DF-41, the newest generation of ICBM rolling out on the parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Communist Party of China (CCP), Oct. 01. 2019. Source: The Washinton Times
Amidst the boiling world tension, China is rapidly increasing its nuclear stockpile, making it possess the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. The recent satellite images revealed that hundreds of additional silos are being built across North-Central China to accommodate the ever-expanding stockpile of nuclear missiles. Though such a trend might be perceived as normal for a revanchist state like China, this is directly opposed to the traditional approach of China’s nuclear doctrinal thought aimed at an absolute minimum deterrence capacity. Thus, the situation posed a crucial question: why has China embarked on its nuclear frenzy now? This raised two questions: First, what factors contributed to China’s threat perception which pumped its rapid nuclear expansion; second, judging from China’s current revanchist goal to claim Taiwan, how the increased China’s nuclear deterrence capacity might affect the US strategists?
To answer the first question, we have to examine Chinese nuclear deterrence thoughts since its inception, and how these have been affected by the external security environment in recent decades. This endeavor will heavily rely on the grey literature: publications and opinion pieces by Chinese authors through RAND Corporation publications. And for the second question, will be based on the testimony by Caitlin Lee, senior Political Scientist, presented before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which highlighted a list of concerns by the US strategists.
Air dome covering a newly constructed missile silo somewhere in North-Central China. Source: FAS
On China’s Nuclear Doctrine
China, when compared to other nuclear states, got its hands on nuclear weapons relatively late; it only began to test its first nuke in 1967. Before that, China often showed a dismissive attitude toward nuclear capacity, which could be traced back to Chairman Mao Zedong’s view of such weapons as nothing less than a “paper tiger”. This attitude would later change, as US officials excessively employed the nuclear retaliation threat to deter Chinese military venture across the 1950s, from the Korean War to the first Taiwan trait crisis. Subsequently, these events incentivized China to develop its warhead as a response. However, unlike the US, which seriously experimented with the theory of how to incorporate nuclear weapons in both its tactical and strategic warfighting capacity, Chinese strategists thought of nuclear weapons in terms of a political tool on the international stage.
This was reflected in the period after the first nuclear detonation test which was marked by a minimal increase in the warhead. Meanwhile, the military service that holds majority control over the nuclear weapon, the Second Artillery Corps, received neither political nor economic attention when compared to the big three Chinese military triads; People Liberation Army (PLA), People Liberation Air Force (PLAF), and People Liberation Navy (PLN). Initial Chinese thought emphasized two concepts: the no-first-use policy and second-strike capability; the latter aim is to inflict damage on the enemy’s economic activities, and military command, hoping to maximize the psychological effect, to make China anorexia for the nuclear strike. This notion was supported by the remark of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1957, which stated that China’s nuclear development should aim to resolve the nuclear threat, not be solely a nuclear arms race.
A China propaganda piece, depicting Chinese people cheering upon China’s first atomic detonation. The picture symbolizes China being a great power. Oct. 16. 1964. Source: SCMP
Why does China increase its nuclear capacity now?
In 2015, the Second Artillery Corps was elevated from the service under the PLA to being its own military branch equal to the PLA and PLN; this signaled an increased commitment of China to nuclear weapons. This move was also accompanied by the rapid expansion of the nuclear stockpile and the modernization of its delivery system. There are two main explanations for this erratic behavior: changes in the external security environment, and China’s growing status on the world stage.
First, on changing the external security environment. Before the 2010s, Chinese writers and academics usually described the environment surrounding China as a calm and stable region with minimum prospect of conflict. This attitude changed around the beginning of the 2010s when Chinese authors attributed the disturbance of peace in China’s periphery area to the ever-increasing provocative actions taken by its neighboring countries which infringed on China’s territorial rights. For example, Japan’s effort to nationalize the disputed Senkaku Islands. However, a particular emphasis was placed on enclosing U.S.-led alliances, and the deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) on its allied soil. It was this BMD system that troubled the Chinese analysts the most; the system can neutralize China’s second strike capacity, thus, compromising Chinese nuclear doctrine.
Second, Chinese analysts believed that the cause of the increasing antagonizing behavior displayed by the U.S. originated from the narrowing down of the Sino-U.S. power balance. Subsequently, the U.S. is trying to scramble strategies to contain China’s rise, which will threaten the U.S. hegemonic position on the world stage. To amend this, Chinese analysts argued, China must increase its power to reach a certain threshold that makes the U.S. feel that its containment strategy is unsustainable, thus leading to a policy of accommodating China’s rise. For this reason, Nuclear weapons are viewed as a political tool to create a perception of strength, forcing U.S. strategists to reconsider their foreign policy approach toward China.
Japanese BMD system developed by the U.S. Source: Nikkei
What’s next?
Assessing the variables above, it can be postulated that China will keep enhancing its atomic stockpile both qualitatively and quantitively as a reaction against what Beijing may perceive as provocative neighbors. Meanwhile, the no-first-use policy is increasingly being omitted from various recent Chinese white papers, making the experts believe China is hinting at the possibility of using its nuke to defend its territorial claims. In this case, China will likely use its nuclear threat to deter a possible U.S. intervention in the future Taiwan Strait crisis, or if it fails, then China can still use a threat to delay U.S. military aid.
On the technical side, China will try to devise a way to counter the BMD system in order to restore the second strike capacity; the obvious route is to overwhelm the system with sheer numbers of missiles. In this scenario, the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) will be deployed in higher numbers in the coming years. However, more subtle methods might also be considered, for example, China can pour more resources into its hypersonic missile research, hoping that its speed will be superior to that of BMD.
MIRV Source: Drishti IAS
Despite the fear of a new nuclear arms race, all evidence indicated that China is only looking for limited deterrence rather than nuclear parity with the U.S. Assuming that the second strike capacity is being fully restored, the U.S. would not be able to use its nuclear capacity to blackmail China. In this regard, China would maintain a limited number of Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that can reach U.S. soil; the numbers would be high enough to cause a psychological effect on the U.S. planners, but insufficient for true annihilation.
The map details the range of different types of China’s missiles. Source: MissileThreat
On future Taiwan Strait conflict
In a way, China’s nuclear weapons garnered concern among U.S. planners. They realized that they could not use the maximum forces when combating China or making unnecessary strikes against the Chinese homeland, which could result in nuclear escalation. This uneasy scenario is forcing the U.S. to forge a subtle strategy that aims to coerce China to negotiate. The U.S. planners came up with the concept of “deterrence by denial”. This strategy aimed to inflict massive damages on Chinese invasion forces, which would convince China that victory was likely untenable and too costly, thus agreeing to settle a war on the negotiating table. If such a retaliation attack on the invasion forces was not sufficient, the strategy calls for the strike of limited numbers of China’s military assets along the coastline. The logic behind this strategy is that the U.S. must coerce China into the negotiating table as quickly as possible since the prospect of a protracted war can generate tension, which may eventually spiral down into Nuclear exchange.
Further readings:
- China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrence: Major Diver and Issues for the United States. RAND Corps. Mar. 15. 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html
- From Minimum to Limited Deterrence: China’s Nuclear Build-up and Future Implications. Asia Pacific Leadership Network. May. 2023. https://www.apln.network/analysis/policy-briefs/from-minimum-to-limited-deterrence-chinas-nuclear-build-up-and-future-implications
- Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Jan. 15. 2024. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/
