly STC-controlled areas, where many secessionist activists still retain their weapons. The Security Belt Forces and the Support and Reinforcement Brigades, once UAE-supported armed wings of the STC, have been brought under PLC control, but tribal groups and confederations remain independently armed. Yemen sees weapons as a key cultural element: it is one of the countries with the highest rates of gun possession.
The new PLC Cabinet expresses the same desire of centralisation on the political side of the spectrum. With ten more members than its predecessor (from 25 to 35), the Cabinet seeks to integrate all domestic interests, particularly after the main opposition group, the STC, was ousted from the political process. Three of the new members are women. The Cabinet’s first priority is building a united front within Southern Yemen, a task that has proved complex to accomplish. Opposition is strong in areas with high tribal relevance, such as Hadhramaut, where protests followed the new Cabinet’s formation. Non-state actors, such as AQAP, remain in the east, and while the STC has been dissolved, many still believe in the ideals it fought for. The crucial point in secessionist activism is Saudi support: Saudi Arabia will pay salaries for soldiers and government bills in Yemen at least for one year, which is seen as a threat to Southern Yemen’s independence.
While Southern Yemen’s attempt to unify its political landscape is certainly a uphill battle, the elimination of the STC from the country, and the UAE as its sponsor, has eradicated the issue of an organised and armed alternative in IRG leadership in Southern Yemen. The ultimate task for unity, however, is linked to the north, where the majority of the Yemeni population lives under control of the Houthis. IRG Prime Minister al-Samei declared that, once well established in the south, the intention of the new PLC is to push into the north and recapture it from the Houthis.
Is a New War Coming to Yemen?
The IRG certainly has the intention to attack the Houthis once unity in Southern Yemen is achieved. The timeline for a conflict, however, is dilated. The SMC was formed only two months ago, and it is still far from achieving the cohesion necessary for attacking the Houthis, which from the Southern point of view have only persisted through the years because of the division of their opponents. On the other hand, the Houthis are emboldened by their resistance (albeit with a few losses during the last year) to not only Yemeni, but to American and British attacks. They believe that a sustained attack on Saudi interests and oil fields will likely result in a de-escalation on the Yemeni side, which relies heavily on Saudi money for its internal mechanisms. It is thus unlikely that the Houthis attack first, although it would benefit them in a full-out conflict.
The current American-Israeli bombing of Iran, along with the Iranian response, complicates the Yemeni scenery. Prior to the strikes, some analyses predicted that the Houthis would likely resume attacks on shipping through Bab-el-Mandeb, given their alliance with the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance. This would probably move the attention back to the Houthi group, and create a problem of saturation for Israeli defences. Luca Nevola, from ACLED, commented on the Houthi’s response to the strikes which has not yet happened in a concrete way. While responses towards Saudi territory are to be excluded, as backchannel Saudi-Houthi discussions are underway, UAE objectives could be plausible, as well as a controlled escalation strategy. It is important to note that while the Houthis’ belonging to the Axis is public and advertised by the group itself in its media, such as al-Masirah, they maintain a keen desire for independent agency and policy. A strong escalation, even to defend Iran, is to be excluded, as the Israeli and American response would constitute an uneven trade-off. At the moment, Houthi media alternate between Ramadan lectures and condemnations of American-Israeli actions, but do not promise or hint at a military response in support of Iran.
Source: Avash Media / Wikimedia Commons, licensed under CC BY‑SA 4.0
Key takeaways
- The December-January conflict in Southern Yemen eliminated the UAE-backed STC, leaving the Saudi-backed PLC in a prime position to control the country. Despite strong efforts to unify the south of the country, with a new cabinet and a reorganised military structure under the SMC, the road is still uphill as disorganised remains of the STC, as well as tribal resistance and local interests, make unity hard to achieve in Southern Yemen.
- In the north of the country, the Houthis, after losing some of their most eminent personalities following strikes in the second half of 2025, have chosen to silently observe the evolutions in the south, emboldened by their resistance to American and British strikes, but careful not to provoke more. They remain engaged against Israel in the Somaliland theatre through propaganda and threats. They could plausibly resume their attacks on shipping after the Israeli-American strikes on Iran, but in a controlled, careful manner. They have not signalled the intention to do so.
- While the dissolution of the STC does make a conflict in Yemen more probable, the Houthis’ emboldened stance and unwillingness to engage prematurely, as well as Southern disunity, mean that the timeline for a clash is unclear.
Suggested readings
- On the new PLC Cabinet: UAE Allies Sacked as Saudi-Backed Politicians Tighten Grip on Yemen’s Government
- U.S. Naval Institute Report on Yemen: Report to Congress on Yemen and Red Sea Security – USNI News
- On the Houthi Red Sea Campaign: Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis’ Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
